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Abstract 
 
Approximately 40% of the world’s ice-free land has lost its original natural habitat cover 
to other land uses, such as croplands and pastures, which poses major challenges to 
conservation. Many conservation strategies have been developed to halt or compensate 
for past or future natural habitat loss, but the effectiveness of such strategies remains 
poorly understood. This thesis explores how an emerging conservation scheme can result 
in effective conservation gains. I use The Environmental Reserve Quota (or CRA; 
Portuguese acronym) within The Brazilian Forest Code as a case study – the largest forest 
offset scheme in the world. Under this scheme, landowners must offset past deforestation 
(buyers) by trading hectares of deforested land with landowners who have standing forest 
available in their properties (sellers). Alternatively, buyers can offset by allowing forest 
regrowth. By examining the viewpoints of potential buyers and sellers about CRA 
(Chapter 2), I find sharp divergences related to programme-specific factors that could 
potentially affect trade, mostly around price expectations and contract length. Next, I 
combine policy scenarios with potential spatial scales of scheme implementation, to test 
how scale affects scheme’s conservation outcomes (e.g. area directed to avoided 
deforestation and/or regrowth; Chapter 3), as the scale in which conservation strategies 
are implemented often affect conservation trade-offs. Allowing offsets to occur within 
large spatial scales results in greater area of avoided deforestation and only a small area 
allocated to regrowth, whilst at small spatial scales results in the opposite pattern. 
However, the greatest total area was directed to conservation when the scheme was 
implemented at small scales. Finally, I compare the potential environmental co-benefits 
(e.g. aboveground biomass storage and accumulation and beta-diversity) associated with 
avoided deforestation and regrowth at large and small spatial scales (Chapter 4) and find 
that trade-offs between biomass and biodiversity co-benefits are dependent on spatial 
scale. Whilst large scale might protect biomass-rich forests, small scale protects highly 
threatened beta-diversity. These results are important for understanding important aspects 
associated to conservation schemes and their conservation outcomes. It is key that 
conservation polices account for landowners preferences in the design of schemes as well 
as the landscape scale in which conservation gains are expected to be delivered, in order 
to improve conservation effectiveness.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Human land-use activities have been responsible for extensively altering Earth’s 
surface, converting natural landscapes into human-dominated lands (Foley et al., 2005). 
Agriculture, for example, covers nearly 40% of the terrestrial ice-free surface 
(Ramankutty et al., 2008). Globally, such conversion of land for agriculture accounts for 
approximately 80% of global deforestation, 35% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and 
threatens 53% of terrestrial species  (Tanentzap et al., 2015). In past decades, much of the 
conversion of natural habitats into agriculture occurred in the tropics (Gibbs et al., 2010). 
This trend is expected to persist, as global population continues to grow (Tilman et al., 
2011), particularly in tropical regions (Laurance et al., 2014). Thus, safeguarding existing 
natural habitats and avoiding future biodiversity losses is a global priority in the 
conservation agenda (Godet and Devictor, 2018). 
The current debate in conservation science has acknowledged that the most 
traditional forms of conservation (e.g. protected areas) alone are unlikely to be sufficient 
to effectively achieve conservation goals. This means that other forms of conservation, 
such as the protection of private and unprotected land, in particular those subject to 
agriculture and grazing, must also be part of the conservation agenda (Kareiva, 2014; 
Soule, 2014; Green et al., 2015). Such debate has supported the emergence of 
conservation policies and mechanisms that seek to align biodiversity conservation and 
economic development, often working within the context of a market (Pirard, 2012). 
Worldwide, these markets have gained popularity and have been implemented under 
diverse frameworks. For example, there are over 550 Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) programmes around the world, targeting watershed, biodiversity and forest 
protection (Salzman et al., 2018). Biodiversity offsetting programmes sums nearly 70 and 
are most commonly used to mitigate or compensate for development impacts on 
biodiversity  (Sonter et al., 2018). Voluntary carbon markets (Duchelle et al., 2018), 
tradable development rights (TDR; McConnell and Walls, 2009) and habitat banking 
(Santos et al., 2014) are other examples of popular Market-based Instruments (MBIs). In 
general terms, such schemes aim to promote conservation by either rewarding landowners 
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for good environmental practices or compensating past or future environmental impacts. 
Although widely adopted, there is still limited understanding about the potential of such 
schemes to achieve conservation goals (Pirard, 2012; Börner et al., 2017) particular of 
compensatory schemes (Maron et al., 2010; Bull et al., 2013; Gonçalves et al., 2015). 
Hence, it is of extreme importance to gain a better understanding of how such schemes 
operate to foster better solutions for conservation.  
The aim of this thesis is therefore to assess the effectiveness of offset schemes to 
deliver conservation goals from independent but interconnected angles, such as the 
viewpoints and engagement of potential participants, the implementation scale of the 
scheme and its environmental co-benefits. For instance, are buyers and sellers of offset 
schemes similarly engaged in participation? What factors associated to the scheme’s 
design are perceived as most important? Will the spatial scale (local, regional, large, 
small) in which offset schemes are implemented influence conservation gains? What 
implementation scale will result in the greatest benefits for carbon and biodiversity? To 
achieve my goal I use the Brazilian Forest Code as a case study, which includes the largest 
emerging forest offset scheme in the world that requires landowners’ to compensate for 
past deforestation (Soares-Filho et al., 2016). Given the vast amounts of native vegetation 
inside private land in Brazil, a thorough understanding of this legislation and its potential 
implications are essential to draw more effective environmental policies that avoid 
deforestation and biodiversity loss (Soares-Filho et al., 2014; Azevedo et al., 2017). I 
particularly focus on the Amazon biome, the world’s largest intact tropical forest (Watson 
et al., 2018). The Brazilian Amazon originally covered nearly 400 Mha, but almost one 
fifth has been deforested (Assunção et al., 2017). In spite of reductions in the deforestation 
rate since the early 2000s, deforestation has been rising since 2014, making the 
application of the FC even more urgent (Rochedo et al., 2018).  
In this first chapter, I review the literature associated with the current debate on 
conservation policies and schemes that have a clear market-based component in their 
rationale and clearly target private land conservation (so-called market-based 
instruments; MBIs). These schemes are the most similar to the Brazilian forest offset 
scheme I focus on. I particularly emphasise strategies applied as tradable permits (e.g. 
biodiversity offsets and TDR) and PES. Such categories of MBIs show more synergies 
with the chosen case study and their associated empirical evidence guided the main 
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objectives of this study. The aim of this literature review is to develop an overview of 
how such schemes are implemented in different contexts, in relation to key points for 
their effectiveness as conservation strategies, such as the participation of landowners 
(Sorice et al., 2013) and the provisioning of conservation gains (Gibbons and 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron et al., 2013). From the literature, I derive knowledge gaps 
that each data chapter aims to answer. Section 1.5 provides the aim and specific objectives 
of this thesis, followed by the proposed thesis outline. In Section 1.7, I provide details of 
this thesis case study, the Brazilian Forest Code. In Section 1.8, I briefly describe the 
methodological approach used and in Section 1.9 I summarise the main data sources used 
in this research.  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are presented as three independent but interconnected 
analytical chapters, that each addresses a unique aspect of the overarching study. Chapter 
2 is already published as a jointly authored publication and empirically explores 
landowners’ perceptions of a forest offset scheme, and particularly perceptions around 
factors associated to the rules of the scheme. In Chapter 3, I test how potential scheme 
implementation scales can alter conservation outcomes, in terms of the total area directed 
to avoided deforestation and potential forest regrowth. In Chapter 4, I draw from the 
results obtained in Chapter 3 to explore carbon-related and biodiversity co-benefits 
associated with each different implementation scale. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides the 
research conclusions and discusses the implications of the study. 
  
1.1 Overview of private land conservation schemes  
The world has been facing a major environmental crisis, with natural habitat and 
biodiversity disappearing at unprecedented rates (Hoekstra et al., 2004; Kindsvater et al., 
2018). Land conversion to agriculture is behind this environmental crisis, causing climate 
change, biodiversity and habitat loss, and land degradation (Foley et al., 2011). Although 
protected areas are a major component of mainstream conservation strategies to halt 
habitat loss and preserve threatened ecosystems (Joppa et al., 2008), only 13% of the 
planet’s land surface is protected (Geldmann et al., 2013). These protected areas, as a 
single conservation strategy, are highly important but therefore unlikely to achieve large-
scale habitat protection alone (Sorice et al., 2013). Alternatively, private land 
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conservation (i.e. land under the ownership of individuals or non-public entities) has 
gained much attention in the conservation debate, given its potential to safeguard 
significant portions of natural habitat (Kamal et al., 2015; Drescher and Brenner, 2018). 
However, private land has also been subject to intense conversion, mostly to agricultural 
expansion and intensification (Tanentzap et al. 2015; Song et al., 2018), given the costs 
of conservation are often higher than a more profitable land-use option  (Börner et al., 
2010; Banks-Leite et al., 2014).  
Private land conservation comes accompanied by a myriad of polices and schemes 
aimed at avoiding future habitat losses and achieving meaningful conservation benefits 
(Cooke and Corbo-Perkins, 2018). Most commonly, these policies involve some sort of 
financial incentive (i.e. a fiscal policy, a subsidy, a reward) or even the creation of a 
market per se, in which environmental goods are traded (Pirard, 2012). Commonly known 
as MBIs, these environmental markets emerged in 1970s under the assumption that 
environmental losses and damages are consequences of economic development that are 
accelerated by agricultural intensification and overexploitation of natural resources. Thus, 
to avoid a potential failure in the provision of environmental goods, environmental 
damages had to be compensated (Stavins, 2003). MBIs rapidly gained popularity in the 
conservation arena, due to the failures of traditional environmental policy (such as 
protected areas) to reduce the high rate of decline of natural ecosystems (Gómez-
Baggethun and Muradian, 2015) and became a highly employed environmental policy 
tool to promote solutions around biodiversity and habitat loss, climate change, 
deforestation and water supply (Lapeyre et al., 2015).   
Although MBIs vary widely in terms of rationale, institutional arrangements and 
actors involved, they all share the same key feature, which is to attribute a price to nature 
and promote change in landowners’ behaviour (Pirard, 2012; Lapeyre et al., 2015). Some 
MBIs for example, such as PES, are leading global policy tools to protect biodiversity 
and reduce land cover change (Alix-Garcia et al., 2018). In general, PES schemes aim to 
change landowner behaviour by offering financial rewards for conservation activities that 
result in the provision, regulation or support of ecosystem services, such as water supply, 
carbon storage and sequestration, and biodiversity protection (Cimon-Morin et al., 2013). 
In other MBIs, a regulatory entity sets a limit on a certain activity (habitat development 
or carbon emissions) and allocates permits amongst landowners or firms who can engage 
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in trade as buyers and sellers (Ring et al., 2010). Such model follows “the polluter pays” 
principle, in which those causing environmental damage, to be in compliance with 
regulations, should compensate those who provide environmental goods (Vatn, 2015). 
Named tradable permits, such conservation policies have been applied in a variety of 
contexts and are becoming a widespread policy given its ability to provide flexible 
instruments that can potentially promote conservation whilst allow economic 
development (Drechsler and Hartig, 2011). Some examples of tradeable permits are 
voluntary carbon markets (Lockie, 2013); habitat banking (Wissel and Wätzold, 2010; 
Santos et al., 2014); biodiversity offsets (Alvarado-Quesada et al., 2014); and TDR in 
urban and rural land use preservation (Pruetz and Standridge, 2009). Schemes such as 
biodiversity offsets and TDR are typically associated with a regulatory component (e.g. 
cap-and-trade) controlling compliance that imposes sanctions or penalties if private actors 
are not liable to environmental regulations (Ring et al., 2010; Vatn, 2015). 
In spite of the popularity, the widespread adoption of MBIs has also faced 
criticism. Firstly, due its strong financial component, some say that it promotes a 
commodification of nature and a potential erosion of individual’s intrinsic motivation to 
preserve (McAfee, 2012; Rode et al., 2015). Secondly, many of these schemes have been 
criticized for achieving poor conservation outcomes despite their substantial funding 
(Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; McDonald et al., 2018). The next sections in this Chapter 
explore the issues that can potentially undermine their conservation potential. I 
particularly focus on PES, biodiversity offsets and TDR schemes, which have been 
employed in different contexts and show clear synergies with the Brazilian forest offset 
scheme (Chomitz, 2004; McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Wissel and Wätzold, 2010; 
Bull et al., 2013; May et al., 2015).  
1.1.1 Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
Since its inception two decades ago, PES has become the most popular and 
widespread conservation tool, with more than 550 programmes around the world 
(Salzman et al., 2018). By definition, PES is a voluntary transaction between service users 
(buyers) and service providers (sellers), achieved through land management practises 
(Wunder, 2015). The services transacted between sellers and buyers encompass several 
different ecosystems functions and processes that are essential to nature and society, such 
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as pollination, climate and water regulation, nutrient cycling, food production, and 
aesthetic and educational values (Costanza et al., 2017). Although PES can take different 
institutional arrangements, which are normally programme-dependent, buyers are often 
individuals, companies, NGOs, public bodies, and sellers are those who supply ecosystem 
services – in general, private landowners (Engel et al., 2008).  
The growing empirical literature about PES has documented several cases in 
which schemes were effective both environmentally and socially (Börner et al., 2017). 
For example, in Mexico, the national PES strategy has contributed to significant 
improvements in private land cover management activities (Alix-Garcia et al., 2018). In 
Uganda, the villages enrolled in the national programme showed an increase in tree cover 
when compared to other non-enrolled villages (Jayachandran et al., 2017). In 
Mozambique and Mexico, PES programmes have contributed to poverty alleviation and 
promoted an increase in participants’ income (Hegde and Bull, 2011; Sims and Alix-
Garcia, 2017). There are some cases, however, that such effectiveness is unclear or 
absent, as payments did not significantly reduce deforestation (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., 
2007) or had no impact on social welfare (Arriagada et al., 2009). Such heterogeneity, 
which is observed both at country and local level, might be explained by the participation 
– or lack of – of motivated buyers and sellers (Salzman et al., 2018). 
Given that landowner participation in PES is essentially voluntary, it is crucial to 
understand what drives and motivates landowners to enrol in such programmes (Sorice et 
al., 2013). While empirical research on PES participation is limited, there are several 
studies that investigate factors that influence landowners’ decisions to enrol (Bremer et 
al., 2014). The assessment of factors influencing landowners’ participation can be done 
following two approaches: the assessment of socio-demographic factors and the 
assessment of programme-specific factors (Kosoy et al., 2008). The first is related to 
independent and intrinsic landowners’ characteristics such as gender, education, and age, 
which might be important to target specific groups of landowners and promote social 
equity and fairness (Zabala et al., 2017; Alpízar et al., 2017). The second is related to 
technicalities and policy specificities of the programme, in which participation is a result 
of upon the rules the programme imposes (Kosoy et al., 2008). Income, education and 
farm size appear as highly influential sociodemographic factors, whereas programme-
specific factors such as access to information, contract duration and payment value are 
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also important drivers of landowners’ decisions to participate (Zbinden and Lee, 2005; 
Kosoy et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2012; Bremer et al., 2014; Kwayu et al., 2014; Page and 
Bellotti, 2015).  
In spite of its extensive adoption, PES schemes have been criticised for delivering 
poor conservation outcomes, such as little additionality (i.e. the provision of additional 
benefits to conservation that would not occur in the absence of the scheme), often 
targeting areas with low deforestation pressure and low opportunity costs (Muradian et 
al., 2013). Nevertheless, the overall additionality in PES schemes has been poorly 
evaluated given the lack of empirical evidence (Pattanayak et al., 2010) and the 
effectiveness of PES schemes remains inconclusive, as current literature has provided 
mixed results (Salzman et al., 2018). 
1.1.2 Biodiversity offsets 
Biodiversity offsets are another MBI that has become increasingly popular in the 
last decade, due to their potential to align conservation and economic development 
(Kiesecker et al., 2009). The offsetting approach consists in the compensation for damage 
or impacts with equivalent biodiversity gains elsewhere (Gordon et al., 2015). The main 
goal of biodiversity offsets is to ensure that offsets from the impacted site achieve no net 
loss and preferably a net gain in terms of species composition, habitat structure and 
ecosystem function (Bull et al., 2013). To achieve such gains, offset policies adopt two 
main strategies: averted loss, which is the protection of existing habitat, or restoration of 
degraded habitat (Maron et al., 2012). Although included in the environmental legislation 
of several countries (i.e. United States, Australia, Brazil and Colombia), biodiversity 
offsets remain highly controversial (Gordon et al., 2015). 
Much of the controversy in biodiversity offsetting policies is associated with 
implementation issues such as their currency, the spatial location of offsets as well as 
ecological equivalence and additionality (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Gonçalves et 
al., 2015). Currency relates to establishing a common metric that could be more easily 
traded among different locations (e.g. habitat area). Although several metrics have been 
developed (i.e. involving habitat condition or ecological function), most offset policies 
that operate at a local level take a case-by-case approach (Bull et al., 2013; Gonçalves et 
al., 2015). This adds more complexity to the trade, impedes a comparable evaluation of 
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scheme’s performance and limits geographical outreach of trade (Bull et al., 2014). The 
issues around the spatial location of the offsets have been mostly associated with the 
choice of neighbouring or more distant offsets (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010). While 
offsets near the impacted site contribute to the conservation of the same (or very similar) 
ecosystem, more distant offsets can benefit sites of great biodiversity importance and can 
be aligned with regional or national conservation goals (Kiesecker et al., 2009; Gordon 
et al., 2011). In terms of ecological equivalence, it is difficult to ensure that offsets can 
result in equivalent ecological gains, as unique characteristics of the impacted site cannot 
be replicated (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011). Since real equivalence may be very unlikely, 
it is argued that offsets placed near the impacted site might the best solution to reach such 
ecological equivalence. This shows that both near or distant offsets are likely to have 
trade-offs that need to be considered in the scheme’s design (Bull et al., 2013). Lastly, 
offsets must ensure additionality, which is the provision of additional benefits to 
conservation that would not occur in the absence of the scheme (Maron et al., 2013). 
Unless offsets are placed in areas under imminent threat of biodiversity loss or are 
achieved via habitat restoration, non-additional offsets can undermine the conservation 
potential of the scheme (Gonçalves et al., 2015).  
Another debated topic in the biodiversity offsets literature is the trade-off between 
restoration and averted loss offsets (Maron et al., 2012; Curran et al., 2014). Although 
restoration appears as a highly additional offset strategy (Gonçalves et al., 2015), its 
potential to deliver conservation gains has been questioned (Curran et al., 2014). The 
most common criticisms are that restoration strategies often result in uncertain 
conservation outcomes, have low success rates (Maron et al., 2012) and long time lags 
(Drechsler and Hartig, 2011). At the same time, averted loss offsets may contribute to 
preservation of important habitat but undermine ecological equivalence and additionality, 
if placed in areas where there is no threat (Bull et al., 2013). Both averted loss and 
restoration offsets need to produce relevant and measurable conservation gains to qualify 
as effective conservation tools (Gardner et al., 2013). 
Overall, most of the literature on biodiversity offsets focuses on conceptual and 
implementation challenges (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Wissel and Wätzold, 2010; 
Bull et al., 2013; Alvarado-Quesada et al., 2014; Gonçalves et al., 2015) and the 
effectiveness of restoration offsets (Maron et al., 2012). There is a general lack of 
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evidence and no large-scale assessments of the actual effectiveness of programmes 
implemented around the world (Gardner et al., 2013), as all programmes are context-
dependent and often operate at local levels. In general, biodiversity offset programmes 
are classified as relatively “thin-markets”, a market characterized by small number of 
buyers and sellers (Alvarado-Quesada et al., 2014) and therefore engaging few 
landowners in participation.  
1.1.3 Transfer of development rights (TDR) 
Private land conservation comes with a set of rights and responsibilities that are 
levied by land-use regulations. As development and land-use change progressively 
expand, these regulations tend to face challenges in terms of preserving important and 
relevant sites that can be subject to depletion or fragmentation (McConnell and Walls, 
2009). Based on this premise, transfer of development rights (TDR) is a market-based 
alternative instrument that trades the rights of an area to develop above the limits 
established by the regulator with the rights of undeveloped areas. The means to achieve 
this objective is to create a free-market in which development rights are traded amongst 
willing sellers and buyers (Johnston and Madison, 1997; Kaplowitz et al., 2008; Menghini 
et al., 2015). In simple terms, “sending” areas (supply side) are the ones to be preserved 
and “receiving” areas (demand site) are the ones appropriate for growth. Landholders in 
sending areas can choose to set aside a share within their property and sell rights to 
landholders in receiving areas. Typically, sending areas are nature reserves, upper 
watersheds, environmentally sensitive areas, farms and other types of open space land. 
Regulatory policies often allow the development of receiving areas without TDR 
obligations, but offer additional development potential when TDR buyers purchase rights. 
This trade happens on a simple ‘hectare per hectare’ basis. Having transferred the 
development rights, landowners from sending areas are restricted from developing their 
land. The areas to where the rights are transferred are then allowed to develop the area 
more intensively than allowed by its baseline regulations (McConnell and Walls, 2009). 
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Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of how TDR schemes operate. 
 
The concept of TDR was firstly applied in New York City for the protection of 
historic buildings and has been much used in urban development control, especially in 
areas with limited infrastructure or public services (Pruetz and Standridge, 2009). To date, 
it has also been expanded to environmental conservation, with programmes targeting 
protection of environmental values on agricultural lands, wetlands, and water quality 
preservation (Kaplowitz et al., 2008). TDR has become popular in some countries, such 
as Switzerland (Menghini et al., 2015), Netherlands (Janssen-Jansen, 2008) and Australia 
(Boronyak-Vasco and Perry, 2015) where schemes are complementary to command-and-
control regulations.  
TDR programmes have been widely adopted in the USA to preserve natural 
resources at low public cost (Kaplowitz et al., 2008; McConnell and Walls, 2009; Pruetz 
and Standridge, 2009). There are about 140 TDR programmes focusing on a variety of 
land use goals, including farmland preservation, prevention of development on 
environmentally sensitive areas, and restraining urban sprawl. Implemented programmes 
have different designs, goals, and enrolment specifications and tend to be very site-
specific as each state has its own land use regulations and context (McConnell and Walls, 
2009). Although TDR has preserved around 150,000 hectares in rural areas across USA 
(that includes farm and forest land), 47% of the programmes have resulted in no 
protection or have been revoked (Pruetz and Standridge, 2009). Possible explanations are 
a limited number of buyers and sellers – and consequently a small number of transactions, 
and lack of landowner participation, as participation is voluntary. As their implementation 
scale are often small (county or municipality), demand is often scarce, which undermines 
trade (McConnell and Walls, 2009). 
Rights 
 
Payments 
 
Sending areas 
 
Receiving areas 
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1.2 Participation of landowners in conservation programmes 
As highlighted above, the engagement and participation of private landowners is an 
essential component to ensure MBIs are effective and private land conservation achieved. 
Given that participation is typically voluntary, the decision of whether or not to participate 
is mostly dependent on factors that influence landowners’ individual choice, such as 
costs, benefits, time and sociodemographic aspects (Greiner and Gregg, 2011). 
Understanding  the influence of such factors can better inform policy-makers how to 
target specific groups of landowners and improve policy design (Sorice et al., 2013; 
Zabala et al., 2017).  
Landowner participation has been widely debated in PES literature, particularly in 
developing countries (Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Kosoy et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2012; Bremer 
et al., 2014; Kwayu et al., 2014; Page and Bellotti, 2015). In TDR schemes, uniquely 
focused in the USA, studies are limited to and date from nearly 15 years ago (Conrad et 
al., 1979; Lynch and Lovell, 2003; Duke, 2004; Duke and Ilvento, 2004). In the 
biodiversity offset literature, landowner participation does not seem to be a debated issue. 
To have more global understanding, landowner participation in agri-environmental 
schemes (AES) were also included in this review. AES are widespread in developed 
countries and consist in the monetary compensation of farmers who voluntarily adopt 
practises that secure environmental goals. In general, landowners with a better education, 
wealthier status who own large farms are more likely to participate in conservation 
programmes (Table 1.1). In PES programmes, for instance, landholders who do not rely 
completely on farm income are more likely to be participants (Zbinden and Lee, 2005; 
Ma et al., 2012; Bremer et al., 2014). The same is observed in AES programmes – the 
higher the off-farm income, the more likely a landholder is to join an AES (Dobbs and 
Pretty, 2008; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). In TDR, on the other 
hand, large and remotely located properties are more likely to enrol compared to 
properties more susceptible to development (Lynch and Lovell, 2003). Although less 
emphasis is given to programme-specific factors (Yeboah et al., 2015), conservation 
programmes that provide good access to information, have a clear conservation potential, 
have short contract durations and with attractive compensation tend to entice more 
participants (Bremer et al., 2014; Kwayu et al., 2014; Page and Bellotti, 2015). 
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Table 1.1 Summary of studies assessing sociodemographic and programme-specific factors influencing landowner participation in PES, AES and TDR schemes. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
References Scheme Region Age Gender Education Income Farm size Farm 
location
Land 
use 
Arable 
land
Environmen
tal attitude
Access 
information
Contracts Value of 
payments
Transaction 
costs
Participation 
in design
Management 
change
Technical 
support
Eligibility Eco-
effectivenes
Zbinden & Lee 2005 PES Developing • • √ √ √ • √ √ • √ √ • • • • • √ •
Kosoy et el . 2008 PES Developing • • • √ • • √ • • √ √ √ √ √ √ • √ •
Ma et a l . 2012 PES Developed • • √ √ √ • √ √ √ • • √ • • • • √ •
Bremer et a l . 2014 PES Developing • • √ √ √ • • • √ √ √ √ • • √ • √ •
Kwayu et a l . 2014 PES Developing • • • √ √ • • • • √ • • • √ √ • √ √
Page & Bel lotti  2015 PES Developed • • • • • • • • √ √ √ √ • • • • • √
Wilson 1997 AES Developed √ • √ √ √ • - √ √ √ • √ • • • • • •
Defrancesco et a l . 2008 AES Developed √ • √ √ • • √ • √ √ • • • • • • • •
Dobbs  & Pretty 2008 AES Developed • • • • √ √ - √ • • • √ • • • • • •
Lastra-Bravo et a l . 2015 AES Developed • • √ √ √ • √ • • • • • • • • • • •
Santos  et a l . 2015 AES Developed • • • • • • √ √ • • √ √ • • • • • •
Conrad & LeBlanc 1979 TDR Developed √ • • √ • • √ • • • • √ • • • • • •
Lynch & Lovel l  2003 TDR Developed • • • √ • √ √ √ √ √ • √ • • • • • •
Duke 2004 TDR Developed • • • • √ √ • • • • √ • • • • • • •
Duke & Ilvento 2004 TDR Developed • • √ √ √ • √ • √ √ • √ • • • • • •
PES Payments  for Ecosystem Services  | AES Agri -Environmental  Schemes  | TDR Transfer of Development Rights
√ reported as  influencia l  in participation | • reported as  non-influencia l  in participation
Sociodemographic factors Programme-specific factors
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Such studies provide evidence about sociodemographic and programme-specific 
factors that influence landowner participation. However, they only consider the 
perspectives of the sellers and do not assess whether buyers have similar or different 
perceptions of programme-specific factors. I address this gap in Chapter 2, by exploring 
the perceptions of potential buyers and sellers of the Brazilian forest offset scheme. The 
understanding of buyers’ perceptions in MBIs in general is as important as that of sellers 
to stimulate trade and effectively meet conservation goals (Bastian et al., 2017). In 
addition, differently from sociodemographic factors, programme-specific factors can be 
amended by policy changes, which makes their assessment particularly important for 
policy design (Yeboah et al., 2015). 
1.3 Spatial scale of programmes, trade-offs and additionality  
The question of where to allocate conservation efforts in MBIs is an ongoing debate 
in the conservation realm (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Hartig and Drechsler, 2009; 
Wissel and Wätzold, 2010; Gonçalves et al., 2015). Such concern lies on the fact that 
environmental elements and ecological processes (e.g. biodiversity, threatened species, 
soil quality and protection of old-growth forests) are highly dependent on their spatial 
location (Walker et al., 2009; Hartig and Drechsler, 2009; Drechsler and Wätzold, 2009). 
In biodiversity offsets, for example, the spatial location of the offset is a key element to 
achieve meaningful conservation outcomes, whether near or distant from the impacted 
site (Wissel and Wätzold, 2010; Gonçalves et al., 2015). In TDR programmes, the spatial 
scale in which the scheme operates, whether large or small, may determine the number 
of buyers and sellers, and consequently, the volume of trade between them (McConnell 
and Walls, 2009).  
Given that the primary logic of biodiversity offsets is to compensate biodiversity 
losses for ecologically-equivalent gains, the spatial allocation of such offsets are 
determined by a suite of strategies (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011; Maron et al., 2012; 
Gardner et al., 2013). The most commonly used, is the “like-for-like” strategy. Here, 
factors such as area and vegetation type, for example, are used to determine the location 
of offsets (e.g. a hectare of a certain vegetation type must be offset by a hectare of the 
same vegetation type; (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011)). Whilst a “like-for-like” strategy 
might be a more straightforward currency to offset biodiversity loss and minimally ensure 
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ecological equivalence, it might be an oversimplification of complex ecological systems 
and lead to perverse conservation outcomes (Walker et al., 2009; Kujala et al., 2015). 
Alternatively, systematic conservation planning approaches are also used to strategically 
determine the location of offsets. In this case, habitat integrity, vegetation condition, 
species occurrence, complementarity and irreplaceability are commonly used metrics 
(Kiesecker et al., 2009; Kujala et al., 2015). Both strategies are commonly employed and 
their choice is typically programme-dependent and based on local or regional 
conservation goals (Kiesecker et al., 2009; Quétier and Lavorel, 2011).  
The evaluation of where biodiversity offsets are placed, often generates trade-offs 
in regards to the type of offset, whether through averted loss or restoration (Kujala et al., 
2015), and such trade-offs are far from being a settled debated in biodiversity offsets 
(Maron et al., 2012). Averted loss offsets tend to favour the protection of important 
existing habitat and tends to yield more certain conservation outcomes than restoration 
offsets but are likely to fail ecological equivalence (Kujala et al., 2015). Conversely, 
restoration offsets are a more certain strategy to promote ecological equivalence, 
especially if it happens near the impacted site and are likely to promote conservation gain 
if it occurs in highly degraded or scarce habitats (Wissel and Wätzold, 2010). Equally, 
averted loss and restoration offsets are only effective conservation strategies if they 
ensure additionality (Maron et al., 2012).  
PES and TDR schemes do not have an explicit biodiversity component that allows 
for clear spatial targeting approaches as observed with biodiversity offsets. Instead, they 
are more grounded on the trade of hectares as their currency, hence, much of the 
discussion regarding the spatial location is associated with implementation scale – if 
strategies are implemented at local, regional or national levels (McConnell and Walls, 
2009; Grima et al., 2016). Although several PES programmes are implemented at national 
levels (Börner et al., 2017), the most successful ones operate at local levels, particularly 
watershed PES (Grima et al., 2016). TDR programmes typically operate at small scales; 
however, different from PES programmes, the small spatial scale has been seen as 
problematic, due to low trade volume between buyers and sellers that undermines the 
programme’s effectiveness (McConnell and Walls, 2009).  
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Additionality has also been reported as a critical issue in PES literature. Although 
poorly evaluated, it is still seen as a barrier to achieve effectiveness as, in most of the 
cases, PES programmes did not manage to reduce the pressures on the ecosystem because 
enrolment is often limited to low threat areas, where landholders have never had the 
intention to convert (Pattanayak et al., 2010; Arriagada et al., 2015; Grima et al., 2016). 
The same is observed in TDR where remotely located properties and unlikely to be under 
development pressure outcompete properties with high development pressure given their 
low opportunity costs (Santos et al., 2014). In addition, since TDR works on a hectare-
basis trade, the conservation potential of the traded hectare is often disregarded, as rules 
of the programme do not explicitly account for its conservation value (Santos et al., 2014). 
Overall, the poor evaluation of the spatial scale and the associated trade-offs, such 
as additionality, might undermine the conservation potential of the programme and result 
in poor or ineffective conservation outcomes. However, a quantification of potential 
conservation outcomes that may arise from different spatial scales wherein the 
programme is implemented has not yet been made. In Chapter 3, I test how different 
spatial scales of implementation (e.g. large and small) alter the conservation outcomes 
and affect the potential additionality of the Brazilian forest offset scheme.  
1.4 Environmental co-benefits in conservation schemes 
Conservation is a globally underfunded activity (Waldron et al., 2013). For this 
reason, conservation efforts typically attempt to deliver multiple benefits through a single 
strategy, under the logic that optimisation of conservation goals are possible and 
necessary given the limited resources (Iacona et al., 2018). There has been a growing 
interest in assessing the possibility of conservation initiatives to foster win-win solutions, 
especially solutions that align biodiversity conservation and the provision and regulation 
of ecosystem services (Cimon-Morin et al., 2013). However, to be effectively optimised, 
such conservation benefits are dependent on co-occurring in the same area and while there 
is much interested in developing win-win solutions, there is little understanding of what 
is required for them to be achieved (Howe et al., 2014).  
In PES programmes, much of the debate around how to foster win-win solutions has 
been focused on bundling carbon storage or sequestration and biodiversity conservation 
services (reviewed in Grima et al., 2016; Börner et al., 2017). In particular, with the 
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increasing interest in carbon-focused strategies (e.g. REDD+) strategies, the potential 
inclusion of biodiversity co-benefits under carbon payments became attractive given the 
possibility of aligning both per money unit spent (Wendland et al., 2010; Phelps et al., 
2012a). However, the extent to which such environmental co-benefits are spatially 
congruent varies greatly in relation to scale (e.g. local or global) and to data used. For 
instance, at global scales, such congruence is observed between species-rich and biomass-
rich areas, although this link is not uniform  across the globe (Strassburg et al., 2010). At 
local scales, species-rich areas indicate a positive and significant association with 
disturbed areas that are not necessarily biomass-rich (e.g. primary and secondary 
disturbed forests, fragmented forests and regenerating pastures), showing that carbon-
focused strategies alone might fail to effectively protect biodiversity (Gilroy et al., 2014; 
Magnago et al., 2015; Ferreira et al., 2018). In addition, the combination of high-
resolution biomass data with species richness show that carbon-focused strategies might 
be positive for certain threatened taxa (Deere et al., 2018). The spatial incongruences 
observed in these local-level studies suggest that conservation efforts will not necessarily 
result in simultaneous environmental gains, potentially resulting in trade-offs.     
A recent review of biodiversity offset programmes around the world shows that 41% 
already consider ES in their design, especially when development projects explicitly 
report potential impacts on the provision or regulation of ES (Sonter et al., 2018). On the 
other hand, the same spatial incongruence between biodiversity and ES is also found in 
biodiversity offsets programmes for provisioning services (e.g. water supply, food and 
timber) but not for regulating services (e.g. carbon storage, sequestration and pollination) 
(reviewed in Cimon-Morin et al., 2013). Biodiversity offset schemes typically employ 
systematic conservation planning approaches at landscape level to spatially allocate 
offsets (Kujala et al., 2015). For example, spatial conservation prioritisation approaches 
typically use the “principle of complementarity”, which recognises the diversity shared 
between sites (Bush et al., 2016). This principle is required to achieve efficient 
conservation solutions because the biodiversity represented by a set of conserved sites is 
not simply an accumulation of their individual richness values (alpha-diversity, Bush et 
al., 2016). Instead, how species composition varies across space (beta-diversity) are 
implicitly accounted (Bush et al., 2016). Other key metrics in conservation planning that 
implicitly incorporates beta-diversity is the principle of irreplaceability, which accounts 
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for species status (e.g. vulnerable, endangered), identity, and endemism, that combined 
inform how to select areas that, if lost, could compromise local conservation targets 
(Margules and Pressey, 2000).  
Although these metrics are widely adopted in conservation planning in reserve 
selection at landscape levels, many conservation strategies are implemented at larger 
scales – often across large environmental gradients (Sullivan et al., 2017; Boyd et al., 
2018). In these cases, an explicit consideration of beta-diversity, rather than implicit 
approaches is important to better assess how to conserve biodiversity across large spatial 
scales and understand regional biodiversity loss patterns (Socolar et al., 2016). However, 
the explicit use of beta-diversity as a tool to inform conservation decision across large 
environmental gradients remains poorly explored (Bergamin et al., 2017). I address this 
gap in Chapter 4 by using beta-diversity to assess potential synergies between biomass 
and biodiversity as potential environmental co-benefits the Brazilian forest offset scheme. 
1.5 Aim and specific objectives  
The introduction and literature review above have shown that global conservation 
efforts still have unresolved issues that need to be overcome, if real effective conservation 
gains are to be delivered. The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the potential of offset 
schemes to result in effective conservation gains, by evaluating three key issues to 
programmes’ effectiveness: the participation of landowners, the scale of implementation 
and potential environmental co-benefits.  
Objective 1: Explore the diversity of viewpoints between scheme potential 
participants as buyers and sellers associated with programme-specific factors (e.g. 
contract length, price, intermediaries, trust, information) and identify potential 
factors that result in sharp divergences between buyers and sellers that could 
potentially affect trade and undermine programme objectives.  
1.1 Identify the most important programme-specific factors influencing buyers and 
sellers’ participation; 
1.2 Quantify agreements or divergences on programme-specific factors between buyers 
and sellers, using an index; 
1.3 Identify buyers’ offset preferences. 
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Objective 2:  Test whether different policy scenarios and potential implementation 
spatial scales (large to small) generate distinct conservation outcomes (averted loss 
and restoration) and affect overall additionality of the scheme.  
2.1 Simulate forest trade between buyers and sellers under different policy scenarios and 
spatial scales; 
2.2 Quantify overall avoided deforestation, potential regrowth and total additionality 
resulted from each policy scenario and spatial scale; 
2.3 Examine the trade-offs associated with each different policy scenario and spatial 
scale; 
2.4 Compare the effect of different policy scenarios and spatial scales on conservation 
outcomes; 
Objective 3: Quantify environmental co-benefits (e.g. biomass and biodiversity) 
resulting from large and small potential scheme implementation spatial scales (i.e. 
biome and municipality) 
3.1 Estimate biomass stocks and potential biomass accumulation for buyers and sellers’ 
from publicly available biomass datasets; 
3.2 Estimate beta-diversity biodiversity co-benefits for buyers and sellers; 
3.3 Calculate differences between buyers and sellers in biomass stock and species 
composition values at large and small spatial scales; 
3.4 Compare trade-offs associated to biomass and biodiversity co-benefits at large and 
small spatial scales. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
This thesis uses a multidisciplinary and multi-methodological approach to address 
some of the key gaps associated with offset schemes. I use a combination of empirical 
and spatial analyses to understand the conservation implications of the largest offset 
scheme in world, regulated in the Brazilian Forest Code. In this thesis, the key findings 
of each data chapter feed the subsequent one.  
The sections in Chapter 1 introduce the literature about relevant conservation 
MBIs employed globally; factors that influence participation of landowners as buyers and 
sellers in MBIs; the spatial scale in which MBIs are implemented and their implications 
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to conservation outcomes; and potential environmental co-benefits associated with MBIs. 
In section 1.8, I also provide a brief description of the methodological approach used and 
in section 1.9 the main data sources.  
In Chapter 2, I identify viewpoints related to programme-specific factors (i.e. 
contract length, price, transaction costs) of buyers and sellers of the Brazilian forest offset 
scheme. I use Q-methodology, a semi-quantitative approach, to empirically identify such 
viewpoints. After, I create a “trade compatibility index” to quantify potential divergences 
between buyers and sellers’ viewpoints that could become barriers to trade and affect 
their willingness to participate in certain offset strategies (Figure 1.2 – red dashed lines).  
In Chapter 3, I test how different spatial scales of scheme implementation alter 
conservation outcomes, more specifically the overall additionality of the scheme through 
avoided deforestation and regrowth. I use the viewpoints identified in Chapter 2 to 
develop three policy scenarios that include a set of different offset options. Trade is 
simulated between buyers and sellers considering the different policy scenarios, in five 
nested spatial scales that gradually go from large (biome) to small (municipality). 
Additionally, I compare the overall additionality to assess which scale is able to provide 
more area directed to conservation (Figure 1.2 – blue dashed lines).   
Chapter 4 uses the key spatial scales identified in Chapter 3 to assess potential 
trade-offs associated with environmental co-benefits. I estimate biomass stocks and 
potential biomass accumulation for all buyers and sellers involved in the offset scheme at 
both large and small spatial scales. I also use species composition (beta-diversity) as the 
biodiversity metric to estimate potential biodiversity co-benefits at both spatial scales. 
Lastly, I assess and compare and biodiversity co-benefits at both spatial scales to draw 
potential policy implications (Figure 1.2 – green dashed lines).  
The main findings from chapters 2–4 are drawn together and discussed in 
Chapter 5. This section contains a general overview of the main findings and places them 
in the context of the literature. The key aims of the thesis are re-examined to see to 
whether they have been achieved, and the research limitations are discussed. I also discuss 
the potential implications of this research for conservation actions and suggest future 
research directions. Finally, the overall conclusions from the thesis are summarised.  
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Figure 1.2 Conceptual diagram that summarises the thesis objectives. Different coloured dashed boxes 
represent each analytical chapter. The overlaps between two dashed boxes represent how each chapter’s 
key findings feed the subsequent chapter. The red dashed box (Chapter 2) represent how scheme-specific 
factors and the offset options available generates distinct viewpoints amongst buyers and sellers and how 
such viewpoint potentially affects trade; the blue dashed box represents how trade between buyers and 
sellers limited to distinct potential spatial scales of scheme implementation affects the area directed to the 
key conservation outcomes of the scheme (Chapter 3); and the green dashed box represent the assessment 
of the environmental co-benefits associated with the conservation outcomes resulted from the different 
spatial scales of implementation (Chapter 4).  
1.7 The Brazilian Forest Code as a case study 
Brazil has achieved important milestones in the implementation of regulatory 
initiatives to combat land use change, mainly in the Amazon biome (Godar et al., 2014; 
Nepstad et al., 2014). Amongst many conservation strategies, perhaps the most important 
one was the approval of the new Brazilian Forest Code (FC), in 2012, which is the main 
legislation that regulates land use on private land (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). This legal 
framework contains important restrictions on forest clearing on private land and at the 
same time sets the scene to the implementation of an MBI.  
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Private lands in Brazil account for 605Mha. Additionally, of all its existing native 
vegetation (537Mha), 53% occur in private lands (Soares-Filho et al., 2014), which makes 
private land conservation particularly important. The main objective of the FC is to 
protect the vegetation within private properties by requiring landowners to set aside native 
vegetation areas in their properties. These areas are distinguished into Permanent 
Protected Areas (PPA) and Legal Reserve (LR). The former corresponds to areas situated 
alongside and around water bodies, steep slopes and hilltops that should be maintained 
intact. The LR, on the other hand, are set-aside areas designated to secure both economic 
and conservation uses, as long as managed sustainably and guaranteeing the provision of 
the natural resources and biodiversity conservation. All properties must maintain this 
vegetation, which can be primary or secondary forest, in every stage of regeneration. The 
proportion depends on which biome the property is located (Figure 1.3). In the Legal 
Amazon (the nine states covered totally or partially by the Amazon biome), this 
percentage in 80% in the Amazon forest, 35% in Cerrado and 20% in grasslands. All other 
biomes outside the Legal Amazon must maintain 20% of LR (Brasil, 2012). However, 
due to lack of enforcement and a long history of non-compliance (Sparovek et al., 2012) 
Brazil presents a LR debt of 16.4Mha to be offset (Soares-Filho et al., 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Minimum required percentages of legal reserve specific to each of the Brazilian biomes, 
according to the FC. 
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To encourage compliance and the conservation of LR, the FC allows landowners 
with a LR deficit (named “buyers”) to offset LR deficit with several options, if LR 
deforestation took place prior to 2008: 
A) Acquisition of private land inside protected areas (PAs, Figure 1.4). In this 
case, buyers must purchase areas at least equivalent to their LR deficit and 
then donate the purchased area to the Environmental Agency in charge; 
B) Adherence to an offset scheme named Environmental Reserve Quota, or CRA 
as the Portuguese acronym, in which buyers lease hectares from landowners 
who have kept their LR above the minimum required by law (named 
“sellers”). In CRA, sellers issue quotas that correspond to 1 hectare and buyers 
acquire quotas under a lease-based system. Trade between buyers and sellers 
must happen in the same biome and state. If outside the state, sellers must be 
located in areas designated as “conservation priority” (Figure 1.4);  
C) Offset LR deficit with on-site natural regrowth or active reforestation.  
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Figure 1.4 Overview of the relevant land use tenure categories for the FC. A) State boundaries (black); B) 
Federal, state and municipal protected areas (dark green); C) Conservation priority areas (blue); D) 
Settlements (orange). Conservation priority do not have established boundaries as they are just considered 
some sort of conservation hotspot. Settlements are defined as former mega-properties that were under-used 
and allotted and distributed to families as part of agrarian reform since the 1970’s.  
The FC legislates over the entire existing native vegetation in private lands 
(Azevedo et al., 2017). Given the magnitude of such legislation and its implications for 
both national and international environmental scenarios, several studies have examined 
the FC from different standpoints. For example, some studies examine the extent of LR 
in private lands and the associated policy implications for available offset strategies, such 
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as CRA and forest regrowth (Sparovek et al., 2012; Soares-Filho et al., 2014; Nunes et 
al., 2016). Others investigate the contribution of mandatory rural registry system stated 
in the FC (named CAR) to avoid deforestation (Richards and VanWey, 2015; L’Roe et 
al., 2016; Azevedo et al., 2017). A few ecological assessments examine the importance 
of the LR set-asides to biodiversity and ecological processes to urge their permanent 
conservation (Banks-Leite et al., 2014; Barlow et al., 2016). In addition, considerable 
attention has been given to the offset options, particularly CRA. State-level studies show 
that allowing offsets to occur only in spatially restricted areas, such as areas designated 
as conservation priority, improves the conservation potential of the scheme although it 
increases compliances costs for landowners when compared to offsets with no spatial 
restrictions (Bernasconi et al., 2016). At the same time, a spatially unrestricted offsets 
results in more market activity between buyers and sellers, although undermines the 
ecological equivalence of offsets (Chomitz, 2004).  
Other national-level studies highlight the policy implications of a general 
oversupply of LR surpluses, particularly from private land located in PAs and from small 
landowners and settlements (Soares-Filho et al., 2016; Freitas et al., 2017). This has been 
seen as a controversial issue for several reasons. Firstly, private land inside PAs (Figure 
1.3B) are likely to absorb much of the offset demand given its low cost. On the other 
hand, as these areas are already protected and cannot be deforested, the additionality of 
the scheme is likely to be undermined (Soares-Filho et al., 2016). Secondly, small 
landowners and settlements (Figure 1.3D) have been granted compliance amnesty 
according to the FC – they are not required to offset their LR deficit (Brasil, 2012). 
Additionally, if they have any amount of native vegetation in their properties, they are 
eligible to offer in the offset market (Brasil, 2012). This may also undermine scheme’s 
additionality, as their remaining their native vegetation cannot be deforested hence 
protecting nature that is already protected by law (Freitas et al., 2017).  
At the moment, the FC offset scheme has not been fully implemented yet and 
awaits state-level legislators to allow for potential geographical restrictions (e.g. limiting 
offsets to the same municipality) to improve the programme’s effectiveness (Freitas et 
al., 2017). Therefore, the analyses and findings presented in this thesis represent a great 
opportunity to provide meaningful contributions that can influence the implementation of 
the offset scheme and eventually result in effective conservation gains.  
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I particularly focus on the Amazon, a biome which has a global and local 
importance in the conservation scenario. Considered the most biodiverse rainforest in the 
world (ter Steege et al., 2016), Amazon forests account for 40% of global tropical forest 
area (Aragão et al., 2014) and contain nearly half of tropical forests carbon stocks (Saatchi 
et al., 2011). Additionally, the Amazon is crucial to local and global biogeochemical 
cycles (Spracklen and Garcia-Carreras, 2015). Although more than half of the Brazilian 
Amazon is protected (Soares-Filho et al., 2010), it has lost nearly 20% of its original 
territory (Assunção et al., 2017). Currently, as classified by the FC, 9.3 Mha of standing 
forest located in private lands can be legally deforested (Freitas et al., 2017). Thus actions 
towards the protection of native vegetation in private land are important to avoid future 
losses.  
1.8 Methodological approach  
To meet the objectives of this thesis I took two distinct methodological 
approaches. The first was an exploratory and empirical analysis in which landowners 
were interviewed following Q-methodology (details in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2). 
Briefly, Q-methodology is a semi-quantitative method designed to capture the underlying 
subjectivity within individual’s viewpoints, allowing the construction of interpretative 
narratives about groups of people and their perspectives (Zabala et al., 2018). Through 
interviews, participants are presented a set of statements representing a wide range of 
possible opinions on a topic. Then they are asked to sort onto a grid which represents their 
level of agreement or disagreement.  
Secondly, I employed spatial analyses to assess the overall environmental 
effectiveness of the CRA scheme across a large scale, the Amazon biome. I combine both 
numerical and spatial explicit analysis using publicly available databases. 
1.9 Data sources 
1.9.1 Landowners empirical data 
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 involved empirical data. Between June and 
August 2016, I collected empirical data from landowners in the state of Mato Grosso, 
Brazil. I considered four criteria when sampling municipalities: (1) location (e.g. Amazon 
or Cerrado); (2) accessibility via major roads (BR-163, BR-158 and BR-070); (3) 
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predominant land use (crop or pasture) and (4) different farm size classes (e.g. small, 
large). To validate this decision, I interviewed two key policy actors of the state 
(Federation of Agriculture and Livestock – FAMATO and Institute of Agro-economics – 
IMEA). This sampling procedure resulted in six municipalities: Querência, Paranatinga, 
Sorriso, Sinop, Alta Floresta and Lucas do Rio Verde. These municipalities were selected 
as bases for the interviews. However, many interviewed landowners have parcels in other 
surrounding municipalities.  
In each municipality, I contacted local organisations such as local associations 
and NGOs. After a brief explanation of my research, they were asked to provide contacts 
of affiliated landowners. Landowners were then contacted via phone and invited to 
participate in the study by taking part in face-to-face interviews. In total, 113 landowners 
were invited but only 59 agreed to participate. The participants were classified into buyers 
and sellers, according to their declared LR percentages. Although this sampling procedure 
is in accordance with the methodology used (see Chapter 2 and Appendix 2 for details), 
landowners who were not affiliated to any local organisation were not approached. Hence, 
the opinions of such group were not accounted in this study, limiting the conclusions of 
this chapter. 
During interviews, I collected both sociodemographic data (e.g. age, education, 
farm size and land use) and their viewpoints about the Brazilian offset scheme. As this 
the analysis in Chapter 2 involved human participants, ethical approval was granted by 
University of Leeds Ethics Review Committee (ref: AREA 15-099, Appendix 1) prior to 
data collection. Key concerns raised were regarding discussing sensitive topics (as one of 
them was illegal deforestations), maintaining of full anonymity of respondents, obtaining 
free, prior informed consent and ensuring that personal data would remain undisclosed.  
In order to avoid raising expectations, I maintained transparency with all 
participants about the purpose of my research and reminded them at the beginning of each 
interview, that I was an independent researcher, with no connection with any 
governmental body. 
1.9.2 Brazilian land tenure database 
To understand the environmental implications of the Brazilian offset across an 
entire biome (Chapter 3), I used a comprehensive land tenure database published by 
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Freitas et al. (2017) that integrates georeferenced land use categories including both 
private and public land. This land tenure map adopts a spatial resolution of 50 meters and 
contains the different categories of land use for all types of rural properties in Brazil. As 
the focus of this thesis is the Brazilian Amazon, I selected properties within the biome’s 
boundaries, resulting in a database with nearly 370,000 rural properties, encompassing 
private land that overlaps with PAs and private land outside PAs (details in Appendix 3).  
Private properties in Brazil must be registered in a national official data bank (e.g. 
Rural Environmental Registry – CAR as the Portuguese acronym). In this dataset, there 
were some voids in some portions of the area mapped, which indicated the absence of 
registered private properties as there were no property boundaries. Despite of this 
limitation, the analysis done in Chapter 3 was not affected, as only registered properties 
are eligible to participate in this scheme. However, these unregistered properties will 
likely be registered in the future, thus the ~370,000 properties used in the analysis of 
Chapter 2 might be underestimated.  
1.9.3 Land cover data  
Global Forest Cover (GFC) data  
I used the GFC dataset (Hansen et al., 2013) to estimate potential cleared areas 
inside PAs to explore potential regrowth in Chapter 3. The most recent year available at 
the time of this analysis was 2016. This data was used exclusively for PAs as I was 
interested in forest and non-forest areas only.  
GFC dataset accounts for tree loss or vegetation loss, and not specifically forest 
loss. Therefore, GFC incorporates secondary forest and/or forest plantations within the 
tree loss category. As a result, this dataset does not attempt to define what type of 
vegetation loss has occurred, e.g. secondary forest, old-growth forest, forest plantation. 
However, this particular limitation did not likely affect the analysis presented in Chapter 
2, as it is solely focused on the Amazon biome. 
TerraClass  
The FC is specific about the cut-off date (2008) which buyers are eligible to offset 
their LR deficit. For this reason, I used TerraClass 2008 to estimate native vegetation and 
land use at the time to map potential buyers. TerraClass is a project of the Brazilian Space 
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Research Agency (INPE) together with The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
(EMBRAPA) that maps land use and land cover changes across the Brazilian Amazon 
and maps 15 different land cover classes (see Almeida et al., 2016). TerraClass explicitly 
accounts for classes, such as secondary forest and regenerating pasture (which can both 
be accounted as native vegetation remnants as part of the LR) hence the preference for 
this dataset. I also used TerraClass 2014 to map potential sellers with the latest TerraClass 
year available. As a result, all rural properties used in Chapter 3 had their native 
vegetation and land use mapped (details in Appendix 3).  
To map deforestation across the Brazilian Amazon, TerraClass uses data from 
PRODES (Programme for Deforestation Monitoring in the Brazilian Legal Amazon) 
which records annual deforestation that is above 6.25ha (Almeida et al., 2016). Such 
limitation might miss small-scale deforestation especially in small properties. In addition, 
although TerraClass provides 30m resolution images, it uses MODIS (Moderate 
Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) to classify the land cover categories, which is 
250m resolution. Such resolution might misclassify different categories of pasture, as all 
pasture categories exhibit similar ground structure (grasses, weeds and shrubs, Almeida 
et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the spatial analysis in Chapter 3 did not attempt to work with 
pasture categories directly as the main focus was the extent of native vegetation in each 
private property.  
1.9.4 Aboveground biomass data 
To estimate biomass stock and potential biomass accumulation in Chapter 4, I 
used a pan-tropical aboveground fused biomass map published by Avitabile et al. (2016). 
This dataset combines two existing aboveground biomass maps and a variety of field 
observations (e.g. tree-based field data and high-resolution local biomass maps) to derive 
a comprehensive 1km resolution pan-tropical fused map of aboveground biomass. To 
meet the objectives of Chapter 4, I used AGB values for each rural property in the 
Brazilian Amazon biome.  
Although this is perhaps the most comprehensive AGB map for the tropics, there 
are some limitations. For example, areas which the existing biomass maps used to 
compose the fused map presented errors, these errors persisted in the fused map if field 
observations of such areas were inexistent and therefore unable to provide correction. 
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Particularly in heavily disturbed forests in South America, this was the case, where quality 
field observation data were lacking (Avitabile et al., 2016).  
1.9.5 Species composition value  
 As the main interest of Chapter 4 was to use beta-diversity as the biodiversity 
component, I used a biodiversity dataset of the Amazon that uses a set of biodiversity 
metrics (e.g. phylogenetic composition, species richness and endemism) to map regions 
of unique species composition at 500m resolution (Strand et al., 2018). This dataset 
comprises terrestrial angiosperm, arthropods, and vertebrates (amphibians, birds and 
mammals).  
 To the best of my knowledge, this is the only dataset that attempts to map beta-
diversity across the entire Amazon biome. The model employed by the authors considers 
species occurrence (presence/absence) to map species variation across the space. 
However, due to large sampling gaps in the Amazon, this dataset does not fully capture 
the species composition heterogeneity of the biome (Oliveira, 2015). In addition, the 
interpolation method the authors used to spatially model the species composition (see 
Strand et al., 2018) implies a linear relationship between species composition that might 
not be entirely realistic. 
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Chapter 2: Divergent landowners' 
expectations may hinder the uptake of forest 
certificate trading scheme 
  
Abstract 
A major challenge to reduce forest loss in the tropics is to incentivise conservation on 
private land in agricultural settings. Engaging private landowners in conservation 
schemes is particularly important along deforestation frontiers, such as in the southern 
Brazilian Amazon. While we know much about what motivates landowners to participate 
in schemes as providers, or sellers, of land for conservation, understanding what 
motivates landowners who act as buyers, i.e. those who require land to meet conservation 
obligations, remains lacking. Here we identify viewpoints of sellers and buyers of an 
emerging forest certificate trading scheme in Brazil and quantify the compatibility of their 
views to examine potential barriers to trade. Sellers and buyers could be divided into three 
groups, but only one group in each case was positive about participating. The differing 
viewpoints suggest that contracts should have minimum duration; and restricting spatial 
scope of trade could maximise uptake of unwilling landowners to effectively avoid future 
deforestation.   
32 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The historical depletion of the natural environment (Gibbons et al., 2016) has led 
to the emergence of a wide variety of market-based conservation instruments. These 
schemes differ in rationale and implementation, but in essence attempt to create supply 
and demand for environmental goods (Lapeyre et al., 2015). Worldwide, forest 
conservation has often been the focus of such schemes, commonly based on Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES). Here, landowners receive payments from an institution 
(e.g. government, NGO, collective fund) to provide certain environmental goods or 
services, such as carbon storage/sequestration (Kosoy et al., 2008; Börner et al., 2017). 
Other recent schemes involve establishing markets for land, such as Tradable 
Development Rights, biodiversity offsets and habitat banking (Santos et al., 2014). These 
promote trade between private actors as “buyers” and “sellers” of environmental 
goods/services, potentially reconciling the trade-off between development and 
conservation (Ring et al., 2010). All such schemes rely on voluntary engagement of 
private landowners as an important factor to deliver long-lasting conservation gains 
(Kosoy et al., 2008; Yeboah et al., 2015). 
In many conservation schemes, participation of rural landowners has been largely 
linked to socio-demographic factors: better-off, well-educated and owners of larger plots 
of land are more inclined to participate, whereas age and gender are not determinant 
factors (Pagiola et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2012; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). Less is known, 
however, about how programme-specific factors influence landowners’ participation 
(Greiner and Gregg, 2011; Yeboah et al., 2015). Additionally, the possibility that sellers 
and buyers might have different perceptions on programme-specific factors and be 
influenced by them in different ways is typically disregarded in the analysis of 
conservation schemes (Bastian et al. 2017; Zabala et al. 2017). For instance, long 
contracts and lack of information tend to be obstacles for sellers (Page and Bellotti, 2015; 
Yeboah et al., 2015). In contrast, a scheme that has clear conservation potential often 
encourages the participation of those landowners who have a positive environmental 
attitude (Greiner and Gregg, 2011; Bremer et al., 2014; Kwayu et al., 2014). High 
payment value can also encourage landowners to participate and forgo opportunity costs, 
but it is not always the main reason for their enrolment (Kosoy et al., 2008; Bremer et al., 
2014; Page and Bellotti, 2015). Overall, understanding the influence of these programme-
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specific factors on the uptake of conservation schemes is important, as they can be 
modified by policy interventions. 
Accounting for the perceptions of buyers and sellers within conservation schemes 
is particularly urgent in areas under high and increasing deforestation pressure and land-
use change, such as at the deforestation frontier in tropical forest landscapes (Nordhagen 
et al., 2017; Zabala et al., 2017). Some tropical countries have incorporated conservation 
incentives into their environmental policies through protection of forest within private 
land (Börner et al., 2016). For example, Brazil, with the world’s largest tropical forest, 
has invested in a variety of strategies to halt deforestation, which have resulted in a 70% 
decline in forest loss from 2005 to 2013 (Nepstad et al., 2014), although deforestation has 
risen more recently (Tollefson, 2016). In particular, the Brazilian Forest Code has 
introduced a promising strategy - the Environmental Reserve Quota (Portuguese 
acronym, CRA; see Appendix 2 for details) - that could potentially avoid the deforestation 
and degradation of native vegetation across a wide range of biomes (Soares-Filho et al., 
2016). The CRA is a mechanism of tradable forest certificates in which private 
landowners can trade hectares of native standing forest (Bernasconi et al., 2016). This 
chapter aims to explore the diversity and agreement between potential sellers and buyers’ 
perceptions of programme-specific factors within CRA (e.g. contract length, price, 
intermediaries, trust, information) and identify factors that result in sharp divergences 
between sellers and buyers that could potentially affect trade. 
2.2 Methods 
The Brazilian Forest Code states that private landowners must set aside areas of 
native vegetation within their farmland. Those who have deforested these set-aside areas 
(hereafter “Legal Reserve”; LR) above the maximum permitted may compensate for their 
deficit by acquiring hectares from landowners who have LR surplus. Non-compliant 
landowners are also given other options, such as: (1) buy and/or register another property 
with LR surplus; (2) acquire private areas pending tenure regularization inside publicly 
owned protected areas and donate to the Environmental Agency; (3) allow natural 
recovery or reforestation of the area (Brasil 2012).  Another key piece of the Forest Code 
that will help monitor CRA trades is the rural registry system, which is still to be finalized. 
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Under this system, landowners must register and georeference their land, to promote 
transparency and compliance (May et al., 2015). 
2.2.1 Study location 
Mato Grosso is the third largest state in Brazil and has extensive coverage by the 
Amazon, Cerrado and Pantanal biomes (Figure 2.1). Since the early 1990s, Mato Grosso 
has experienced high rates of deforestation, mainly driven by expansion in pasture and 
soybean plantations (Brando et al., 2013). Private properties in Mato Grosso occupy 73 
(of 90) Mha and nearly 22% (16Mha) of native vegetation was cleared between 1990 and 
2012 (Brando et al., 2013). Across the state as a whole, around 5.6 Mha of native 
vegetation within private land have been deforested above the maximum permitted 
(Soares-Filho et al., 2014). There should, therefore, be considerable demand from 
landowners to ‘buy’ forest credits in order to meet their legal obligations (Soares-Filho et 
al., 2014). Nevertheless, there are also landowners who retain set-aside areas which 
exceed the minimum required who could, therefore, act as sellers. This makes Mato 
Grosso a large potential market for CRA trades (Soares-Filho et al., 2016), once the Forest 
legislation is fully enforced and the CRA is regulated.  
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Figure 2.1 Inset: location of municipalities sampled in Mato Grosso (MT). Dark grey shades indicate the biomes in MT and the white areas are conservation units or 
indigenous lands. Main figure: Panels (a)–(e) show the municipalities where buyers and sellers have plots (a single landowner can own several plots of land): (a) Alta 
Floresta, Carlinda and Nova Canaã do Norte; (b) Tapurah, Lucas do Rio Verde, Sorriso and Vera; (c) Querência; (d) Paranatinga and Nova Ubiratã; and (e) Tabaporã, 
Ipiranga do Norte, Sinop, Cláudia, União do Sul and Santa Carmem. White areas represent the same conservation units or indigenous lands in the inset; grey areas area 
settlements and lighter grey shading represents area covered by private land. Different symbols represent buyers or sellers, symbol size is proportional to property size 
and each colour represents a different land‐use. Black solid bars represent 50 kilometres in each of the (a)–(e) panels to give an indication of scale.
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2.2.2 Assessing willingness to participate in CRA 
I used Q-methodology to explore the diversity of opinions of buyers and sellers 
regarding the CRA programme-specific factors (details in Appendix 2). Q-methodology 
identifies and clusters individuals according to distinct perceptions of a topic (Watts and 
Stenner, 2012). Our main objective was to assess different opinions on CRA, and Q-
methodology enables an exploratory narrative of these opinions via a systematic and 
quantitative analysis (Zabala and Pascual, 2016). 
Between June and August of 2016 I contacted farmers within the sampled 
municipalities (Figure 2.1) via local organisations that could facilitate communication by 
providing local landowners contacts (e.g. rural unions, cooperatives, local NGOs and 
Municipal Agricultural and Environmental Agencies). Of the 113 farmers invited to 
participate, 59 agreed to be interviewed (52.2% response rate), comprising 35 potential 
sellers (landowners who stated they have LR surplus) and 24 potential buyers (stated LR 
deficit). Participants were shown 39 statements representing possible opinions on CRA 
programme-specific factors and asked to sort these onto a grid which represents their level 
of disagreement or agreement, namely Q-sort (Appendix 2, Figure A2.2). Twenty-seven 
statements were identical to both groups, five were similar with opposing meanings 
(Table 2.2) and seven were specific to either sellers or buyers (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). I built 
statements and thematic categories (contract length, price, intermediaries, trust, 
transaction costs, payment vehicle, information, eco-effectiveness and demotivation) 
based on literature review and interviews with key actors (details in Appendix 2). All 
statements were pilot-tested with six landowners prior to application with participants. 
In spite of the efforts to cover a variety of land-uses, farm sizes and demographic 
profiles (Table 2.1), landowners who are remotely-based and non-affiliated to any 
organisation are likely undersampled. However, our final sample reflects the main 
characteristics of Mato Grosso’s agriculture: large landholdings (> 1000 ha) dominated 
by pasture and soybean (DeFries et al., 2013; Godar et al., 2014). 
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Table 2.1 Summary information about sellers and buyers (covering landholder and farm characteristics) 
and respective explained variances for each grouping identified as part of the Q analysis: A represents 
independent conservationists; B environmental disbelievers; C willing deforesters; D CRA outsiders; E 
cautious buyers; and F compensation seekers. 
  Sellers Buyers 
  
A B C D E F 
  
n=14 n=10 n=7 n=8 n=10 n=5 
 
Explained variance (%)* 20 14 10 19 17 10 
Landholder 
 
      
 
Average age 46 53 55 49 51 46 
 
Education       
 
Primary school (%) 28 20 40 25 20 0 
 
Secondary school (%) 29 20 0 37 10 40 
 
Technical (%) 7 0 20 0 0 20 
 
University (%) 36 60 40 38 70 40 
Farm 
 
      
 
Mean farm size† and SD 
2224 
(3779)   
7119 
(16169)  
3768 
(7029)  
12931 
(20369)  
6186 
(6548) 
2740 
(2675) 
 
Mean arable area and SD 
797 
(1429) 
475 
(450) 
2070 
(2718) 
7730 
(11351) 
4967 
(6552) 
1748 
(1125) 
 
Mean Legal Reserve and 
SD 
1417 
(2781) 
5957 
(16335) 
2604 
(4908) 
5890 
(11555) 
911 
(1395) 
920 
(1762) 
 
Land-Use       
 
Pasture (%) 50 50 28 12 10 20 
 
Agriculture (%) 14 20 28 50 60 80 
 
Pasture + agriculture (%) 0 20 30 38 30 0 
 
Timber (%) 7 10 14 0 0 0 
 
Fruits (%) 29 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Biome       
 
Cerrado (%) 36 50 43 25 30 20 
 
Amazon (%) 64 50 57 75 70 80 
*Altogether, the three factors extracted explained 44% of the study variance. Factor 
analysis considers as a reasonable solution an explained variance above 35% (Howard 
et al., 2016). 
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† Most of the areas registered in CAR (rural database system) for MT are greater than 
1,000 hectares (Godar et al., 2014). 
2.2.3 Data analysis 
Q-sorts from buyers and sellers were analysed separately using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and varimax rotation in R package ‘qmethod’ (Zabala, 
2014). The analysis provides representative groups of participants who share similar 
views about CRA. The final product of the analysis is an idealized sorting distribution 
of statement scores (hereafter ‘normalised factor scores’; ranging between -4 (strongly 
disagree) to +4 (strongly agree)) corresponding to the view of a hypothetical best 
representative participant of each group; and the statements that are statistically 
distinguishable to groups of sellers or buyers for p-value < 0.05 (Zabala, 2014). To ease 
subsequent calculations, I negated the buyers normalized factor scores for statements 
with opposing meaning between the two groups (Table 2.2, statements with asterisks). 
2.2.4 Measuring trade compatibility between buyers and sellers 
To assess whether buyers and sellers have similar views about programme-
specific factors that could indicate a potential trade, I developed a Trade Compatibility 
Index (TCI) for each combination of buyer and seller category across all statements 
(details in Appendix 2), based on significant differences in normalised factor scores. TCI 
is calculated for a particular pair of sellers and buyers as derived from the PCA analysis. 
The lower the TCI, the more compatible a pair is in their perceptions (i.e. more similar 
Q-sort). More formally, we define TCI as: 
 
𝑇𝐶𝐼({𝑠}) =  
 ∑ |𝑆𝑖 − 𝐵𝑖| 𝑝𝑖
𝑆𝑝𝑖
𝐵
𝑖∈𝑠
𝐶 × ∑  𝑝𝑖
𝑆𝑝𝑖
𝐵
𝑖∈𝑠
 
 
(Eq. 2.1) 
where 𝑆𝑖 is the normalised factor score for statement 𝑖 for sellers and 𝐵𝑖 is the normalised 
factor score for statement 𝑖 for buyers. 𝑝𝑖
𝑋 equals 1 if the respective statement was given 
a significantly different score (p < 0.05) by a group, when pairwise compared to scores 
given by all other groups. If not significant, 𝑝𝑖
𝑋 equals 0. This is to ensure that only 
statements that were distinct to define how a group “thinks” were included in the 
calculations. The constant C ensures TCI range from 0 to 1 (here 𝐶 = 8; C is the sum of 
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minimum and maximum absolute values of normalised factor scores). I calculated TCI 
for each pair of sellers and buyers, starting with statements set {𝑠} belonging to the 
contract thematic category, and step-wise added other thematic categories to the 
statements set in Eq. 2.1 (details in Appendix 2).  
2.3 Results 
PCA analyses revealed three groups of sellers and three of buyers (total explained 
variance 44% and 46%, respectively). Q-methodology is designed to capture the diverse 
viewpoints from a relatively small sample size (Zabala and Pascual, 2016). Thus the 
number of assigned sellers and buyers to each group (Table 2.1) cannot be used as an 
accurate measure of their relative proportion within the overall landowner population. Of 
the 35 potential sellers interviewed, four were not representative of any of the three 
groups, while of the 24 potential buyers, only one was not representative (all identified 
via automatic flagging; details in Appendix 2). Hence, they were not considered in 
subsequent analyses.  
2.3.1 Sellers 
A lack of awareness about their responsibilities (statement 12 for sellers, hereafter 
denoted S12) was a consensus statement among sellers. Sellers also collectively agreed 
that transaction costs should be included in CRA price per hectare (S37). Beyond these 
areas of consensus, three groups of sellers were identified: 
Independent conservationists (group A) 
Ideas of conservation provoked strong feelings for these landowners. They not 
only agreed that CRA can be a good conservation scheme to significantly protect forests 
at a large scale (S4, S5), but are also eager to conserve regardless of an economic incentive 
(S6). Predominantly composed of small landowners, 29% rely exclusively on growing 
fruits and vegetables as their main land-use (Table 2.1). 
Their mean LR is the lowest of the sellers (Table 2.1), but this does not alter their 
perception that CRA could be a way to receive income for their LR (S34). Price (S28) 
was important, and for them it should vary according to forgone opportunity costs, even 
though they do not wish to deforest their land. ‘With or without CRA the forest must be 
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preserved. Our consciousness does not let us do any type of deforestation', said one 
independent conservationist in this interview. 
This group was strongly motivated to take part in CRA as they disagreed with 
statements on potential barriers (S24, S31). However, they require more information to 
facilitate their engagement (S8). They do not anticipate deforesting their LR surplus in 
the near future (S33) and a 10-year contract appears to be a good period (S2).   
Environmental disbelievers (group B) 
Although attributing importance to conservation (S4, S33), this group does not 
believe that CRA will help protect forests (S5). They distrust negotiation with other 
landholders (S22) and do not wish to create opportunities to build trust (S23), indicating 
reluctance to be involved at all. Even a higher price (S30) per hectare did not influence 
their distrust in CRA, or in other landowners. Additionally, they do not see any reason to 
participate (S24). They recognise the importance of intermediaries in facilitating trade 
(S16) and are aware that this can have an impact on pricing (S14) but were unconcerned 
about the other roles intermediaries might have (S13, S17, S35). Long-term and perpetual 
contracts are unthinkable (S3, S36) and the potential CRA returns were not important 
(S20, S28, S32). 
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Table 2.2 Sellers and buyers’ statements and respective programme-specific factors, including the normalised factor scores for each group (group definitions given in 
Table 1 caption). The scores range from -4 (strong disagreement) to + 4 (strong agreement). Asterisks represent significant differences (**p < 0.05) of the scores given 
by the groups thus scores with asterisks are significantly different from the other scores given by the other groups. Sentences in bold are consensus statement amongst 
either sellers or buyers.  
Thematic 
categories 
Statement 
number 
Statement 
Sellers   Buyers   
A B C D E F 
Contract  S1/B1 Five years is the maximum period I'd contract CRA. -1** 1** -2* 0** -3 -3 
Contract  
S2/B2 
I think a 10-year contract is good length to guarantee stability and a fair price for 
contracting CRA. 
3** -1 -3 0** -2 -1 
Contract  S3/B3 I'd rather sign long-term contracts, from 15 years onwards. -1 -3** 0 -2* 0** 2** 
Eco-
effectiveness 
S4/B4 The CRA scheme will significantly help animal and plant conservation. 4** 3** -1** 2** 4 3 
Eco-
effectiveness 
S5/B5 The CRA scheme will help protect forested areas. 4** 1** -2** 1 -1 3** 
Eco-
effectiveness 
S6/B6 I'd deforest all native vegetation on my property if the Forest Code allowed. -4 -4 -1** -2 -4** -2 
Information S7/B7 
Before this interview, I already had a good knowledge of the regulations and 
requirements in the new Forest Code. 
0 2** 0 2 1 2 
Information S8/B8 Before this interview, I was well-informed of the possibility to trade forest credits (CRA). -4 -1* -2 -1 -1 0* 
Information S9/B9 I think the CRA rules are too complicated. 0 -1 3** -1 1** -1 
Information S10/B10 I think CRA will not work. -2** 0* 1** -3** 1** -3* 
Information S11/B11 I know intermediary institutions of CRA such as BVRio and Biofilica. -2 -2 -4** 0** -2** -4** 
Information S12/B12 I don't know what my responsibilities are as a seller/buyer. 2 3 1 0 -1 0 
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Intermediary S13/B13 
I would be willing to pay an annual fee for an intermediary institution that monitors the 
contract yearly. 
1** 0** -2** -3 -2 1** 
Intermediary S14/B14 Having an intermediary makes the whole process more expensive. 0** 2 3 1** 2** -1** 
Intermediary S15/B15 To me it would be impossible to go through all the CRA process without an intermediary. 1** -1** 2** 1 -2** 0 
Intermediary S16/B16 I do not know where to find buyers and I need somebody to do that for me. 2 2 0** 0 0 1** 
Intermediary S17/B17 I prefer to negotiate CRA contract with a buyer/seller myself, without intermediaries. -1* 0* 2** 1 1 -2** 
Payment 
vehicle 
S18/B18 I prefer to receive/pay annual payments for the duration of the contract. 0 2** -1 -1 0 -2* 
Payment 
vehicle 
S19/B19 I only feel safe to receive/ pay the payment via an intermediary. 1 -3** 1 -2 -2 0** 
Price S20/B20 The price will depend on my land-use. 1** -1** 4** 1* 0 1 
Transaction 
costs 
S21/B21 
The associated expenses (negotiation, fencing (as seller) etc.) are a significant barrier for 
me to participate in CRA 
0 -1 2** 0 0 -1 
Trust S22/B22 I would trust an unknown landholder to proceed with a CRA contract. -2** -3 -2 0 -4** 0 
Trust S23/B23 I would visit the property of the seller/buyer, no matter how far it is, before selling credits 1** -2 -1 -4** 3** 1** 
Demotivation S24/B24 I do not see any real incentive for me to sell/compensate my exceeding Legal Reserve -2** 4** -1* 1* 2** -1** 
Demotivation S25/B25 
I think the Forest Code will change again, so will wait and do nothing in the next few 
years 
0** 1 1 -1 2** 0 
Contract S26/B26 I would only sell/buy CRA for perpetuity. -3 -4 -1** -2** 2** 4** 
Transaction 
costs 
S27/B27 CRA must have a fiscal incentive for aiming at conservation. 2 3 4 3** 3 2 
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Price S28 The per-hectare price of CRA should be at least how much I would get renting my land 3 1** 3 NA NA NA 
Price B28* The per-hectare price of CRA should be at most how much I make per hectare NA NA NA (+)-3** (+)-1** (-)2** 
Price S29 The per-hectare price of CRA should be at least how much I would get selling my land -2* -2** 1** NA NA NA 
Price B29 
The per-hectare price of CRA should be at most how much I would pay purchasing 
vegetated land in my region. 
NA NA NA 3 3 2 
Price S30 For a higher price, I would sell to any landowner regardless of his location in my state -3 -2 -4** NA NA NA 
Price B30† For a lower price, I would buy from any landowner regardless of his location in my state. NA NA NA (+)-1 (+)-1 (-)1* 
Demotivation S31 CRA will only be attractive for who has Legal Reserve well above the minimum. -1** 0 1 NA NA NA 
Demotivation B31† CRA will only be attractive for who has Legal Reserve well below the minimum. NA NA NA (+)-1** (-)2** (+)-3** 
Price S32 The longer the contract the higher the price should be. -1* 0** 2** NA NA NA 
Price B32* The longer the contract the lower the price should be. NA NA NA (-)3 (-)1 (-)4* 
† the normalised factor scores of these statements were negated to ease calculations using Eq. 2.1 
 
Table 2.3 Sellers’ only statements and respective programme-specific factors, including the normalized factor score for each group (group definitions given in Table 1 
caption). Asterisks represent differences between groups significant at **p-value < 0.05. Sentences in bold are consensus statement amongst sellers. 
Thematic 
categories 
Statement 
number 
Statement 
Sellers Buyers 
A B C D E F 
Eco-
effectiveness 
S33 I wouldn’t deforest my exceeding Legal Reserve. 3 4 -3** NA NA NA 
Information S34 I see CRA as an investment so I will definitely be part of this market. 2** -2 -3 NA NA NA 
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Intermediary S35 An intermediary institution as a mediator reduces the risk of default. 2** 0 0 NA NA NA 
Transaction 
costs 
S36 The requirement of fencing makes CRA unattractive to me -1** 1 0 NA NA NA 
Transaction 
costs 
S37 
The costs for travelling, documentation, certificates and other associated expenses must 
considered as part of the CRA price 
1 2 0 NA NA NA 
Demotivation S38 My exceeding LR is not significantly large so I wouldn’t be willing to issue CRA -3** 1 2 NA NA NA 
Demotivation S39 
Only CRA credits are not enough to make up the effort I made to conserve my exceeding Legal 
Reserve. 
0* 0 0 NA NA NA 
 
Table 2.4 Buyers’ only statements and respective programme-specific factors, including the normalized factor score for each group (group definitions given in Table 1 
caption). Asterisks represent differences between groups significant at **p-value < 0.05. Sentences in bold are consensus statement amongst buyers. 
Thematic 
categories 
Statement 
number 
Statement 
Sellers Buyers 
A B C D E F 
Eco-
effectiveness 
B33 If buying from another private landholder I'd like it to be from a conservation priority area. NA NA NA 2** 0 1 
Price B34 I am very afraid of getting fined for non-compliance with the Forest Code. NA NA NA 2** -1 0 
Trust B35 
I am afraid to run the risk of the sellers not keeping their obligations to preserve the land 
appropriately. 
NA NA NA -2 1** -1 
Demotivation 
B36 
I would prefer to buy vegetated land from another private landholder to be in compliance as 
opposed to renting CRA. 
NA NA NA 2** 4** -4** 
Demotivation 
B37 
I would prefer to buy a land within a protected area and donate to the government as opposed to 
renting CRA. 
NA NA NA 4** 0 1 
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Demotivation B38 I prefer natural regeneration than buying CRA. NA NA NA -4** -3 -2 
Demotivation B39 To reforest my deficit is my least option. NA NA NA 4** -3** 3** 
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Willing Deforesters (group C) 
Price is all that matters to this group. CRA should provide the same financial 
return as productive land (S20, S28), regardless of its potential to protect native standing 
forests (S4, S5). How this potential monetary return will reach them does not matter (S18, 
S19). They do not perceive that complete deforestation is necessarily a poor outcome (S6) 
and would be willing to deforest their LR surplus (S33), suggesting they have no intrinsic 
motivation to conserve. They see CRA rules as too complicated (S9) and limited to 
specific groups of landowners (S31, S38). Interestingly, they were neutral about long-
term and perpetual contracts (S3, S26): CRA is simply not seen as a profitable investment 
(S34). This will act as a barrier to them entering the market as they will favour more 
profitable land-uses, such as cattle or agriculture.  
2.3.2 Buyers 
Lack of awareness about their responsibilities was also consensus among buyers 
(B12) and, in general, buyers did not attribute much importance to being uninformed 
about CRA. 
CRA outsiders (group D) 
This group wants to be exempted from their environmental liability for a 
competitive price, preferably without any responsibilities for land management 
(statement 37 for buyers, hereafter denoted B37). They are very production-driven and 
would not promote any sort of environmental conservation activity if it meant a loss of 
productive land (B38, B39). CRA seems to be an odd and unfair compensation strategy 
to them. It involves making regular payments for a forest certificate that will never be 
theirs and has an “expiry date”. Interestingly, from our interviews with them we learned 
that half of this group had recently acquired private land in areas designated by the 
government for conservation - the so called public conservation units. For them, to have 
somebody (the seller) managing a forested land for them is not a rational decision. They 
prefer to delegate this responsibility to the government (B36, B37) and are not prepared 
to consider any of the contract lengths proposed for CRA (B1, B2, B3, B26). In their own 
words: ‘The whole society should pay to maintain forest inside farms as the big urban 
centres also depend on clean air and water. To make this as an exclusive expense on the 
farmer is unfair.’ 
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Cautious buyers (group E) 
As opposed to the other buyers, this group understands the conservation value of 
their LR (B6). They believe CRA has conservation potential (B4) but not at a large scale 
(B5). To ensure reliable negotiations they like to take the lead and are unwilling to go 
through intermediaries (B15). This is illustrated by their preference to visit a seller’s 
property to minimise risks (B23) and to engender trust in the negotiation (B22). Perpetual 
contracts are the only contract duration that would be agreeable (B26). They are 
concerned about the longevity of CRA and stability of the Forest Code (B25), leaving 
them disinclined to participate (B24). They did not think they would participate in the 
market as: (i) they would rather acquire another forested farm in order to meet their 
obligations, rather than use CRA (B36); and (ii) in contrast with other buyers, they feel 
that active reforestation on their own land remains a possible strategy to recover their 
forest deficit (B39). 
Compensation seekers (group F) 
This group was the most willing to enter in CRA market, but their participation 
would be conditional on long-term contracts (B1, B2, B3, B26). They declined other 
compliance options (B36, B38, B39) and are indifferent about acquiring land in 
conservation units (B37). They see the conservation potential in CRA (B4, B5) and are 
positive about the success of the scheme (B10). However, a competitive price is important 
to guarantee their long-term participation (B28, B32). As they are seeking a perpetual 
contractual commitment, they seek the lowest price per hectare and trusting an unknown 
landowner is not an issue (B22, B23, B35). 
2.3.3 Trade Compatibility Index (TCI) 
Pairs of buyers and sellers were not substantially incompatible regarding CRA 
programme-specific factors (Figure 2.2). The overall TCI (i.e. including all thematic 
categories) for the most compatible pair (independent conservationists and compensation 
seekers: AF) was 0.16 on the scale of 0 to 1 (low TCI values indicate strong agreement; 
high values indicate strong disagreement for all statements in common). The most 
incompatible pair, willing deforesters and compensation seekers (CF), had a TCI of 0.417. 
TCI overall results suggest that willing deforesters, as the most incompatible group of 
sellers, is unlikely to engage in a trade. Although environmental disbelievers are ranked 
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as the second and third most compatible sellers, they clearly stated their disinterest in 
CRA. Apart from pairing up successfully (TCI = 0.167) with independent 
conservationists, compensation seekers were the most incompatible group of buyers (TCI 
range = 0.4 – 0.417). Ironically, they were the only group of buyers who considered 
participating in CRA.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Trade Compatibility Indexes (Eq. 2.1) for each pair of sellers and buyers. The darker the cell, 
the more compatible the pair. The thematic categories were included in the model step-wise left to right. 
For A to F titles, see caption in Table 1. To assess overall compatibility, sorting was made according to 
right-most column, which the one including all thematic categories. 
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Analysing how TCI values vary among different categories of factors allows us 
to identify the causes of particularly high agreement or disagreement between groups.  
For example, TCI values for contract length only are particularly high (e.g. TCI = 0.625) 
between environmental disbelievers and compensation seekers (BF), and the latter and 
willing deforesters (CF), as compensation seekers have a strong preference for long or 
perpetual contracts. For independent conservationists and compensation seekers (AF), 
contract length was not significant, in spite of independent conservationists’ disagreement 
with perpetual contracts (S26). However, when the TCI values were based only on price, 
AF had a relatively high TCI (0.438). When statements about other thematic categories 
were included, the incompatibility decreased suggesting price the main point of 
disagreement between them.  
2.4 Discussion 
Differences among landowners must be considered in the design of market-based 
conservation instruments as I show that perceptions of programme-specific factors vary 
widely among potential groups of sellers and buyers. Here, in the case of CRA, not all 
sellers were equally inclined to participate and not all buyers saw CRA as a good 
compensation strategy. Two programme-factors in particular played a major role in 
determining compatibility between buyers and sellers: contract length and price.  
Sellers prefer short-term contracts, as they associate long-term agreements with 
land management restrictions and the potential to miss future advantageous opportunities. 
In analogous programmes, such as PES and conservation easements, long-term and 
perpetual contracts discouraged the participation and permanence of sellers (Sorice et al., 
2013; Yeboah et al., 2015; Bastian et al., 2017). The results presented here corroborate 
these findings as potential CRA sellers are reluctant to accept long-term contracts. In 
contrast, it was found that buyers have a strong preference for long-term or perpetual 
agreements. Many buyers, therefore, might choose to acquire land inside publically 
owned protected areas. In Mato Grosso, these areas represent 800,000 ha in the Amazon 
and 50,000 ha in Cerrado (Andrade, J., May, P.H. & Bernasconi, 2013) which would 
cover a portion of the estimated LR deficit of 3.9Mha and 1.6Mha in Amazon and 
Cerrado, respectively (Soares-Filho et al., 2014).  
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Despite the fact that some buyers, such as CRA outsiders, are likely to meet their 
Forest Code obligations by purchasing land in conservation units, Amazon and Cerrado 
would still have 3.1Mha and 1.1Mha of demand left, respectively, which could result in 
successful CRA trades. Sellers willing to participate, such as independent 
conservationists, are well-placed to trade with compensation seekers, if issues around 
contract length can be resolved. To encourage this match, CRA regulation could set a 
minimum of 10-15 year contracts to ensure medium-term supply of forest certificates and 
to provide a middle-ground for sellers and buyers. This time-frame is widely adopted in 
analogous schemes (Lennox and Armsworth, 2011) and contributes to increased 
likelihood in future re-enrolment (Ando and Chen, 2011).  
Another important issue policy-makers need to address is how to make CRA more 
attractive to unwilling sellers like willing deforesters - landowners who clearly stated an 
intention of legally deforesting their LR surplus. If this land could be brought into CRA, 
the potential gains for the area of land under protection could be huge. In Mato Grosso, 
nearly 1.6Mha and 4Mha, in the Amazon and Cerrado, respectively, could face legal 
deforestation. For willing deforesters, who are more profit-driven, price will likely play 
an important role. Because their properties are located in regions of high opportunity 
costs, buyers will prefer trading with low-cost areas under no imminent deforestation 
pressure. A potential strategy to address issues around price is to restrict the spatial scale 
of trade (May et al., 2015). If trade could be constrained sub-regionally within the state, 
potentially restricted to areas under similar deforestation pressure, surpluses owned by 
willing deforesters could be brought into the market. Spatially restricted trade appears as 
an effective measure to achieve conservation gains both in CRA (Bernasconi et al., 2016) 
and in PES schemes (Sattler et al., 2013; Grima et al., 2016). 
These findings provide empirical evidence of how different perceptions on 
programme-specific factors can become substantial barriers to sellers and buyers 
engaging in trading land. To overcome these barriers, I suggest that (1) establishing 
minimum contract durations; and (2) restricting the spatial scale of trade to resolve issues 
around price and target specific landowner groups, are important policy recommendations 
that could minimise barriers to trade and improve chances of success. In addition, law 
enforcement and transparent monitoring should not be overlooked by regulators. 
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This study provides useful insights which can be applicable in contexts where 
peer-to-peer schemes are promoted to avoid further forest conversion. In settings that 
provide similar pre-conditions in terms of environmental policies and land tenure, it is 
likely that many buyers will also prefer perpetual solutions whereas sellers will prefer 
short-term contracts to avoid long-term commitments. In addition, landowners’ 
heterogeneity about a given scheme should be considered, in order to target specific 
groups that are not likely to participate. The Trade Compatibility Index, as a novel and 
generally applicable methodological step, allows a systematic comparison between 
groups, emphasizing trade potentialities and key programme-specific factors that could 
be points of concern. Forest conservation objectives are likely to be attainable if policies 
are sensitive to the intended audience.  
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Chapter 3: The scale of a forest offset 
scheme alters the outcomes for conservation 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Offset schemes help to reduce or avoid habitat loss either via averting loss, through 
protection of existing habitat, or by the restoration of degraded areas. The spatial scale of 
an offset scheme may influence which of these two outcomes is favoured, and is an 
important aspect of the design of these schemes. However, how spatial scale influences 
the trade-off between the preservation of existing habitat and restoration of degraded 
areas is poorly understood. Here, I therefore used the largest emerging forest offset 
scheme in the world, which is part of the Brazilian Forest Code, to explore how 
implementation at different spatial scales may affect the outcome in terms of the area of 
avoided deforestation and/or natural regrowth. I employed an efficiency frontier approach 
to identify which spatial scale provided greater averted loss or restoration. Allowing 
offsets over large spatial scales led to a greater area of avoided deforestation and only a 
small area allocated to regrowth, whilst restricting offsets to small spatial scales led to the 
opposite pattern. Overall, the greatest total area, and the largest area in regions that are 
already highly deforested, was directed to conservation when the scheme was 
implemented at small scales. To maximize conservation gains from averted loss and 
restoration, it is important that offset schemes embrace a “think local” focus when 
implementing nationwide strategies. A “think local” strategy will help to ensure that 
conservation benefits stay localized, and promote the recovery of degraded areas in the 
most threatened forest landscapes. 
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3.1 Introduction 
A variety of mechanisms have been developed to manage human-caused habitat 
change and promote outcomes that aid conservation (Betts et al., 2017). Some of these 
systems incentivise landowners to follow good environmental practices (e.g. subsidy 
payments and payments for ecosystem services), while others legislate to ensure that past 
or future environmental disturbances are compensated for (e.g. tradable permits or habitat 
and biodiversity offset schemes). The latter group operate as markets, in which 
environmental goods are traded between landowners who supply the market goods 
(“sellers”) and those who need to compensate for environmental damage (“buyers”, Ring 
et al. 2010). 
Offset schemes have gained popularity around the globe due to the 
straightforward logic of trading environmental losses for equivalent conservation gains, 
although there has been concern whether such equivalency can, in fact, be achieved (Bull 
et al., 2013; Bull et al., 2015). To compensate for environmental loss, offset schemes 
typically employ averted loss or restoration as offset strategies. These different strategies 
target different kinds of habitat (Gardner et al., 2013): averted loss targets the protection 
of existing biodiversity and natural habitat, such as old growth forest, whilst restoration 
favours the recovery of degraded habitats and promotes secondary vegetation (Curran et 
al., 2014; Maron et al., 2016). 
The trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages of conservation 
schemes that favour either averted loss or restoration have been extensively debated 
(Maron et al., 2012; Gardner et al., 2013; Curran et al., 2014; Quétier et al., 2015). While 
the length of time that restoration requires increases the risk of failure (Drechsler and 
Hartig, 2011; Maron et al., 2012), this strategy might be attractive if occurring on-site or 
near impacted areas (Wissel and Wätzold, 2010). For example, where impacts are caused 
by land cover change to pasture or agriculture, such as in many tropical forest regions, 
restoration via natural regrowth has been promoted to recover degraded land and enhance 
secondary forest cover (Chazdon et al., 2016; Strassburg et al., 2016). Averted loss, on 
the other hand, can favour the protection old-growth vegetation, but to result in effective 
conservation gains, the protected habitat needs to be ecologically equivalent (i.e. the same 
habitat type) to the damaged site (Bull et al., 2013). The protection also needs to occur in 
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sites where threats or development pressure are imminent, and therefore generate benefits 
that would not occur in the absence of the scheme – a concept defined as ‘additionality’ 
(Maron et al., 2010). 
A key element that determines the effectiveness of averted loss and restoration is 
the spatial location of the offset (Gonçalves et al., 2015). Several studies have used 
conservation planning approaches to identify the spatial scale (e.g. local or regional) 
where potential offsets should be located; they typically consider specific biological 
targets or habitat characteristics (e.g. species distributions, or the presence of certain taxa) 
to determine where offsets should occur (Kiesecker et al., 2009; Gordon et al., 2011; 
Underwood, 2011; Kujala et al., 2015). These studies indicate that both local and regional 
spatial scales have the potential to achieve averted loss and restoration goals, as long as 
offsets are placed in strategically defined areas. Conservation planning approaches have 
been particularly useful in offset schemes that explicitly include biodiversity metrics in 
their offset strategies (Gordon et al., 2011). However, some offset schemes have simpler 
offset conditions (e.g. a hectare of loss for a hectare of gain) that do not include specific 
biodiversity metrics (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010). In these cases, conservation 
planning approaches cannot be used so readily to determine the location of offsets. For 
these schemes, administrative boundaries, such as the limits to municipalities, states or 
counties, may be an appropriate way to influence the spatial scale and location of offsets 
in order to maximise the benefits for conservation. 
The approach to use administrative boundaries to define the spatial scales of offset 
schemes is currently used in the United States (e.g. for conservation banking and 
transferable development rights, McConnell & Walls 2009; McKenney & Kiesecker 
2010) and in Brazil (Brazilian Forest offsets, Soares-Filho et al. 2014) as they represent 
well-known jurisdictions in which many policy decisions already operate and therefore 
facilitate the implementation of offset markets. Some studies suggest that averted loss 
might not be achieved within offset schemes that use small administrative boundaries to 
limit trade, as this restriction will lead to a reduced number of sellers, and little area 
available for compensation (Chomitz, 2004; McConnell and Walls, 2009). Conversely, 
the use of larger administrative boundaries to expand trade, may lead to limited 
additionality. In these cases, areas that are under no current development pressure are 
likely to absorb the offsets that the scheme requires, as these areas will tend to have low 
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opportunity costs, and outcompete areas under deforestation pressure that are typically 
associated with high opportunity costs. Hence, only areas that would likely remain 
untouched even in the absence of the scheme may ultimately be protected, and scheme 
additionality will be very low (McConnell and Walls, 2009; Freitas et al., 2017). 
However, explicit tests of how the spatial scale of offsets might alter the trade-off between 
averted loss and restoration, and overall scheme additionality, have not been performed.    
Here, I quantify the effect of scale on the trade-offs between averted loss and 
restoration as conservation outcomes of an offset scheme, using the Brazilian Forest Code 
as a case study (Brasil 2012). This analysis focuses on the Amazon, the world’s largest 
standing forest covering 400 million hectares (Assunção et al., 2017) and holding nearly 
26% of total carbon stored in tropical forests (Baccini et al., 2012). Despite a historical 
decline, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has risen since 2014, endangering national 
commitments to reduce carbon emissions (Rochedo et al., 2018). I used avoided 
deforestation to represent averted loss and natural regrowth as a restoration strategy, as 
these are the principal conservation outcomes of the offset strategies within this example. 
I employed different administrative boundaries as approximations of different spatial 
scales (i.e. small to large) and compared the effect of scale on conservation outcomes 
across a range of policy scenarios. The administrative boundaries represent regions over 
which the scheme could be implemented and are well-established jurisdictions. I 
hypothesize that allowing offsets across large spatial scales will yield more avoided 
deforestation than regrowth, given the number of sellers available to offset, whilst the 
opposite happens at small spatial scales. I expect that intermediary spatial scales yield 
similar gains from avoided deforestation and regrowth. Regrowth and avoided 
deforestation were estimated using numerical simulation of offset trade between > 
370,000 buyers and sellers and consider our results in light of the current implementation 
guidelines for offsetting policies. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Description of case study 
The case study here is the Brazilian Forest Code (FC), which requires compliance 
from landowners who deforested property-level native vegetation above the limits 
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established law (Soares-Filho et al., 2016), hereafter called “buyers”. In general terms, 
offset can be via: 
1. Acquisition of private land inside protected areas (PAs). Private lands that overlap 
with PAs need to be expropriated. Offsets can be made via acquisition of such 
private lands followed by donation to the statutory environmental agency; 
2. For private landowners located outside PAs who own hectares of native 
vegetation above the minimum established by law (“sellers”) – a scheme called 
Cota de Reserva Ambiental (hereafter CRA as the Portuguese acronym); 
3. On-site offset restoration through natural regrowth or active reforestation. 
Buyers who wish to offset inside PAs (option 1) must purchase private land equivalent 
to the area deforested. This option allows for a perpetual solution for non-compliant 
buyers, which appears to be buyers’ preferred option (Giannichi et al., 2018). CRA 
(option 2), conversely, is a hectare-by-hectare market. A buyer can, therefore, trade with 
several sellers and one seller can supply several buyers. Instead of a single perpetual 
transaction, CRA works as a lease, in which contracts with specific durations are made 
between buyers and sellers. Lastly, regrowth (option 3) requires buyers to abandon 
deforested hectares to allow secondary forest to recover or actively reforest the deforested 
hectares (Soares-Filho et al., 2016). 
I used a land tenure database (Freitas et al., 2017) to acquire landowners’ property 
boundaries, and land cover datasets (TerraClass, Almeida et al. 2016, and Global Forest 
Change, Hansen et al. 2013) to calculate the extent of native vegetation per property - the 
Legal Reserve (LR). Based on the LR extent, I classified landowners into buyers or 
sellers. According to the FC, a landowner is a potential buyer if LR deforestation occurred 
prior to 2008. If the LR currently (I used TerraClass 2014 as proxy to estimate LR extent 
at the present) exceeds 80%, the property was classified as a seller. In private lands, LR 
that exceeds 80% can be legally deforested. Although native vegetation below this 
amount can never be deforested (so its protection in an offset scheme is non-additional), 
in some cases landowners who have LR below 80% are also eligible to supply the market. 
These cases include smallholders and settlements (i.e. former mega-properties that were 
under-used and allotted and distributed to families as part of agrarian reform since the 
1970’s), who can offer any amount of LR within their property. Private properties inside 
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PAs were also classified as sellers and their native vegetation was considered non-
additional for the same reasons as above. Section 1.7 in the introduction describes the 
specifics of the FC and Appendix 3 describes the datasets used (A3.2, A3.3) and the 
classification of buyers and sellers (A3.4). 
3.2.2 Offset spatial scales and policy scenarios 
I considered five different nested administrative boundaries as offset spatial scales 
(Table 3.1, Figure 3.1), from the large (biome) to small (municipality). The FC states that 
offset must occur within the same biome. If between states, offsets must occur in areas 
identified as priorities for conservation (Appendix 3, Figure A3.1). These areas represent 
regions of high biodiversity importance and are established by the Ministry of the 
Environment as regions of endemism or biodiversity hotspots. However, these areas are 
not protected. Instead, a number of private lands occur within these regions.  
Besides the boundaries mentioned in the law (biome and state), I used other three 
nationally established administrative boundaries (meso-regions, micro-regions and 
municipalities) that could facilitate implementation. The FC offset scheme has not been 
fully regulated, and thus offset scales can still be amended once each state legislates their 
own offsetting rules. Apart from biome, all administrative boundaries include several 
individual units which vary in size (Table 3.1). 
For each spatial scale, I considered three policy scenarios (Appendix 3, Figure A3.1): 
 Policy Scenario 1: Offset in all PAs, CRA and regrowth. Offset was allowed in 
private land inside all PAs. The text in the FC is not specific about whether the 
PA must be a federal, state or municipal area thus this scenario included all PAs, 
followed by CRA and regrowth as offset options. 
 Policy Scenario 2: Offset in federal PAs, CRA and regrowth. The Ministry of 
the Environment established a regulatory framework (Brasil, 2016) that considers 
only federal PAs for compensation. As states still need to legislate their offset 
rules, we included this framework as a scenario, excluding offsets in state and 
municipal PAs, followed by CRA and regrowth as offset options.   
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 Policy Scenario 3: Offset with CRA and regrowth. This scenario ruled out offset 
within private land inside any PAs and included only CRA and regrowth as offset 
options. 
Table 3.1 Spatial scales and respective deciles of units’ sizes in Mha, showing size variation within each 
scale. The biome scale is a single unit of 422 Mha, thus the absence of deciles. 
 
Units 
1st decile 
(Mha) 
5th decile 
(Mha) 
9th decile 
(Mha) 
Biome 1 - - - 
State 9 9.8 22.4 131 
Meso-region 26 1.6 9.2 38.6 
Micro-region 81 0.5 3.1 12.1 
Municipality 499 0.04 0.3 2.1 
 
Scenario 1 included all offset options stated by law – the most permissive scenario. 
Scenarios 2 and 3 gradually imposed restrictions on the offsets. I imposed such 
restrictions to better assess if the outcomes of imposing different scales would be 
consistent regardless of the restrictions. 
This analysis assumed that compliance is a buyer-led strategy, as incompliance incurs 
severe penalties, such as fines, land embargoes or no access to loans. Therefore, buyers 
actively ‘looked’ for sellers in our analysis. Offset in PAs appears to be preferred by 
buyers as, besides being perpetual (Giannichi et al., 2018), they tend to be low-cost 
(Freitas et al., 2017). Thus, in policy scenarios 1 and 2, I first attempted to exhaust demand 
inside the respective PAs. Then, CRA trade was simulated with the remaining demand. 
To simulate offset (PAs and CRA), an algorithm was developed (Appendix 3, A3.5) 
whereby each buyer sought the best-matching seller. In the case of offset in PAs, I 
assumed that buyers would be willing to purchase areas that were equivalent or up to 20% 
larger than their LR deficit, given their low-cost. If the conditions of area equivalence 
were met, a buyer was considered compliant. If not, a buyer remained non-compliant and 
available for CRA trade. As CRA is a hectare-by-hectare offset market, each buyer looked 
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for a seller that had the most similar area of native vegetation surplus to their deficit. A 
buyer was then considered compliant when they managed to offset all their deficit within 
the number of transactions allowed: we only allowed a limited number of transactions 
(one, for offset in PAs, and three for offset as CRA) as the general behaviour of buyers 
and sellers is to minimize transaction costs associated with each trade (Reid et al., 2015). 
If a buyer remained non-compliant after CRA trade, they were automatically allocated to 
offset through natural regrowth by default. Importantly, the assumptions above are 
simplifications of a complex and embryonic offset policy. There is still no data on offsets 
in PAs and CRA as they are still in early or pending regulatory stages. I submitted the 
simulations to a sensitivity analysis (Appendix 3, A3.7) (e.g. changes in the 20% limit of 
private land inside PAs and the number of transactions in CRA) to assess whether our 
results are robust. 
The best-match algorithm was iterated for each policy scenario at each spatial scale. 
After each of the 15 simulations, I computed the sum of total offset (in Mha) for each of 
the three compliance options: offset in PAs, CRA, and regrowth. Offset in PAs was subset 
into two conservation outcomes: the area of potential regrowth and the area representing 
non-additional offset. Private land in PAs, after acquired by buyers, must be donated to 
the statutory environmental agency, making their non-forested portions likely to be 
allocated to regrowth. The area covered by natural vegetation was therefore considered 
non-additional, as it is already protected. Total offset with CRA was also subset in two 
conservation outcomes: the avoided deforestation and non-additional offset. Avoided 
deforestation corresponded to offsets occurring in unprotected native vegetation (e.g. 
vegetation that can be deforested). Lastly, offsets through regrowth outside PAs was 
computed as a single conservation outcome. 
To calculate total additionality for each simulation, I summed avoided deforestation 
and regrowth (inside and outside PAs), assuming that these are both conservation benefits 
that would not occur in the absence of the offset scheme. Non-additional outcomes 
represented offsets in already protected vegetation that are mostly in the land of 
smallholders and settlements. Thus, the key conservation outcomes of this analysis were 
avoided deforestation, regrowth and total additionality. Finally, for each policy scenario 
and spatial scale, I calculated the percentages of each conservation outcome based on the 
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total deficit, to assess the proportion of total forest deficit that was effectively converted 
to a conservation gain.  
3.2.3 Optimal spatial scale with efficiency frontiers 
I constructed efficiency frontiers to assess the trade-off between avoided 
deforestation and regrowth for the five spatial scales for each scenario. Efficiency 
frontiers illustrate a set of optimal situations where returns of one objective cannot be 
increased without diminishing returns of another (Gourevitch et al., 2016). In this case, 
the returns were avoided deforestation and regrowth at each scale. 
This approach considers a hypothetical frontier representing a set of optimal 
values of avoided deforestation or regrowth. If any conservation outcome, at any spatial 
scale, lies on the hypothetical frontier, that given scale was interpreted as optimal to 
provide the maximum return of one outcome or the other. Frontiers were calculated as 
slopes (Appendix 3, A3.6), based on the differences between the maximum and minimum 
percentages of avoided deforestation and regrowth resulted from the largest to the 
smallest spatial scale (biome to municipality). 
Percentages of avoided deforestation and regrowth were plotted as curves 
showing the five spatial scales as points connected by lines, in each policy scenario. 
Although the lines did not represent a series of values between the spatial scales, I 
assumed that if other scales existed in between, they would follow the same trend. 
 
3.3 Results 
The total native vegetation deficit across the Brazilian Amazon was 4.94 Mha 
whereas the total supply of native vegetation that could be used for compensation (50 
Mha) was 10 times greater. Of this, 8.8 Mha could be legally deforested according to 
current legislation. Of the 41 Mha that could not be legally deforested, 17.8 Mha was in 
settlements and 13 Mha in already protected vegetation, such as private land inside 
protected areas. Small landholdings and non-additional sellers could offer 8.5 and 1.5 
Mha, respectively. There were substantial differences in the spatial distribution of the 
deficit. Mato Grosso, Pará and Rondônia contributed 80% of the total deficit, with the 
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northern Mato Grosso and south-eastern Pará containing around half of the deficit (2.3 
Mha). These regions are inevitably likely to absorb much of the demand for surplus. 
3.3.1 Effect of spatial scale 
Simulations showed three main results. Firstly, as scales became smaller, the area 
of offsets via avoided deforestation decreased and the area of offsets via regrowth 
increased (Figure 3.1, Table 3.2). Across all scenarios, offsets via avoided deforestation 
remained higher than regrowth at all scales, except at the municipality level, when more 
offsets were allocated to regrowth. This pattern was observed because whilst some 
municipalities hold large amounts of forest deficit and little surplus, others have vast 
amounts of surplus and very little deficit. At the municipality level, this imbalance 
becomes more evident, as municipalities with large amounts of deficit had little surplus 
to offset. Consequently, as scale decreases, we observed an increased contribution of 
regrowth to total additionality and a decreased contribution of avoided deforestation 
(Figure 3.1). 
Secondly, the total area directed to conservation was larger in an offset scheme 
implemented at smaller scales, than in a scheme allowing offsets over large scales. Using 
scenario 1 as an example (Figure 3.1), 2.07 Mha (41.9%) of the total deficit resulted in 
avoided deforestation and regrowth at the municipality level, compared to 1.38 Mha 
(27.8%) at the biome level (Table 3.2).  
Thirdly, spatial scales also altered the area of offsets inside PAs. As the scale of 
implementation was reduced, offsets inside PAs declined substantially (Table 3.2). The 
total supply of private land inside PAs would likely be enough to absorb the entire total 
deficit when using larger scales (e.g. biome) and result in very little additionality. 
However, our simulations showed that reducing the spatial scale also reduced offsets 
inside PAs, as high supply from PAs is less available at smaller scales.  
The sensitivity analysis showed that increasing the best-match limit of offset in 
PAs from 20% to 150%, resulted in an increase of only 4% of the total offset, at all scales 
(Appendix 3, Table A3.2). This result indicates that, even if the best-match assumptions 
established were more flexible, the findings showed here would likely remain the same, 
and that smaller scales would still result in more additionality when compared to larger 
scales.  
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In all scenarios, across all spatial scales, most of the offset was non-additional. In 
scenarios 1 and 2, offsets in PAs generated little regrowth compared to the total offset. 
For CRA offsets, avoided deforestation was lower than the non-additional offsets. 
Overall, the total additionality was smaller than 50% in all scenarios, with scenario 3 
resulting in the greatest total additionality across all scales (Table 3.2). 
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Figure 3.1 Expected spatial distribution and extent of conservation outcomes (avoided deforestation, regrowth and total additionality) in each spatial scale, for policy 
scenario 1. Maps in the far left column show boundaries of the scales, rows represent the five nested spatial scales. At state-level is given the acronym of each of the nine 
states: AC (Acre), AM (Amazonas), AP (Amapá), MA (Maranhão), MT (Mato Grosso), PA (Pará), RO (Rondônia), RR (Roraima) and TO (Tocantins). Maps show 
conservation outcomes as a proportion of the total area of the spatial scale units. Shades of (a) green, correspond to avoided deforestation; (b) blue, regrowth; and (c) red, 
total additionality. Darker shades represent more of a given conservation outcome. Light grey shades show areas where buyers were absent. Numbers under each coloured 
map show the sum of the given conservation outcome across all spatial scale units, in Mha. 
  
66 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Total offsets and conservation outcomes in protected areas (option 1), CRA trade (option 2) and regrowth (option 3) in million hectares (Mha), for each 
spatial scale and policy scenario (PS). The sum of the total offset for each option corresponds to the total native vegetation deficit (4.94Mha). Total offset inside PAs 
resulted in regrowth inside PAs as a conservation outcome and total offset with CRA resulted in avoided deforestation (avoided). Regrowth outside PAs was a single 
conservation outcome by itself. Total additionality is the sum of both avoided deforestation and regrowth (from inside and outside PAs) and total non-additionality is 
the sum of offsets that occurred in already protected standing vegetation. Each conservation outcome has a percentage given in bold and in brackets, calculated based 
on the total deficit. The percentage of total additionality and non-additionality sums to 100%. 
PS 
 
Spatial 
Scale 
Protected Areas (Mha) CRA Trade (Mha) 
Regrowth 
(Mha) 
Total 
additionality 
Total 
non-additionality 
Offset Regrowth Offset Avoided Offset 
1 
Biome 1.36  0.1 (2) 3.58  1.28 (25.8) 0.0005 (0.01) 1.38 (27.8) 3.56 (72.2) 
State 1  0.09 (1.9) 3.82 1.17 (23.6) 0.13 (2.6) 1.39 (28.1) 3.55 (71.9) 
Meso 0.68  0.07 (1.3) 3.95 0.97 (19.6) 0.31 (6.2) 1.35 (27.1) 3.59 (72.9) 
Micro 0.47  0.06 (1.2) 3.81 0.89 (18.1) 0.66 (13.3) 1.61 (32.6) 3.33 (67.4) 
Municipality 0.24  0.03 (0.6) 3.41 0.75 (15.1) 1.29 (26.2) 2.07 (41.9) 2.87 (58.1) 
2 
Biome 0.36  0.005 (0.1) 4.58 1.48 (30) 0.0004 
(0.0008) 
1.48 (30.1) 3.46 (69.9) 
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State 0.18  0.003 (0.07) 4.63 1.3 (27.5) 0.13 (2.6) 1.43 (30.7) 3.51 (69.3) 
Meso 0.17  0.003 (0.07) 4.45 1.1 (22.6) 0.32 (6.5) 1.42 (29.2) 3.52 (70.8) 
Micro 0.06  0.001 (0.03) 4.20 1 (21.2) 0.68 (13.8) 1.68 (35) 3.26 (65) 
Municipality 0.01  0.0003 
(0.007) 
3.72 0.84 (17) 1.21 (24.4) 2.05 (41.4) 2.89 (58.6) 
3 
Biome - - 4.94 1.64 (33.2) 0.0004 
(0.0008) 
1.64 (33.2) 3.3 (66.8) 
State - - 4.73 1.48 (29.9) 0.21 (4.3) 1.69 (34.2) 3.25 (65.8) 
Meso - - 4.62 1.20 (24.2) 0.32 (6.5) 1.52 (30.7) 3.42 (69.3) 
Micro - - 4.26 1.06 (21.5) 0.68 (13.8) 1.74 (35.3) 3.2 (64.7) 
Municipality - - 3.63 0.84 (17) 1.31 (26.5) 2.15 (43.5) 2.76 (56.6) 
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3.3.2 Different conservation outcomes at different scales 
The efficiency frontiers showed that both biome and municipality levels are the 
best scales to implement the offset scheme if the objective of the offset strategy is to 
preserve standing forest or promote secondary forest growth, respectively. Avoided 
deforestation was maximized at the biome level whereas regrowth at the municipality 
level, across all scenarios (Figure 3.2). At intermediary scales (state, meso-region and 
micro-region), neither avoided deforestation nor regrowth were maximized, except in 
scenario 3, where at state-level both conservation outcomes were also maximized. 
However, maximizing avoided deforestation at the biome level resulted in almost no 
regrowth, whereas the municipality level fostered regrowth without substantially 
reducing avoided deforestation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Avoided deforestation and regrowth (percentages from total deficit) under three policy 
scenarios. Red dots on the curves show percentages measured at five spatial scales: biome, state, meso-
region, micro-region, municipality (left to right). Grey dashed lines show efficiency frontiers. Dots that lie 
on the efficiency frontiers are the most efficient spatial scale for either avoided deforestation or regrowth.  
In all policy scenarios it is observed a decline in the efficiency of avoided 
deforestation offsets at the intermediary scales, mostly at meso and micro-regions (Figure 
3.2). This could be explained by a significant spatial limitation in terms of area, when 
restricting the trade from state to meso-region. In Pará state, for example, at state level, 
offsets can occur within an area of nearly 1,200,000 km2. When restricting offsets to 
meso-regions, the entire state is sub-divided into four smaller areas (Figure 3.1). At 
micro-regional level, the state is then sub-divided into eight smaller areas (Figure 3.1). 
Such spatial limitation reduces the number of potential areas available for avoided 
deforestation offsets, especially in regions of high deforestation rates, such as regions in 
Pará, Mato Grosso and Rondônia states. For this same reason, an increase in regrowth is 
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observed, as buyers would be limited to this offset option only, with the lack of forest 
surpluses to offset via avoided deforestation.    
3.4 Discussion 
The offset simulation exercise showed that the larger spatial scales (e.g. biome 
level) achieved more avoided deforestation, compared to smaller spatial scales (e.g. 
municipality level) which were associated with more regrowth. However, importantly, 
avoided deforestation was not substantially reduced at smaller spatial scales, meaning the 
greatest total benefit to conservation in terms of area was achieved at the smallest scale 
of offset implementation. All policy scenarios showed similar areas of avoided 
deforestation and regrowth. 
These results suggest that, in offset schemes, the choice of large or small spatial 
scales of implementation will influence the outcomes for conservation. For example, 
larger spatial scales could favour the protection of old-growth and remote habitats through 
averted loss. The protection of old-growth habitats would ensure that conservation values 
such as above and belowground carbon storage, hydrological services, and the diversity 
of flora and fauna are maintained (Watson et al., 2018). Although not necessarily under 
imminent threat, the protection of these areas is extremely relevant for conservation, for 
being considered a proactive conservation approach (Brooks et al., 2006). Such approach 
is important as it accounts for areas where many species are endemic, irreplaceable and 
sensitive to future human impact but are not yet threatened because such impact is 
currently low (Cardillo et al., 2006). On the other hand, smaller spatial scales could favour 
restoration and protect secondary-growth habitats, particularly in areas where habitat loss 
have already occurred. These areas are typically of high vulnerability, where a reactive 
conservation approach is needed – and often urgent – to prevent more habitat loss (Brooks 
et al., 2006). The restoration of highly vulnerable and degraded habitats can contribute to 
increase provision of biodiversity and ecosystem services and improve the environmental 
quality of the degraded site (Benayas et al. 2009). In places such as tropical forests, 
passive restoration also allows the growth of secondary forests, and consequently, 
increases carbon sequestration and above-ground biomass (Chazdon et al., 2016).  
The findings presented here have a range of scheme-specific policy implications. 
Firstly, the FC currently states that CRA offsets must happen in the same biome and, 
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preferably, in the same state  (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). However, CRA offsets are still 
pending regulation, and each state is entitled to restrict the offset scale within their 
boundaries (Freitas et al., 2017). These findings indicate that restricting offsets to the 
municipality level would ensure that the scheme results in the greatest additionality. 
Secondly, to achieve even greater additionality, policy-makers could also primarily target 
unprotected native vegetation, as more than 50% of offsets occurred in already protected 
vegetation. 
I showed that spatial scales were key to determine trade-offs between averted loss 
and restoration in offsets schemes. More importantly, these findings highlight that averted 
loss and restoration could be similarly incentivised by maintaining offsets at small scales. 
Although larger scales might have more market activity (Walker et al., 2009) and generate 
more averted loss in untouched habitats, the scheme might result in few conservation 
gains without strict requirements on the location of the offset (Gordon et al., 2011). 
Consequently, offsets might take place far from the impacted site, undermining ecological 
equivalence. In addition, areas that are not under development or land use pressure, tend 
to have lower conservation costs (McConnell and Walls, 2009). When the decision of 
where to offset is at the discretion of the buyer, cheaper areas are unavoidably likely to 
absorb the offsets. This might also lead to little additionality, weakening the conservation 
potential of the scheme. 
Using small administrative boundaries as spatial scales might also be useful to 
maximise other conservation objectives, in offset schemes that do not explicitly include 
biodiversity or habitat characteristics in their requirements. For example, maintaining 
offsets near the impacted site may contribute to preserve similar ecological values when 
compared to distant sites (Wissel and Wätzold, 2010), avoid future habitat losses of areas 
under development pressure (Drechsler and Wätzold, 2009) and promote a more 
connected habitat with larger habitat patches (Helmstedt and Potts, 2018). 
Although this chapter uses administrative boundaries as spatial scales, the use of 
other ecologically-focused criteria to limit constrain where offsets should occur (e.g. 
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areas of endemism, ecoregions1, and biogeographical regions) could be argued as more 
ecologically fit. In fact, this used to be the case of the FC. Prior to its revision in 2012, 
offsets were determined based on the limits of micro-watersheds (Sparovek et al., 2012). 
Such determination was amended to administrative boundaries in the revised version 
under the assumption that would facilitate environmental governance, potentially leading 
to better conservation outcomes. However, several meso-regions, micro-regions and 
municipalities seem to have rivers delimiting their boundaries (Figure 3.3, comparison 
between columns (a) and (b)). In this case, the use of watersheds as spatial scales would 
likely yield similar results. In addition, rivers have long been recognised as delimiters of 
biogeographic regions and act as dispersal barriers, generating the current distribution 
patterns of the Amazon biota (Oliveira, Vasconcelos, et al., 2017). Thus, limiting offsets 
to small spatial scales, such as municipalities, also represents a more ecologically fit 
decision to keep benefits localized within similar biota. On the other hand, the use of 
ecoregions (Olson and Dinerstein, 2002) as another potential ecologically-focused offset 
scale would likely generate different results, as they do not overlap with the 
administrative boundaries used here (Figure 3.3, columns (c) and (d)).  
The current implementation of the FC offset scheme only considers area, as it is 
a hectare-by-hectare scheme. Thus, the analysis presented here assumed that averted loss 
and restoration would be equally additional, as I considered the area allocated to 
conservation as the key additionality metric. The concept of additionality adopted in this 
chapter is associated with the conservation benefits that would not occur in the absence 
of the scheme (Maron et al., 2010). This concept does not attempt to weight or rank 
distinct conservation benefits. Instead, it treats all benefits equally. However, from an 
ecological perspective, averted loss and restoration will result in distinct conservation 
benefits: a hectare of preserved old-growth forest is ecologically different from a hectare 
of secondary forest. For example, while old-growth forests store more carbon than 
second-growth forests (Brienen et al., 2015; Watson et al., 2018), their net carbon 
sequestration rate is significantly higher (Pan et al., 2011; Poorter et al., 2016). 
Conversely, old-growth forests are irreplaceable in terms of species richness and 
                                                          
1 Ecoregions are defined as relatively large area of land or water containing a characteristic set of natural 
communities that share a large majority of their species, ecological dynamics, and environmental 
conditions (Olson and Dinerstein, 2002). 
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composition (Barlow et al., 2007). To properly account for the ecological additionality of 
large and small implementation scales, future research could include potential ecological 
benefits of averted loss and restoration offset options (e.g. biomass or species similarity 
between buyers and sellers) resulted from different implementation scales.   
While this study provided analysis of how spatial scale could be important for 
conservation schemes, there are some limitations. For example, price usually influences 
trade activity between buyers and sellers. Particularly for sellers, price is related to 
forgone opportunity costs but that is not the case for buyers, who expect price to be much 
lower than sellers’ forgone opportunity costs (Giannichi et al., 2018). Perhaps at smaller 
scales, where opportunity costs are high, there would be even less averted loss and more 
restoration, as sellers would expect high returns of their surplus, making restoration a less 
costly offset option for buyers. However, this might not lead to any substantial impact on 
the overall additionality. Price could not be included in this analysis due to lack of data 
per property. Some previous studies accounted for price using opportunity costs as a 
proxy (Bernasconi et al., 2016; Soares-Filho et al., 2016) at the scale of municipalities, 
but I believe this only reflects sellers’ price preferences. More empirical data on price 
expectations would be useful in future analyses. It is also worth noting that the algorithm 
elaborated assumed that all sellers were available for trade which might not be true. 
However, I believe it would be arbitrary and unrealistic to establish any sort of criteria 
that would exclude non-participant sellers as there are no data that could support this 
decision. 
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Figure 3.3 Maps showing administrative boundaries, watersheds and ecoregions. Column (a) depicts the five administrative boundaries used and column (b) shows four 
different classification levels of watersheds in the Brazilian Amazon. Level 1 shows the limits of the river basins that the Brazilian Amazon biome comprises (Amazon 
basin, North Atlantic Basin, Tocantins-Araguaia basin). Level 2 shows the main rivers of these basins. Levels 3 and 4 show different levels of precision of the main 
rivers inside the Brazilian Amazon biome, with level 4 being the most precise. Columns (c) and (d) superimpose the administrative boundaries and watersheds maps with 
the ecoregions of the Amazon biome to examine potential overlays. The watershed maps were acquired in the ANA database (Brazil’s National Water Agency, available 
at http://metadados.ana.gov.br/geonetwork/srv/pt/main.home) and ecoregions by TNC (available at http://maps.tnc.org/files/metadata/TerrEcos.xml).   
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In this chapter I showed that limiting offsets to a small-scale approach yielded 
greater conservation outcomes. Related conservation schemes, such as some Payment for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) and REDD+ could also benefit from a more local focus. 
Typically implemented at national levels, such schemes often face challenges related to 
governance and distinct jurisdictions rules (Blom et al., 2010). Such challenges result in 
high transaction costs if buyers (or beneficiaries) and sellers are in different jurisdictions, 
and scatter potential conservation co-benefits (Salzman et al., 2018). Applying a local 
focus to nationwide conservation strategies might be a useful way to decrease transaction 
costs and keep benefits localized, whilst also maintaining national targets. Additionally, 
keeping restoration near the degraded or impacted site could be particularly helpful for 
offset schemes in regions where development is predominant and restoration is feasible. 
Allowing offset schemes to occur more locally might be a way to incentivise the recovery 
of the lost habitat. Given the vast amounts of degraded land and the recent global efforts 
to restore degraded landscapes (Verdone and Seidl, 2017), localized strategies to promote 
regrowth might be a way to achieve ambitious restoration targets. The protection of 
natural vegetation remnants is important, but alone is not sufficient to deliver long-term 
conservation goals (Chazdon & Guariguata, 2016). It is crucial that large-scale 
conservation strategies consider a “think-local” focus to fully attain conservation goals. 
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Chapter 4: Carbon-biodiversity trade-offs 
vary according to the implementation scale 
of an offset scheme 
 
Abstract 
Addressing the climate-biodiversity crisis requires solutions that align carbon and 
biodiversity co-benefits simultaneously. However, carbon and biodiversity are not 
necessarily spatially interlinked and sharp trade-offs often arise. Such trade-offs have 
previously been assessed by exploring how ecosystem carbon stocks are related to point 
estimates of diversity or alpha-diversity. However, the trade-offs involved in protecting 
carbon stocks and diversity across landscape scales, or beta-diversity remain poorly 
understood. This is crucial given the urgent global commitments made to achieve the 
Aichi Targets (established by the Convention on Biological Diversity) by 2020 to avoid 
further biodiversity loss, and in the Paris Climate Agreement to mitigate climate change, 
as conservation initiatives are applied across landscapes where there may be substantial 
variation in diversity and composition. Here, I explore the trade-offs that occur between 
the protection of carbon and beta-diversity under different implementation scales of an 
emerging, large-scale conservation initiative – the Brazilian forest offset scheme. I found 
that at large implementation scales, the most biomass-rich areas are protected, but there 
is little biodiversity protection across all communities. Conversely, at small 
implementation scales, highly threatened and very distinctive biodiversity in the context 
of regional variation was preserved, but this was mostly in biomass-poor areas. These 
results show that the inclusion of beta-diversity in carbon-biodiversity assessments is 
crucial to better understand the impacts of conservation initiatives. Specifically, policy 
makers may be able to alter carbon-biodiversity co-benefits by altering the 
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implementation scale of conservation initiatives, but will likely face difficult choices as 
“win-win” solutions may not exist. 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a growing need in international policy to align multiple conservation 
objectives, in particular the protection of carbon and biodiversity, to achieve so-called 
“win-win” solutions and maximise the return on conservation investments (Strassburg et 
al., 2010; Busch et al., 2011; Phelps et al., 2012b). However, such win-win solutions may 
be unrealistic, as multiple conservation objectives, such as carbon and biodiversity, are 
not always spatially co-located (Thomas et al., 2013; Potts et al., 2013). Such spatial 
mismatch has led to a substantial interest in the assessment of potential trade-offs 
associated with carbon and biodiversity conservation (Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006; 
Mccarthy et al., 2012; Phelps et al., 2012b; Gilroy et al., 2014), predominantly in tropical 
forests where many carbon-focused conservation policies are implemented (Börner et al., 
2016). 
Several studies have combined carbon and alpha-diversity (i.e. species diversity 
of a small area, frequently expressed as species richness) metrics to explore carbon-
biodiversity relationships and the feasibility of “win-win” solutions. Globally, there is a 
high spatial congruence between biomass carbon and species richness, although such 
congruence is unevenly distributed (Naidoo et al., 2008; Strassburg et al., 2010). At 
continental scales, carbon-biodiversity spatial incongruences are more evident, and many 
priority areas for carbon conservation do not overlap with biodiversity hotspots (Thomas 
et al., 2013). Across the tropics, carbon-biodiversity relationships are absent at fine-scales 
and either weak or absent within continents (Sullivan et al., 2017). These studies suggest 
that carbon-centred conservation strategies do not automatically conserve biodiversity-
rich areas and highlight that win-win solutions are not always feasible and often indicate 
sharp trade-offs (Phelps et al., 2012a; Thomas et al., 2013; Sullivan et al., 2017).  
Locally, such carbon-biodiversity trade-offs may become more apparent and 
stronger and may be associated with disturbance gradients across the landscape. For 
instance, among secondary and disturbed primary forests, a positive and strong 
association between carbon and alpha-diversity is found, whereas in undisturbed forests 
such association is not statistically significant (Ferreira et al., 2018). In regenerating 
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forests near pastures and old-growth forest mosaics, carbon and alpha-diversity are even 
more strongly related (Gilroy et al., 2014). Large forest fragments also show a positive 
relationship between carbon and alpha-diversity, and especially fragments near old-
growth forests (Magnago et al., 2015). In agricultural land-use mosaics, such positive 
carbon-biodiversity relationships are also present, although only evident with high-
resolution carbon data (Deere et al., 2018). Such landscape-level studies use species 
richness (alpha-diversity) to provide evidence on the trade-offs involved in aligning 
carbon and biodiversity and show that the protection of carbon-rich areas alone might not 
suffice to also protect biodiversity. 
The scales of conservation strategies, however, are larger than points or plots 
(Sullivan et al., 2017; Boyd et al., 2018; Duchelle et al., 2018). In such cases, to better 
understand carbon-biodiversity trade-offs, beta-diversity (i.e. how species composition 
varies through space) is as important as alpha-diversity (Condit et al., 2002; Karp et al., 
2012; Socolar et al., 2016). Beta-diversity can be viewed as a measure that compares 
diversity at two different scales – alpha and gamma diversity (Baselga, 2010), with 
gamma being the species diversity of a relatively large area (e.g. ecoregion, biome). In 
conservation, beta-diversity is often distinguished between two patterns: nestedness and 
spatial turnover (Baselga, 2010). Nestedness occurs when the biotas of sites with smaller 
numbers of species are subsets of the biotas at richer sites whereas spatial turnover occurs 
when species present at one site are absent at another site, but are replaced by other 
species absent from the first. Measuring both phenomena indicate distinct conservation 
strategies that might target richest sites (nestedness) or multiple sites (turnover) (Socolar 
et al., 2016). The assessment of beta-diversity and its associated phenomena is important 
for designing protected area selection, land-use policies, offset schemes, and climate 
change mitigation strategies (Socolar et al., 2016). However, the use of beta-diversity as 
a tool to inform conservation decision remains underexplored (Draper et al., 2019), 
specially across large-scale environmental gradients (Socolar et al., 2016; Bergamin et 
al., 2017). 
In schemes which target avoided deforestation or offset carbon emissions via 
carbon payments (e.g. REDD+), the implementation scale, whether large or small, does 
not influence in the overall conservation outcome. Carbon per se, is a transferable 
“currency” in which the carbon losses in one area, could be acceptably compensated for 
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with carbon gains in another area (Phelps et al., 2012a). Conversely, in schemes that 
include biodiversity or habitat hectares as their main compensatory “currency” (e.g. 
biodiversity offsets), the implementation scale is crucial to generate meaningful 
conservation outcomes as the biodiversity losses in one area are not necessarily 
transferable to equivalent gains in another area (Potts et al., 2013). For instance, as species 
composition similarity decreases with distance and over large environmental gradients 
(Anderson et al., 2010; Bergamin et al., 2017), habitat loss over large scales contributes 
to considerable decline in species turnover, eventually homogenizing biodiversity (Karp 
et al., 2012; Püttker et al., 2015). It is particularly important to consider these relationships 
to effectively administer conservation initiatives placed at large scales. The use of species 
distributions to inform large scale conservation initiatives should reveal important 
regional patterns to properly assess carbon-biodiversity trade-offs across space (Van De 
Perre et al., 2018).  
This chapter therefore investigates carbon-related and biodiversity trade-offs as 
co-benefits of an emerging large-scale conservation strategy. I combined a pan-tropical 
aboveground biomass (Avitabile et al., 2016) and a large-scale beta-diversity dataset, 
comprising terrestrial angiosperm, arthropods, and vertebrates (Strand et al., 2018), to 
assess whether large- versus small-scale conservation scheme implementation results in 
different outcomes for conservation for these two variables. The results obtained in 
Chapter 3 are used here to compare carbon-biodiversity trade-offs of the Brazilian forest 
offset scheme under two possible subnational scheme implementation scales: biome and 
municipality. Subnational jurisdictions (i.e. states and municipalities) are increasingly 
being used as governance units in which conservation initiatives are implemented (Boyd 
et al., 2018; Duchelle et al., 2018). The focus of this analysis is the Amazon biome, one 
of the world’s largest stores of biodiversity and carbon (Ter Steege et al., 2006). 
4.2 Methods  
4.2.1 Assessing environmental co-benefits at large and small implementation scales 
The results obtained in the previous chapter were used here to explore potential 
carbon-biodiversity co-benefits in offset schemes. Chapter 3 provided the extent of 
potential areas protected under avoided deforestation and forest regrowth as conservation 
outcomes of an offset scheme implemented at five different scales of implementation and 
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under three different policy scenarios. To compare co-benefits at large and small 
implementation scales, I used biome and municipality, the largest and smallest scales, 
respectively, as they generated distinct outcomes (Figure 4.2). Of the three policy 
scenarios simulated, here I used policy scenario 1 (the one allowing offsets inside all 
protected areas), as this is the most likely scenario to be implemented in Brazil. In the 
simulations made, each offset transaction, or “contract”, made between a seller with forest 
surplus and a buyer with forest deficit resulted in areas allocated to avoided deforestation. 
Buyers who did not offset their deficit with a seller were allocated to offset via regrowth, 
by abandoning their deforested deficit and allowing vegetation to recover naturally. 
Regrowth resulted from contract with sellers located inside protected areas were also 
included in this analysis. Therefore, the resulting areas of avoided deforestation and 
regrowth in Chapter 3 were used here to estimate the potential biomass stock protected 
under avoided deforestation and potential biomass accumulation from areas allocated to 
regrowth.  
This analysis assumed that areas under avoided deforestation and regrowth were 
established as perpetual offset strategies. This is realistic for regrowth as once these areas 
are abandoned, they can no longer be deforested as these are not forest surpluses. By 
assuming perpetuity for areas allocated to regrowth, it was also assumed that these areas 
would eventually achieve their old-growth biomass values (Poorter et al., 2016) as well 
as a significant recovery of tree and animal diversity (Barlow et al., 2007; Gilroy et al., 
2014; Edwards et al., 2017). Avoided deforestation offsets, on the other hand, are not 
necessarily perpetual, although it is known that perpetual offsets are a real preference of 
buyers (Giannichi et al., 2018). Currently, there is no study or data available that could 
inform a time-oriented assumption for avoided deforestation offsets. For this analysis, it 
was assumed that avoided deforestation contracts would be perpetual and so therefore 
biomass and biodiversity values for these areas were considered constant across time.  
4.2.2 Quantification of carbon-related co-benefits 
My main objective was to assess whether avoided deforestation contracts between 
sellers and buyers resulted in biomass gains (i.e. whether buyers traded lost biomass for 
greater existing biomass stock in sellers’ areas) or biomass losses (if buyers traded lost 
biomass for lower existing biomass stock). For that, I used a pan-tropical aboveground 
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biomass (AGB) map published by Avitabile et al. (2016) that estimates aboveground 
biomass per hectare, at 1km resolution, for the Brazilian Amazon (Figure 4.2A). Avitabile 
et al. (2016) produced a “fused” map by combining existing biomass maps, field data and 
local high-resolution biomass maps.  
First, the 95th percentile of biomass (Mg ha-1) value (hereafter named Bmax, Eq. 
4.1) were extracted for each rural property 𝑖 that participated in the offset scheme as buyer 
and seller. For the sellers, we assumed that the Bmax was the maximum biomass stock 
value of their forest surplus protected under avoided deforestation. For the buyers, we 
assumed the Bmax value was the biomass accumulation potential if buyers decided to 
abandon their forest deficit, thus choosing regrowth as the offset option. Then, for each 
avoided deforestation contract 𝑗 at biome and municipality levels, I calculated the 
difference between sellers’ 𝑠(𝑗) and buyers’ 𝑏(𝑗) Bmax (∆Bmax, Eq. 4.1) to assess 
whether avoided deforestation offsets resulted in potential biomass stock gains (∆Bmax 
> 0). As offset via regrowth is the buyer’s forest deficit natural recovery, it did not involve 
contracts between sellers and buyers, hence ∆Bmax was not calculated. In this case, only 
the buyers’ Bmax values were used to assess biomass accumulation potential for each 
implementation scale. 
∆𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗 =  𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟,𝑠(𝑗) −  𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟,𝑏(𝑗) Eq. (4.1) 
 
For each property, Bmax values varied between 0 and 487 Mg ha-1, with a small 
number of buyers and sellers’ properties (0.05% and 0.57%, respectively Figure A.4.1, 
Appendix 4) showing zero Bmax value. Such zero values could be due to high degradation 
of their forested areas or perhaps the resolution of the dataset did not properly capture 
Bmax values for small properties. Following the assumptions made of maximum biomass 
stock and maximum potential biomass accumulation, I applied a moving window 
approach to extract statistics of neighbouring values in the entire image. I employed a 10 
x 10 km window, in which the maximum pixel value within that window was extracted, 
generating a coarser image as an output. Exclusively for the properties that showed a 
Bmax value of zero, the values of the coarser image were used. 
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Figure 4.1 Gradients of aboveground biomass (A) and species composition values (SCV, B) used in this 
study. SCV correspond to regions of unique biota which are represented by discrete values ranging from 1 
to 49. Aboveground biomass dataset for the Amazon was derived from Avitabile et al. (2016) and species 
composition values were acquired from Strand et al. (2018).   
4.2.3 Quantification of beta-diversity 
Beta-diversity was derived from Strand et al. (2018), which is a comprehensive 
biodiversity dataset of the Amazon that maps regions of unique biota at 500m resolution 
based on species occurrence (Figure 4.2B). This biodiversity map compiles occurrence 
data on terrestrial angiosperm, arthropods, and vertebrates (amphibians, birds and 
mammals) from several sources, such as researchers, online databases (e.g. Nature Serve, 
Birdlife International), literature and biodiversity inventories. This compilation computed 
113,571 georeferenced species occurrence records. The occurrence records were used to 
model the spatial variation in species composition to identify regions of unique biota. In 
summary, the model involved the calculation of species presence/absence per grid cells 
of 0.5 degrees; a cell-to-cell calculation of Bray-Curtis dissimilarity matrix; and the 
computation of Non-metric Multidimensional Scaling (NMDS) axis scores of species 
distribution. The three NMDS scores resulted in an interpolated RGB map to identify 
regions of unique species composition. Each region of unique species composition is 
given a colour and a discrete value ranging from 1 to 49 (Figure 4.2B), hereafter as species 
composition value (SCV). Areas that have no vegetation cover are attributed zero, as if 
they were voids (Figure 4.2B, areas in white). Details about the methods used and data 
are available at https://csr.ufmg.br/amazones/biodiversity/.  
For this analysis, rivers and waterbodies were masked out. To identify the regions 
of unique biota wherein the properties of buyers and sellers were located, I extracted the 
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most common SCV within each property 𝑖 directly from the original dataset (Figure 
4.2B). For 9.6% of the buyers, the most common SCV was zero (Figure A.4.2, Appendix 
4), most likely because the entire property has been deforested. Sellers did not show any 
zeros for SCV (Figure A.4.3, Appendix 4). To be consistent with the assumptions about 
regrowth (see Section 4.2.1), the zero SCV for those 9.6% of buyers had to be substituted. 
Thus, I employed a 7.5 x 7.5 km moving-window approach, in which the zero values were 
replaced by the nearest most common SCV. This procedure generated a coarser-
resolution dataset of unique species composition (hereafter SCV*) with values from 1 to 
49 (eliminating zero values), which was used to identify the most common SCV for this 
subset of properties only. Additionally, this reduced-resolution SCV dataset was used to 
calculate threat ratios (see section 4.2.4 below). All the spatial analysis steps were 
performed in Google Earth Engine. 
As with biomass, I also calculated the difference between sellers’ and buyers’ 
SCV (∆𝑆𝐶𝑉, Eq.2) for each avoided deforestation contract 𝑗, to assess whether avoided 
deforestation contracts at biome and municipality levels resulted in trading similar or 
dissimilar forest communities based on beta-diversity. Since SCV are discrete values, 
positive or negative ∆𝑆𝐶𝑉 values only indicate that avoided deforestation contracts are 
trading dissimilar beta-diversity, whereas zero ∆𝑆𝐶𝑉 indicates similar communities.  
∆𝑆𝐶𝑉𝑗 =  𝑆𝐶𝑉𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟,𝑠(𝑗) −  𝑆𝐶𝑉𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟,𝑏(𝑗) Eq. (4.2) 
 
4.2.4 Calculation of protection and threat ratio 
To assess whether avoided deforestation and regrowth offsets resulted in the 
effective protection of threatened biodiversity hotspots, protection and threat ratios were 
calculated for each forest community, based on the species composition values. The 
protection ratio (PR) indicates how much area of each SCV area is being protected under 
avoided deforestation and regrowth and is calculated as follows:  
𝑃𝑅𝑖 =  
∑𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑖 + ∑𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ,𝑖
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑆𝐶𝑉𝑖
 
Eq. (4.3) 
 
85 
 
where ∑𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑖 is the sum of the area corresponding to avoided deforestation and 
∑𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ,𝑖 is the sum of area corresponding to regrowth, both for each SCV value 𝑖; and 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑆𝐶𝑉𝑖 corresponds to the total area that each SCV occupies in the original dataset. All 
areas were calculated in hectares and the resulting protection ratio was converted to 
percentage.  
Threat ratios (TR) were calculated to assess the area of each SCV that had 
undergone past loss (Figure 4.2B, areas in white, attributed zero) as a proportion of the 
total area each SCV (values 1 to 49) occupied before loss: 
𝑇𝑅𝑖 =  
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑆𝐶𝑉𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑖
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑆𝐶𝑉∗𝑖
 
Eq. (4.4) 
 
where 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑆𝐶𝑉𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑖 is the area of each SCV that had undergone past loss (i.e. the area 
corresponding to zero within each region of unique species composition) and 𝑆𝐶𝑉𝑖
∗ is the 
total area of each SCV* extracted from the coarser dataset (see section 4.2.3). Threat ratios 
were calculated in hectares and later converted to percentages corresponding to the 
proportion of each SCV that had been lost. If a SCV had undergone a loss of > 40%), it 
was interpreted as highly threatened, as there is evidence that many species, particularly 
forest specialists, could not tolerate a habitat loss greater than 40% (de Filho and Metzger, 
2006; Yin et al., 2017). 
4.3 Results 
Avoided deforestation and regrowth had distinct distribution patterns at biome 
and municipality levels (Figure 4.2). Although these are results from the previous chapter, 
they are important to better understand the patterns observed here related to biomass and 
biodiversity co-benefits. Biome-level implementation showed a high concentration of 
avoided deforestation offsets across the southern, northern and central parts of the 
Amazon, whereas at municipality level, avoided deforestation offsets were highly 
concentrated in the southern part and relatively moderate in across eastern Amazon. 
Regrowth was considerably higher across the southern and eastern parts of the Amazon 
at municipality level. At the biome level, regrowth was only modestly scattered across 
the entire biome.  
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of avoided deforestation and regrowth at large (biome) and small (municipality) 
scales. Panel A: avoided deforestation areas at biome level; Panel B: avoided deforestation at municipality 
level; Panel C: regrowth at biome level; and Panel D: regrowth at municipality level. Panels A-D consist 
of 10km resolution pixels, in which the colour scheme gradient shows high (dark blue) to low (yellow) 
pixel area coverage of avoided deforestation and regrowth for each spatial scale. Grey shading represents 
areas where neither avoided deforested or regrowth were observed. 
4.3.1 Avoided deforestation biomass co-benefits 
Large and small implementation scales showed distinct biomass-biodiversity 
trade-offs related to the maximum potential biomass stock and accumulation. Figure 4.3A 
shows the difference between protected biomass under avoided deforestation and lost 
biomass due to deforestation (∆Bmax) at biome and municipality levels for each avoided 
deforestation contract. A large implementation scale showed greater biomass-related co-
benefits when compared to a small scale (Figure 4.3A, Table 4.1). At biome level, there 
was a more positive spread of ∆Bmax and a significantly greater mean when compared to 
municipality level (biome = 90.87, municipality = 36.28, two sample t-test, p-value = 
0.0000). In general, this indicates that avoided deforestation offsets at a large 
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implementation scale resulted in biomass gains (i.e. at this scale sellers showed greater 
Bmax values than buyers). On the other hand, the slightly more symmetrical shape of 
∆Bmax distribution and a mean closer to zero at municipality level (one sample t-test, p-
value = 0.0000) show that avoided deforestation offsets yielded similar Bmax values. 
Overall, the large implementation scale resulted in the protection of forest with twice as 
much biomass per hectare, with 0.34 Pg of biomass stock protected under the biome-level 
implementation compared with 0.17 Pg protected at the municipality level (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Area directed to avoided deforestation and regrowth, and potential biomass co-benefits for biome 
and municipality levels. Avoided deforestation and regrowth are given in million hectares (Mha) and were 
derived from Chapter 3. Biomass values are given in petagrams (Pg). Biomass stock values show the total 
of biomass corresponding to the areas of avoided deforestation for biome and municipality levels. Potential 
biomass accumulation refers to the total biomass that regrowth could accumulate if abandoned long-term. 
The sum of stock and potential biomass corresponds to the sum of the biomass values for both avoided 
deforestation and regrowth.  
 Avoided 
deforestation 
(Mha)* 
Biomass 
stock for 
avoided 
deforestation 
(Pg) 
Regrowth 
(Mha)* 
Potential 
biomass 
accumulation 
for regrowth 
(Pg) 
∑ stock 
and 
potential 
biomass 
(Pg) 
Biome 1.28 0.34 0.1 0.007 0.347 
Municipality 0.75 0.17 1.32 0.15 0.32 
*Results derived from Chapter 3 
4.3.2 Potential biomass co-benefits under regrowth 
Large and small implementation scales produced distinct outcomes associated 
with the potential biomass accumulation for areas where the offset option was regrowth. 
When examining Bmax values alone, biome level offsets showed a greater frequency of 
biomass-rich values (> 300 Mg ha-1) whereas in municipality, there was a high frequency 
of lower Bmax values (< 200), particularly concentrated below 100 Mg ha-1 (Figure 4.3B). 
The respective means (biome = 275.69 ± 111.22, municipality = 141.76 ± 92.69) also 
highlight such significant difference between large and small scales (two sample t-test, p-
value = 0.0000). However, in terms of overall frequency and area, regrowth at 
municipality level generated much greater biomass co-benefits. The potential biomass 
accumulation at biome level summed 0.007 Pg, given that only 0.1Mha was directed to 
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regrowth (Table 4.1). At the municipality level, however, potential biomass accumulation 
summed 0.15 Pg, mainly driven by 1.32Mha that were directed to regrowth. Biome and 
municipality levels showed almost the same biomass benefits when combining avoided 
deforestation and regrowth offsets. The sum of biomass stock from avoided deforestation 
and potential biomass accumulation from regrowth were 0.347 Pg and 0.32 Pg for biome 
and municipality levels, respectively (Table 4.1).  
4.3.3 Avoided deforestation biodiversity co-benefits 
Biodiversity-related co-benefits also rendered notably distinct outcomes at large 
and small implementation scales (Figure 4.3C). The distribution of ∆SCV at biome level 
indicates that large-scale implementation resulted in offsets with dissimilar species 
composition values, as ∆SCV values significantly differ from zero (Wilcoxon test, p-value 
= 0.0000). At municipality level, however, the vast majority of ∆SCV values are 
concentrated around zero (Wilcoxon test, p-value = 0.0003), showing that, at a small 
scale, avoided deforestation offsets promoted greater biodiversity similarity when 
compared to a large scale.  
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Figure 4.3 Biomass (A and B) and biodiversity (C) differences at large (biome – grey shading) and small (municipality – green shading) offset implementation scales. 
A) Differences between maximum biomass values (∆Bmax) for each contract made for avoided deforestation offsets. Dashed lines represent ∆Bmax mean values for 
biome (grey) and municipality (green) scales. B) Potential biomass accumulation (Bmax) for deforested areas that were allocated to regrowth as offset option. Dashed 
lines represent mean Bmax values for biome (grey) and municipality (green) scales. C) Differences between species composition values (∆SCV) for each avoided 
deforestation contract. Mean values were not calculated in panel “C” as SCV is a discrete number. Asterisks in panels “A” and “B” represent statistically significant 
values (p-values = 0.0000). 
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4.3.4 Threat and protection ratios of beta-diversity under large and small 
implementation scales  
Figure 4.4 shows how much of each SCV was protected under biome- and 
municipality- level implementation scales, in relation to how threatened each SCV is. The 
protection ratio shows that biome-level offsets protected no more than 3% of each unique 
SCV, although such protection was relatively uniform across the 49 discrete scores 
(Figure 4.4A). Conversely, protection ratios at municipality-level offsets (Figure 4.4B) 
were much greater, protecting up to 20% of the area of some forest communities. The TR 
represents how much area of each unique species composition has already been lost due 
to land cover change. Biome-level implementation protected less than 5% of the area 
occupied by each of communities that have undergone more than 40% of habitat loss, 
thus considered highly threatened beta-diversity (Figure 4.4A, points on the right-hand 
side of the dashed line). On the other hand, municipality- level implementation protected 
greater areas of highly threatened beta-diversity, protecting 8–20% of the area of 
communities that have undergone severe loss (70-90% of the area deforested).  
 
Figure 4.4 Protection and threat ratios for beta-diversity at biome (A) and municipality (B) levels. 
Protection ratio denotes to the percentage of the area of each species composition value (SCV) that is 
protected both under avoided deforestation and regrowth in relation to the total area of each SCV. Threat 
ratio refers to percentage of the area of each species composition value that has undergone past loss in 
relation to the area each SCV had in the past (see Methods for the calculations). Communities with > 40% 
of existing deforestation were threshed based on values reported in the literature (see section 4.2.4).  
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4.4 Discussion  
The biomass and biodiversity assessments reveal important trade-offs at large and 
small scheme implementation scales (Table 4.1, Figure 4.3). In terms of carbon-related 
co-benefits, large implementation scale drove avoided deforestation offsets to distant 
biomass-rich areas, resulting in more positive offsets in terms of biomass, when compared 
to small implementation scale. This could be explained by the fact that, historically, land 
cover change in the Brazilian Amazon was mostly concentrated in the crescent along the 
southern and eastern fringe (Skole and Tucker, 1993; Gibbs et al., 2010), in the savanna-
forest boundary, areas of low biomass (Saatchi et al., 2007). Thus, biomass-rich areas in 
the northern and central part of the Amazon are still preserved, which is consistent with 
the avoided deforestation distribution observed here (Figure 4.2). Conversely, at a small-
scale implementation, avoided deforestation offsets did not result in a positive balance, 
as they had to be made locally, in forest fragments with similar biomass and within the 
same highly deforested southern-eastern fringe. The use of beta-diversity as a biodiversity 
indicator also showed clear scale-dependent trade-offs. Firstly, small implementation 
scale preserved, in general, the same species composition lost with existing one, whilst 
large scale avoided deforestation offsets showed the opposite. Secondly, small scale also 
promoted the protection of more biodiversity threatened forest communities (Figure 4.4).  
Such distinct scale-dependent trade-offs indicate important considerations when 
trying to promote win-win solutions in conservation initiatives. For carbon-related co-
benefits, it was found that large scale protected 0.34 Pg of biomass whereas small scale 
protected 50% less, showing that the loss/gain relationship in biomass is easily 
substitutable (i.e. the loss in one area can be replaced by gains in another, Potts et al., 
2013). For biodiversity co-benefits, species composition was non-substitutable at a large-
scale implementation, which makes large scale a “win” for biomass but not for 
biodiversity, as species composition similarity decreases with distance (Anderson et al., 
2010; Karp et al., 2012). On the other hand, a small implementation scale could ensure 
the protection of similar species distributions because it would limit avoided deforestation 
to occur within several small geographic regions. However, such a win scenario for 
biodiversity would likely restrict biomass gains.   
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Regrowth could play an important role to achieve the best outcome possible. 
Although large implementation scale yielded twice as much biomass stock, potential 
biomass accumulation from forest regrowth was much greater at small scale. In addition, 
the combination of biomass stock and potential accumulation was similar for large (~ 
0.35 Pg) and small (0.32 Pg) scales. Large implementation scale might result in biomass 
gains and protect biomass-rich areas, but it is likely to forgo potential recovery of highly 
fragmented and degraded ones. A large implementation scale could thus be an opportunity 
to commit to climate change mitigation targets of avoiding and reducing emissions from 
deforestation, as established in the Paris Agreement (Duchelle et al., 2018), but 
possibilities around forest regrowth would likely be reduced. On the other hand, an 
implementation at a small scale could ensure immediate but smaller biomass gains whilst 
long-term but greater biomass (Poorter et al., 2016; Chazdon et al., 2016) and biodiversity 
recovery (Barlow et al., 2007; Gilroy et al., 2014; Edwards et al., 2017; Lennox et al., 
2018). This is a scenario that could positively address international commitments made 
to reduce pressures on biodiversity and avoid further biodiversity loss, such as the Aichi 
Targets (CBD, 2014). 
While this analysis showed the importance of considering beta-diversity in large-
scale conservation strategies, the input data layer used has limitations. As the beta-
diversity map is derived from species occurrence, there are large sampling gaps and 
deficiencies associated with the biodiversity data use to develop the species composition 
model. There is a significant area of the Brazilian Amazon that remains uncovered, with 
no data entry of any of the taxonomic groups used in the input data layer (Oliveira et al., 
2017). The knowledge on species composition in the Brazilian Amazon is strongly biased 
spatially (Oliveira et al., 2016). Although the model used by the authors attempt to correct 
this error by employing interpolation methods, sampling gaps likely obscures potential 
higher heterogeneity in terms of species composition. The awareness of this issues is 
crucial to draw realistic conclusions and adequately inform policy-makers. Other species 
composition products at biome-scale remain lacking for the Amazon. A potential 
alternative product that could complement future analysis is a map of ecoregions, which 
represents regions of outstanding biodiversity (Olson and Dinerstein, 2002). Such 
analysis could identify whether large or small implementation scales are protecting 
ecoregions with high levels of diversity, endemism and/or threat.  
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The input biomass data contain errors. The model employed by Avitabile et al. 
(2016) to compose the fused biomass map highly relies on the input field and local high-
resolution data. Areas where field and high-resolution data were missing are therefore 
under-represented in this dataset, which compromises the representativeness of AGB 
variation across the tropics. There are some biomass products available that can provide 
AGB current estimates for the Amazon biome based on remotely sensed data (Saatchi et 
al., 2011; Baccini et al., 2012) and others that use plot data to provide current estimates 
of forest areas and potential biomass for deforested areas (Mitchard et al., 2014; Nogueira 
et al., 2015). It is important to highlight that remote sensing products show very different 
spatial patterns of AGB distribution, especially in the Amazon, when compared to field 
data (Mitchard et al., 2014).  
Although this chapter assumed that forests allocated to regrowth would eventually 
achieve their old-growth biomass values, this remains uncertain. Studies suggest that 
secondary forests can take nearly 70 years to recover 90% of old-growth forests biomass 
stock (Poorter et al., 2016). This recovery, however, is highly dependent on water 
availability (e.g. wetter places shows higher biomass recovery rates) and presence of old-
growth forests in the surrounding (e.g. isolated secondary forest patches are likely to have 
slow biomass recovery rates). The assumption adopted in this chapter is a simplification 
of a complex process which is not quantified in this study. The values of potential biomass 
accumulation for regrowth showed here are rough estimates which need further and a 
more precise assessment. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to explicitly consider beta-
diversity to assess carbon-biodiversity trade-offs of a real conservation policy. The 
findings presented here showed that to protect biomass-rich areas, threatened biodiversity 
conservation would be compromised. Conversely, to protect threatened biodiversity, low-
biomass areas would be automatically protected, along with considerable forest recovery. 
The use of beta-diversity was crucial to reveal such important spatial patterns in terms of 
species composition conservation that alpha-diversity assessments would not capture 
(Van De Perre et al., 2018). A simple qualitative comparison with tree alpha-diversity in 
the Amazon (ter Steege et al., 2003) shows that areas of high diversity would, overall, 
overlap with biomass-rich areas, leading to the conclusion that there could be a win-win 
scenario for carbon-biodiversity co-benefits. However, it may obscure patterns associated 
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with threatened species that are crucial for a thorough biodiversity assessment. 
Additionally, the use of beta-diversity ensures that regional patterns of species 
distributions are explicitly accounted for when establishing the implementation scale of 
conservation initiatives. Given that several conservation initiatives (e.g. REDD+, 
biodiversity offset schemes, payment for ecosystem services) are often implemented at 
national or subnational levels, this study indicates that even national initiatives could 
better balance carbon-biodiversity trade-off if implemented in several smaller regional 
units.     
Policy-makers constantly face challenges when accounting for trade-offs in 
conservation schemes. On one hand, the Aichi Targets urge – by 2020 – a reduction in 
rates of biodiversity loss to prevent the extinction of threatened species. In addition, it 
also promote the protection and restoration of existing habitat contribution to enhance 
carbon stocks (CBD, 2014). On the other hand, the Paris Climate Agreement states the 
importance to keep global warming below 2oC by 2030 with avoided deforestation and 
restoration measures (Duchelle et al., 2018). As the climate-biodiversity crisis needs to 
be addressed rapidly, there must be an explicit and thorough assessment of the carbon-
biodiversity trade-offs involved when establishing the scale of conservation initiatives. 
The regional implementation of national large-scale conservation initiatives could be a 
way forward to find acceptable compromises where both carbon and biodiversity co-
benefits can be aligned accepting that win-win solutions may not always exist.  
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Chapter 5: Synthesis and conclusions 
 
This chapter of the thesis will collate the findings from chapters 2–4 and revisit 
the key objective of each analytical chapter to assess whether they have been achieved. 
Subsequently, I will provide further critical analysis of the findings and review the 
potential limitations associated. I will also discuss the research implications of this study 
for local and global conservation strategies and suggest directions for future work. 
Finally, the chapter will end with a summary of conclusions that can be drawn from the 
thesis.  
5.1 Overview of findings 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the potential of offset schemes to result 
in effective conservation gains. To achieve this, I focused on key independent but 
interlinked elements associated with the design and implementation of offset schemes 
(e.g. the participation of landowners, the scale of implementation and the potential 
environmental co-benefits associated) by using a combination of empirical and spatial 
methodological approaches. The case study used was the largest forest offset scheme in 
the world, stated in the Brazilian Forest Code, with focus on the Amazon biome. Each of 
the analytical chapters focused on one specific objective linked to an element of scheme’s 
effectiveness. The first chapter empirically explored the viewpoints of potential buyers 
and sellers of an offset scheme associated with programme-specific factors. I identified 
the factors that resulted in sharp divergences between buyers and sellers were contract 
length and price. In the second and third chapters, using spatial analysis, I tested whether 
the spatial scales of scheme implementation (e.g. large or small) produced distinct 
conservation outcomes and then quantified potential carbon and biodiversity co-benefits 
associated with different spatial scales. In both chapters, large and small spatial scales 
resulted in trade-offs associated the conservation outcomes of the offset scheme (avoided 
deforestation and regrowth) as well as the assessed environmental co-benefits (carbon 
and biodiversity). Although I evidenced such trade-offs associated with spatial scales, the 
results of this thesis generally support the idea of a “think local” focus to promote more 
effective and additional conservation outcomes.  
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In the following paragraphs I summarize the main findings of each analytical 
chapter and how they contributed to achieve the objectives of this thesis. 
5.1.1 Buyers and sellers are differently influenced by programme-specific factors 
in an offset scheme  
To empirically explore the viewpoints of potential participants on programme-
specific factors about CRA, I used Q-methodology, which is a semi-quantitative method 
that provides a structured way to categorise and cluster individual viewpoints (Zabala et 
al., 2018). I identified three groups of sellers and three of buyers that showed distinct 
viewpoints about programme-specific factors. In each case, only one group was positive 
about participating in the scheme. The other two groups of buyers were sceptical about 
CRA and showed interest in other options such as natural regrowth and offset in protected 
areas. The other two groups of sellers were not interested in participating for different 
reasons, such as lack of trust in buyers to proceed with trade and interest of converting 
the forest surplus into a more profitable use.  
I also developed an index to numerically assess the compatibility of buyers and 
sellers to engage in trade (Trade Compatibility Index – TCI) based on their views about 
programme-specific factors. I found that the three groups of buyers and sellers showed 
incompatibilities, mostly related to contract length and price. Sellers preferred short-term 
contracts, as they associate long-term contracts with missing future and more profitable 
land-use opportunities, finding which corroborates with other studies in analogous 
schemes (Bremer et al., 2014; Page and Bellotti, 2015; Yeboah et al., 2015). On the other 
hand, buyers preferred long-term or perpetual ones, as they seek to solve their 
environmental liabilities at once and forever, without the need of renewing contracts or 
finding willing sellers. In relation to price, sellers believed that it should vary according 
to forgone opportunity costs, especially sellers who manifested interest in deforesting 
their native vegetation surplus. Buyers, however, stated that offsets should cost well 
below opportunity costs. Such diverging preferences might challenge the effectiveness of 
the offset scheme in several ways. Firstly, divergences on contract length might 
encourage buyers to seek other competing offset strategies in perpetuity, such as offsets 
in protected areas. Secondly, the mismatches on price expectation may undermine the 
participation of profit-driven sellers located in areas with high opportunity costs (i.e. areas 
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that typically have undergone high deforestation rates), and potentially result in 
deforestation. These findings highlighted that participants of conservation strategies 
cannot be generalized and that such assessments are important to target specific groups 
of landowners that are unlikely to participate to maximise uptake. 
In the discussion of chapter 2, I suggested that a potential strategy to address issues 
around price and avoid future deforestation is to restrict the spatial scale of trade wherein 
buyers and sellers interact within sub-regional boundaries with similar opportunity costs 
and deforestation pressure. In chapter 3, therefore, I tested this premise to assess whether 
spatial restrictions could potentially impact conservation outcomes of the offset scheme. 
I also used the contractual preferences identified in chapter 2 to compose different policy 
scenarios that were combined with the spatial scale restrictions in chapter 3. 
5.1.2 The implementation spatial scale results in distinct conservation outcomes 
In chapter 3, I tested whether potential implementation spatial scales (large to 
small) across a range of policy scenarios generated distinct conservation outcomes, i.e. 
area directed to avoided deforestation and potential forest regrowth. I considered the three 
main offset options established by the FC: offsets through the acquisition of private land 
inside protected areas, CRA, and regrowth. By numerically simulating the trade between 
over 370,000 buyers and sellers across the entire Amazon biome, I showed that offsets 
placed within a large spatial scale (e.g. biome level) generated a greater area of avoided 
deforestation (1.28 Mha) but only a small area was allocated to regrowth (0.1Mha). 
Restricting offsets to occur at smaller spatial scales progressively reduced the area 
directed to avoided deforestation, while regrowth increased. At the smallest spatial scale 
(e.g. municipality), avoided deforestation offsets were still observed (0.75 Mha) but the 
area directed to regrowth was nearly two times greater (1.32 Mha). I also found that the 
smallest spatial scale resulted in the greatest total area directed to conservation (2.07 Mha, 
avoided deforestation and regrowth combined), and particularly large shares in already 
highly deforested regions (e.g. southern and eastern amazon belts).  
These results suggest that while large spatial scales may protect more of existing 
standing forest, restricting offsets to small scales can more effectively contribute the 
overall additionality of the scheme, by protecting standing forest whilst promoting 
regrowth, especially in degraded and fragmented areas. I explore these results further in 
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chapter 4 to assess potential environmental co-benefits (e.g. carbon and biodiversity) 
associated with both large and small spatial scales. 
5.1.3 Large-scale implementation protects carbon-rich forests whilst small-scale 
protects threatened biodiversity 
In this chapter I investigated environmental co-benefits (carbon and biodiversity) 
associated with large and small spatial scales of implementation. I used the area allocated 
to avoided deforestation and regrowth at large and small spatial scales to quantify biomass 
storage and potential biomass accumulation and assess potential biodiversity co-benefits. 
I found that a large spatial scale, avoided deforestation offsets resulted in the protection 
of biomass-rich forests, potentially avoiding the loss of 0.34 Pg of biomass. Such biomass 
gains at this scale showed that avoided deforestation offsets were placed in areas with 
greater biomass values per hectare, that significantly differ from the biomass values 
observed in regions where most buyers are concentrated. Conversely, at a small spatial 
scale, such biomass gains were not observed, although avoided deforestation offsets still 
resulted in the protection of 0.17 Pg of biomass. Nevertheless, regrowth played an 
important role in small scale offsets, potentially contributing to the accumulation of 0.15 
Pg of biomass. The sum of biomass stock and potential accumulation was therefore 0.32 
Pg, nearly as much as the total biomass protected at large scale (0.34 Pg). 
Using beta-diversity as biodiversity metrics for species composition similarity 
between buyers and sellers revealed important findings associated with each spatial scale. 
Firstly, avoided deforestation offsets placed at a small spatial scale protected more similar 
forest communities than a large scale. This means that offsets made between distant sites 
did not result in equivalent biodiversity outcomes. In addition, I calculated how much 
area of avoided deforestation and regrowth offsets combined protected distinct forest 
communities in relation to the total area each distinct forest community occupied. This 
analysis demonstrated that a small spatial scale protected more area of highly threatened 
forest communities (i.e. areas that have already undergone significant habitat loss). Large 
spatial scale in this case, resulted in little and uniform protection of all forest communities 
across the biome. 
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5.2 Implications of this research  
The results shown in this thesis have a number of important implications across 
multiple knowledge levels, including academic and policy-making. Although this 
research is presented as a case study, its methods and findings could be easily applied to 
other countries and analogous conservation strategies. Here, I describe potential 
implications of this thesis’ findings to the Brazilian Forest Code; to other conservation 
schemes implemented globally and to the current debate about effectiveness in private 
land conservation. 
5.2.1 Implications for the Brazilian Forest Code 
Brazil has approximately 4.6 million private properties2 that hold more than 390 
Mha of native vegetation (Azevedo et al., 2017). Given the magnitude of these numbers, 
private land conservation is critical. Knowing the opinion of those who manage these vast 
amounts of private land – the landowners – is key to the successful implementation of the 
FC. To the best of my knowledge, I presented the first empirical study that captured 
viewpoints of landowners about CRA – one of the many forest offset strategies in the FC. 
Until now, it was unknown whether potential buyers and sellers could be engaged in 
participation and what factors related to the scheme’s design could influence 
participation. Programme-specific factors such as contract duration, price and transaction 
costs are easily influenced by policy design (Yeboah et al., 2015). Thus, the results 
presented in chapter 2 show that CRA design should consider the issues raised by buyers 
and sellers about contract length and price. Importantly, the viewpoints elicited in this 
chapter account for a very small share of the rural landowner population. Although the 
methodology is purposefully designed for small sample sizes, there might be other 
important viewpoints that were missed in this study – this is discussed further in section 
5.3. 
In chapter 2, I also showed that many landowners might prefer to acquire private 
land inside protected areas as their offset strategy. This finding adds to other previous 
studies (May et al., 2015; Soares-Filho et al., 2016) that consider this offset option 
problematic, due to a huge oversupply that, in the Amazon biome, could absorb the entire 
                                                          
2 Data publicly disclosed in the Rural Registration System (CAR) available at 
http://www.car.gov.br/publico/imoveis/index (last access 22/12/2018).  
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demand and result in low additionality (i.e. these areas area already protected and it is 
unlikely that they will face deforestation pressures). The results in chapter 3 contribute to 
addressing issues related to the oversupply of private land inside protected areas. I showed 
that restricting the spatial scale of offsets also decreased offsets in protected areas. Given 
that compensation in protected areas is unlikely to be overruled as it has been already 
regulated (Brasil, 2016), state-level legislation could restrict offsets to sub-state levels 
(e.g. municipalities) to resolve issues around the oversupply of private land in protected 
areas. Such spatial restriction could also benefit total overall additionality, as documented 
in chapter 3. The current way that the FC legislates CRA and other offset mechanisms is 
perceived and non-additional as many offsets take place where native vegetation is 
already protected by (Freitas et al., 2017). I demonstrated that offsets placed with 
municipalities boundaries resulted in a greater area allocated to conservation. I also 
highlight that this chapter included limitations, such as a simplification of buyers’ 
decision to determine their offset strategy. This, and other limitations of this chapter are 
also discussed further in section 5.3. 
The findings in chapter 4 highlight that small scale implementation has the 
potential to protect highly threatened biodiversity, particularly in regions that have 
undergone nearly 90% of habitat loss in the eastern Amazon, in the states of Maranhão 
and Tocantins. This finding also calls attention to a sub-state implementation of the offset 
strategies as it could help Brazil meet the goals established in the National Biodiversity 
Strategy and Action Plan submitted to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
For example, by 2020 as part of the Aichi Targets, Brazil has committed to conserve at 
least 30% of the Amazon biome through the protection of areas, such as legal reserves 
and prioritize the restoration of highly degraded biomes (Brazilian Ministry of 
Environment, 2017). 
Brazil has made important commitments in the Paris Agreement by submitting 
ambitious targets for avoided deforestation, forest restoration and biodiversity 
conservation under the NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) in order to 
contribute to the 2oC goal (Brazil, 2015). As stated in the document, the Forest Code is a 
key element to achieve zero illegal deforestation in the Amazon and restore over 12 Mha 
of forests by 2030. Thus, the implementation of FC at municipality level can contribute 
to effectively achieve these targets.  
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5.2.2 Implications for global market-based instruments for conservation  
One of the biggest challenges in the implementation of conservation strategies is 
the definition of the “right” spatial scale, as social ecological processes operate at multiple 
scales, and the definition of a single unit of implementation might fail to include important 
dynamics  (Baylis et al., 2016). The combination of all the findings presented here can 
provide useful insights to this debate. While I showed that conservation strategies 
implemented at large scale might yield positive conservation outcomes, greater gains 
were observed at small scales, suggesting that smaller implementation units might be a 
way forward to improve effectiveness of conservation strategies worldwide. Although 
small units of implementation might not provide the ideal “win-win” scenario for 
conservation gains, it revealed important dynamics related to biodiversity conservation 
and additionality that are key to schemes’ success (Maron et al., 2013). In additional, 
these results are consistent with PES strategies, for example, that seem to be more 
effective in terms of social and ecological gains when implemented at local levels (Grima 
et al., 2016). 
Each analytical chapter, in isolation, has also important key insights that 
contribute to the private land conservation debate. For example, in chapter 2, I showed 
that buyers and sellers have distinct perceptions about a conservation scheme. Such 
distinction between these two groups is often overlooked when evaluating landowners’ 
participation in conservation schemes (Bastian et al., 2017). The results of this chapter 
highlight the importance of acknowledging that buyers and sellers of MBIs show different 
interests and to consider them as single entity might undermine scheme effectiveness. In 
addition, the findings of chapters 3 and 4 provide similar contributions to implementation 
of conservations strategies, in particular REDD+ and biodiversity offsets. The use 
administrative units (e.g. municipality, county, state) could be a useful and 
straightforward way to assess the effectiveness of conservation strategies. In REDD+, for 
instance, governance units are increasingly promoted to implement projects within more 
legally defined territories (Boyd et al., 2018). The carbon-biodiversity trade-offs 
associated with the different administrative units documented in chapter 4 could help the 
assessment of future REDD+ project implementation and provision of biodiversity co-
benefits. Such carbon-biodiversity trade-offs have already been explored but only at 
landscape levels (Gilroy et al., 2014; Ferreira et al., 2018).  
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In the context of biodiversity offsetting schemes, there is evidence that averted 
loss offsets could contribute to the protection of important existing habitat whilst 
regrowth near the impacted area can promote ecological equivalence as biodiversity and 
ecological processes are spatially correlated (Hartig and Drechsler, 2009; Kiesecker et 
al., 2009; Maron et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2011). The results shown in chapter 3 and 4 
are consistent with such patterns. Avoided deforestation offsets across large spatial scale 
protected biomass-rich forests while offsets at small scales promoted more ecological 
equivalence between forest communities. The findings of chapter 3, in particular, 
contribute to the challenge of achieving additionality in biodiversity offset schemes 
(Maron et al., 2013) by showing that offsets near the impacted site (e.g. at a small spatial 
scale) yielded more additional offsets for both potentially restoring highly degraded areas 
and avoiding future habitat loss in regions of high deforestation pressure. These findings 
highlight that using administrative boundaries as implementation units could also be 
useful to determine the spatial location of biodiversity offsets, as well as the use of 
conservation planning strategies, which are currently adopted by biodiversity offsets 
planners (Kiesecker et al., 2009).  
Although the findings of this thesis suggest that small-scale implementation of 
offset schemes have more additional outcomes, such statement should be carefully 
evaluated. As small-scale implementation tends to allocate more areas to regrowth, it is 
expected an increase in the total secondary forest area. In tropical forests, if old-growth 
forests remain unprotected together with business-as-usual scenario, these forests will 
likely be deforested and reduced in area. This shift can have serious implications to 
climate change. In the Amazon, for example, the recovery of secondary forests biomass 
is associated with water availability: in wetter places, secondary forests are more resilient 
than in drier places (Poorter et al., 2016). As models have predicted a consolidation of the 
dry season and rise in temperatures across the Amazon (Esquivel-Muelbert et al., 2019), 
secondary forests will likely be more vulnerable under hotter and drier conditions, which 
may potentially hinder the recovery of these areas (Poorter et al., 2016). Other factors 
also contribute to hinder secondary forest recovery, such as land-use intensification (e.g. 
swidden agriculture) and absence of forest cover in the surroundings (Jakovac et al., 2015; 
Poorter et al., 2016). Policy-makers should consider the vulnerability of secondary forests 
under small-scale implementation and take both reactive and proactive conservation 
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approaches (Brooks et al., 2006, see Chapter 3, section 3.4). A reactive approach should 
be implemented to regenerate lost and/or degraded forests alongside a proactive approach, 
to protect existing and irreplaceable forest within the landscape matrix, especially in drier 
areas. This is could potentially be a way forward to effectively achieve meaningful 
conservation outcomes at smaller scales.  
 Overall, the findings showed in this thesis provided key insights to private land 
conservation in general, that, although assessed as a case study, could be easily 
extrapolated to other contexts around the globe. Private land conservation is an emerging 
and highly important conservation debate that still faces challenges to achieve effective 
conservation gains (Drescher and Brenner, 2018). I believe that, by the integration of 
empirical and spatial assessments, I provided useful tools that could guide future 
strategies and advance the academic debate.  
5.2.3 Contributions of methodological steps  
This research employed some methodological steps that could be replicated in 
future studies. In chapter 2, for example, I developed an index to numerically compare 
the compatibility of the viewpoints identified with the Q-methodology, the TCI. This 
index could be employed in other Q-methodology studies that seek to analyse potential 
compatibilities between two antagonist groups, such as buyers and sellers of MBIs. As 
the TCI uses the normalised factor scores provided by the Q-methodology and fit them 
into an equation, every Q-methodology study could easily apply it.  
To simulate trade between buyers and sellers in chapter 3, I developed an 
algorithm that considers the area of forest surplus to offset areas of forest deficit. Other 
offset mechanisms, such as habitat banking and biodiversity offsets, also use the same 
principal (habitat area) to establish offsets. Studies or conservation practitioners that aim 
to establish offsets between buyers and sellers could benefit from this algorithm and apply 
it according to their needs. In addition, other studies that consider other the trade of 
ecosystem services, such as carbon, could replace the area parameter for Mg of carbon, 
for example.  
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5.3 Suggestions for future research 
The work presented in this thesis has been in many ways exploratory, and 
therefore provides a number of possible avenues for future research. In chapter 2, I 
focused on the viewpoints of landowners of an agricultural frontier in the southern 
Amazon. Nevertheless, Brazil is an extreme diverse country in terms of land-use and 
social aspects, thus important viewpoints were likely missed in this study. Other Q-
methodology studies that explore the diversity of landowners’ opinions about the FC are 
inexistent. It would be highly useful to state-level regulation of CRA to be informed by 
Q-methodology studies performed in different states of Brazil. 
In MBIs, the value of payments for a given environmental good is often 
determinant to engage buyers and sellers in trade (Kosoy et al., 2008). To determine the 
price of an ecosystem service or nature goods (e.g. hectares of standing forest, clean 
water), economic valuation is typically performed via willingness to pay (WTP) and/or 
willingness to accept (WTA) assessments (Bateman et al., 2011). In the absence of these 
assessments, studies employ the use of proxies, such as land rental prices, to estimate the 
value of services for buyers and sellers (Börner et al., 2010; Bernasconi et al., 2016). One 
limitation stated in chapter 3 was the absence of price in the analysis. To date, there is no 
robust empirical valuation of how much buyers and sellers would be willing to pay or 
accept for the offset strategies in the FC. One study attempted to perform such valuation 
(Soares-Filho et al., 2016), however, given the unrepresentative sample size, such 
valuation cannot reflect general preferences. Economic valuations are often time 
consuming given that samples should necessarily be representative of the population 
(Bateman et al., 2011). Although laborious, an empirical economic valuation of the 
offsets options stated in the FC could be substantially informative to perform more 
detailed trade modelling between buyers and sellers and provide useful results to the 
implementation of the FC. For example, price variation of WTP and WTA could be 
spatially modelled to identify regions of high trade activity between buyers and sellers if 
WTP and WTA are similar. Where trade activity is low (e.g. discrepant WTP and WTA), 
this could indicate areas were forest surpluses are unlikely to be protected under avoided 
deforestation offsets and, therefore, be more vulnerable to deforestation. A combination 
with data on future deforestation projections (Aguiar et al., 2016) could make such model 
more robust. 
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Although I focus on the Amazon, the methods developed in chapter 3 could be 
replicated in other biomes and provide national-level assessments of the conservation 
trade-offs associated with different spatial scales of implementation. Until now, country-
level appraisals of the FC have solely considered the extent of forest deficit and surplus 
across the properties to make inferences about additionality (Freitas et al., 2017) and 
estimate overall costs of the CRA market (Soares-Filho et al., 2016). The use of the 
methods presented in chapter 3 will allow a comprehensive and comparative investigation 
across all biomes. Potentially, this could reveal distinct conservation trade-offs that could 
be biome-specific and eventually encourage tailor-made conservation actions that are 
could be implemented in accordance with each biome’s needs. 
In chapter 3 and 4, it was assumed that unprotected legal reserve surpluses would 
be deforested and legal reserve deficits that were not offset in protected areas nor with 
CRA would be automatically abandoned and regrown. Both simplifications are 
limitations of this study. Land-use models, perhaps built with more empirical information 
from buyers and sellers could provide results that better aid the spatial planning of offset 
strategies. For instance, by interviewing landowners and asking how likely sellers are to 
keep their LR surpluses without any compensation and how likely buyers are to abandon 
their LR deficit to comply with the FC could help identify areas where more action to 
protect LR surpluses are needed or where to focus restoration actions. This kind of human 
empirical information is essential to build robust agent-based models that simulates land-
use change (Bakker et al., 2014). There is a growing need in the conservation field to 
incorporate analysis that include human behaviour at the individual level to better address 
how people interact with the environment (Rounsevell et al., 2012). 
More broadly, it would be particularly interesting and informative to also compare 
outcomes of spatial planning approaches with outcomes of small administrative units to 
determine the spatial location of the biodiversity offsets. The determination of the 
location of offsets in biodiversity offsetting is often case-specific. This adds complexity 
to trade and impedes reliable comparisons across different offsetting actions that 
challenges implementation (Bull et al., 2014; Gonçalves et al., 2015). The comparison 
between a well-established approach (spatial planning) with a novel one could result in 
important implications for one of the biggest implementation challenges faced by 
biodiversity offsetting. Spatial planning approaches at landscape-level consider a number 
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of ecological processes and elements to determine the location of offsets, such as 
biodiversity, threatened species, protection of old-growth forests etc. (Kiesecker et al., 
2009). As such elements are dependent on their spatial scale (Hartig and Drechsler, 2009), 
I would therefore expect that landscape-level spatial planning and small administrative 
units presented similar results (e.g. similar area of old-growth forests protected and 
conservation of similar biodiversity components). If such results are indeed similar, some 
biodiversity offsets could then use small administrative units as a more objective way of 
placing offsets.  
In chapter 4 I showed how implementation at a small spatial scale resulted in the 
protection of highly threatened beta-diversity. The use of beta-diversity is still 
underexplored to inform conservation strategies when compared to alpha-diversity 
(Socolar et al., 2016). It would be interesting to compare the use of both species richness 
and beta-diversity across large environmental gradients, such as the Amazon, to assess 
whether they would be contradicting or complementary in providing biodiversity 
assessments.  
 
5.4 Final remarks  
In this thesis I investigated the potential of conservation strategies to result in 
effective conservation gains. For this, I used the Brazilian Forest Code, which is 
considered the largest forest offset scheme in the world and has the potential to avoid the 
deforestation of 92 Mha of primary forest and/or restore 18 Mha of degraded land. The 
empirical analysis of landowners’ viewpoints of programme-specific factors showed that 
heterogeneous perceptions about the scheme and sharp divergences between opinions of 
buyers and sellers might undermine scheme’s conservation goals. These results suggest 
that policy interventions that target groups of landowners unlikely to participate could be 
useful to improve the scheme’s effectiveness. One potential way of targeting is to restrict 
the spatial scale of the scheme. I tested this hypothesis and showed that restricting the 
spatial scale of the scheme has clear trade-offs. At a large spatial scale, the scheme 
resulted in the protection of greater areas of standing forest through avoided deforestation. 
However, restricting the spatial scale of the scheme to smaller units resulted in more area 
directed to conservation, when combining offsets from both avoided deforestation and 
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forest regrowth, especially in highly deforested regions. Such findings suggest that 
restricting the spatial scale of conservation schemes might contribute to improving their 
additionality. In terms of potential environmental co-benefits, such as carbon and 
biodiversity, I also demonstrated potential trade-offs associated with different spatial 
scales. While a large spatial scale promoted the protection of biomass-rich areas, it 
resulted in little protection of biodiversity across all forest communities. Conversely, at a 
small spatial scale, highly threatened biodiversity was protected but mostly overlapping 
with biomass-poor areas. In essence, these results indicate that the overall effectiveness 
of conservation schemes could be optimised by design and implementation of strategies 
at local levels. Although I showed that effectiveness may be accompanied by trade-offs, 
the findings presented here support a “think-local” focus. This thesis contributes to our 
understanding of how to improve the implementation of conservation strategies around 
the world and achieve more effective conservation gains. 
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Appendix 1: Ethics Form, Risk Assessment 
and field survey 
 
 
A1.1: Ethics Form 
 
 
University Research Ethics Committee - application for ethical review 
 
Please email your completed application form along with any relevant supporting documents 
to ResearchEthics@leeds.ac.uk (or to FMHUniEthics@leeds.ac.uk if you are based in the 
Faculty of Medicine and Health) at least 6 weeks before the research/ fieldwork is due to start. 
Dentistry and Psychology applicants should follow their School’s procedures for submitting an 
application.    
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Student number (if a 
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externally funded) 
Module code (if 
applicable) 
 200518375   
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Research Ethics 
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 Biological Science (BIOSCI) 
X ESSL, Environment and LUBS (AREA) 
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‘X’ next to your choice) 
 MaPS and Engineering (MEEC) 
 School of Dentistry (DREC) 
 School of Healthcare (SHREC) 
 School of Medicine (SoMREC) 
 School of Psychology (SoPREC) 
 
Indicate what type of 
ethical review you are 
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 Staff project (externally or internally funded) 
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Research end date 
(dd/mm/yy) 
01/02/2015 01/06/2016 15/07/2016 31/01/2018 
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x  1.3 I confirm that I have read and understood the current version of the 
University of Leeds Research Ethics Policy.  
The Policy is available at http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/ResearchEthicsPolicies.  
x  1.4 I confirm that I have read and understood the current version of the 
University of Leeds Research Data Management Policy. 
The policy is available at http://library.leeds.ac.uk/research-data-management-
policy.  
x  1.5 I confirm that I have read and understood the current version of the 
University of Leeds Information Protection Policy.  
The policy is available at 
http://it.leeds.ac.uk/info/116/policies/249/information_protection_policy  
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x  1.6 I confirm that NHS ethical review is not required for this project.  
Refer to http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/NHSethicalreview for guidance in identifying 
circumstances which require NHS review 
 x 1.7 Will the research involve NHS staff recruited as potential research participants 
(by virtue of their professional role) or NHS premises/ facilities? 
Please note: If yes, NHS R&D management permission or local management 
permission may also be needed. Refer to http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/NHSethicalreview.  
 
 
Section 2: Contact details 
2.1 Name of applicant Marta Lisli Ribeiro de Morais Giannichi 
2.2 Position (eg PI, Co-
I, RA, student) 
PhD student 
2.3 Department/ 
School 
School of Geography 
2.4 Faculty Faculty of Environment 
2.5 Work address 
(usually at the 
University of Leeds) 
University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
School of Geography – Garstang Building 
2.6 Telephone number 07470300141 
2.7 University of Leeds 
email address 
bs10mlg@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
Section 3: Summary of the research  
3.1 In plain English provide a brief summary of the aims and objectives of the research.  
(max 300 words). The summary should briefly describe 
 the background to the research and why it is important, 
 the questions it will answer and potential benefits, 
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 the study design and what is involved for participants. 
Your answers should be easily understood by someone who is not experienced in the field you 
are researching, (eg a member of the public) - otherwise it may be returned to you. Where 
technical terms are used they should be explained. Any acronyms not generally known should 
be described in full.  
Background 
Privately owned forests account for 959Mha globally, an area almost the size of USA. Private 
forest land is susceptible to deforestation pressure due to agriculture intensification. To halt 
deforestation and its underlying reasons, economic incentives have been advocated as a tool 
to promote conservation via monetary compensation of landholders who are willing to 
engage in conservation practises.   
However, effective design and implementation of economic incentives schemes are dependent upon 
understanding the factors influencing landholders’ decision-making process.  To better comprehend 
this context, we chose Brazil as a case study. The Brazilian forestry framework has a combination of 
regulation and economic incentives that can contribute to deforestation decrease via a tradable 
permit scheme promoting conservation of set-aside areas in private lands (named CRA).  
Questions and benefits 
I. What are the factors determining private landholders’ participation in CRA? 
II. What is the potential market value per hectare of set-aside areas that would trigger 
participation?  
III. What is the expected minimum number of participants that would secure 
conservation in considerable proportions? 
This research seeks to gather empirical data from private landholders in the Amazon to 
assess their willingness to participate. Results will provide insights for the implementation of 
CRA and conservation strategies in Brazil and other tropical nations facing similar challenges. 
Study Design 
- First fieldwork: conduct pilot interviews with different types of landholders (small, 
medium and large) located in two distinct biomes: Amazon and Cerrado. The main 
objective is to collect socio-economic data and perform interviews to assess what 
factors influence participation in CRA. I expect to interview in this campaign a total of 
180 volunteer farmers. 
- Second fieldwork: This second campaign will apply objective surveys with landholders 
located in 10 municipalities to rank most important participation factors for future 
statistical and spatial analysis. I expect to survey around 650 farmers. 
3.2 Who is funding the 
research? 
 CNPq – The Brazilian National Council for Scientific and 
Technological Development 
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Section 4: Research data  
You may find the following guidance helpful: 
 Research data management guidance 
 Advice on planning your research project 
 Dealing with issues relating to confidentiality and anonymisation 
4.1 What is the data source? (Indicate with an ‘X’ all that apply) 
X New data collected for this research 
 Data previously collected for other research 
 Data previously collected for non-research purposes 
X Data already in the public domain 
 Other, please state: _______________________________________________.  
4.2 How will the data be collected? (Indicate with an ‘X) 
X Through one-to-one research interviews 
 Through focus groups 
 Self-completion (eg questionnaires, diaries) 
 Through observation 
 Through autoethnographic research 
 Through experiments/ user-testing involving participants 
 From external research collaborators 
 Other, please state: _______________________________________________. 
4.3 How will you make your research data available to others in line with: the University’s, 
funding bodies’ and publishers’ policies on making the results of publically funded research 
publically available (while not compromising requirements around data protection 
legislation)? (max 200 words)  
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My research sponsor, CNPq, does not have any specific demand about making data publicly 
available. However, following the University’s recommendations on data access, sharing and 
re-use 
(https://library.leeds.ac.uk/info/461/research_data_management/304/data_management_p
lanning/7) I intend to use one of the repositories indicated in re3data Registry of Research 
data repositories, such as Zenodo or Figshare, which are long-term data storage repositories. 
For data that might be sensitive and cannot be made available as open data, I will submit to 
the University’s Institutional Repository (IR) which has restricted access and data is stored 
minimum of 10 years beyond project end’s date. Also, another possibility of sharing data is 
when publishing make available Supplementary Information containing data that can be 
open to the Scientific community.  
4.4 How do you intend to share the research data? (Indicate with an ‘X) 
 Depositing in a specialist data centre or archive 
X Submitting to a journal to support a publication 
 Depositing in a self-archiving system or an institutional repository 
 Dissemination via a project or institutional website 
 Informal peer-to-peer exchange 
 No plans to report or disseminate the data 
 Other, please state: _______________________________________________. 
4.5 How do you intend to report and disseminate the results of the study? (Indicate with an 
‘X) 
X Peer reviewed journals 
 Internal report 
X Conference presentation 
 Publication on website 
 Other publication 
 Submission to regulatory authorities 
 No plans to report or disseminate the results 
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 Other, please state: _______________________________________________. 
 
Section 5: Protocols 
Which protocols will be 
complied with? (Indicate 
with an ‘X’).  
There may be 
circumstances where it 
makes sense not to comply 
with a protocol, this is fine 
but should be clarified in 
your application. 
X 
Data protection, anonymisation and storage and sharing of 
research data 
 Informed consent 
X Verbal consent 
 Reimbursement of research participants 
 Low risk observation 
 
 
Section 6: Additional ethical issues 
6.1 Indicate with an ‘X’ in the left-hand column whether the research involves any of the 
following:  
 Discussion of sensitive topics 
 Prolonged or frequent participant involvement 
 Potential for adverse environmental impact 
 The possibility of harm to participants or others (including the researcher(s)) 
 Participants taking part in the research without their knowledge and consent (eg covert 
observation of people in non-public places) 
 The use of drugs, placebos or invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of 
any kind 
 Food substances or drinks being given to participants (other than refreshments) 
 Vitamins or any related substances being given to participants 
 Acellular blood, urine or tissue samples obtained from participants (ie no NHS 
requirement) 
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 Members of the public in a research capacity (participant research) 
 Participants who are particularly vulnerable (eg children, people with learning 
disabilities, offenders) 
 People who are unable to give their own informed consent 
 Researcher(s) in a position of authority over participants, eg as employers, lecturers, 
teachers or family members 
 Financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) 
being offered to participants 
 Cooperation of an intermediary to gain access to research participants or material (eg 
head teachers, prison governors, chief executives) 
 Potential conflicts of interest 
 Internet participants or other visual/ vocal methods where participants may be 
identified 
 The sharing of data or confidential information beyond the initial consent given 
 Translators or interpreters 
X Research conducted outside the UK 
 An international collaborator 
 The transfer of data outside the European Economic Area 
 Third parties collecting data 
X Other ethical clearances or permissions 
6.2 Provide details of any ethical issues the research may involve other than those mentioned 
previously and explain how these issues will be addressed. (max 200 words) 
 
 Research interviewees will participate in my fieldwork on an entirely voluntary basis. 
At no point will I try to coerce a participant into agreeing to a research interview. 
 I will ensure that all research interviewees are entirely comfortable with answering 
the questions posed in the interview. I will brief them before they give their verbal 
consent to be interviewed. 
 I will also avoid using any means of suasion to bias a research interviewee's 
comments towards particular outcomes.  
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 I shall ensure confidentiality of information provided by our research interviewees. 
Comments from my interview material I use in published or other publicly 
disseminated works will be anonymised. I shall make this verbally clear to 
interviewees verbally when I meet with them. 
 Where any politically, economically, socio-culturally sensitive issues do arise in 
research interview situations, I will exercise due care and caution, being mindful to 
treat the interviewee's comments with the utmost respect, and re-stating that his or 
her comments will be treated in a completely confidential manner.  
 
 
Section 7: Recruitment and consent process  
For guidance refer to http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/InvolvingResearchParticipants and the research 
ethics protocols.  
7.1 State approximately how much data and/ or how many participants are going to be 
involved. 
Data on socio-economic information and factors particular to the scheme to be investigated 
from around 800 landholders. Potential presence of rare or endangered species on set-aside 
areas within private properties reported by landholders will be recorded for assessing 
potential conservation value. 
7.2 How was that number of participants decided upon? (max 200 words) 
Please note: The number of participants should be sufficient to achieve worthwhile results but 
should not be so high as to involve unnecessary recruitment and burdens for participants. This 
is especially pertinent in research which involves an element of risk. Describe here how many 
participants will be recruited, and whether this will be enough to answer the research 
question. If you have received formal statistical advice then please indicate so here, and 
describe that advice. 
The state where the research will be conducted has 82,000 private landholders. It is 
unrealistic to have a 10% representative sample size of all landholders. Therefore I aim at 
interviewing 1%. This is sufficient to answer my research questions. As my research design 
considers contrasting landholders within the sample size, 1% would be sufficient to cover 
representativeness issues, reflecting accurately members of the state farmers’ population. 
Still, 1% corresponds to 800 landholders. Graduate students from local university (UNEMAT) 
will be recruited and trained by me to perform surveys in different municipalities to achieve 
sample size goals.  
7.3 How are the participants and/ or data going to be selected? (max 200 words) 
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The participants will be visited in their farms and they will be asked if they are willing to 
answers some questions for research purposes. The farms were selected according to 
contrasting socio-economic factors (e.g. mean income per capita, mean farm size, main land 
use) of the municipalities in which the farms are located. 
7.4 For each type of methodology, describe the process by which you will obtain freely given 
informed consent for the collection, use and reuse of the research data.  
Guidance is available at http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/InvolvingResearchParticipants. The relevant 
documents (information sheet and consent form) need to be attached to the end of this 
application. If you are not using an information sheet and/ or seeking written consent, please 
provide an explanation.  
For all both interviews and surveys I will obtain a verbal informed consent. Participants are 
much likely to be illiterate, semi-illiterate or present difficulties in reading and interpreting 
information in the areas interviewed. Thus to avoid any embarrassments, the verbal consent 
was chosen. Apart from taking notes I will also record interviews after obtaining participants 
explicit agreement to be able to register their verbal consent. Additionally, from my own 
experience in the fieldwork region, there is a particular alarm when a non-acquainted person 
asks for the individual’s signature. Thus asking for a written consent from participants might 
create an uncomfortable situation, which can lead to a lack of trust between researcher and 
interviewee, damaging data collection process. Nevertheless, to be conservative, I prepared a 
written consent and will carry with me if I feel it will not cause any uncomfortableness. 
Before the interviews it will be clearly explained to them (by reading the information sheet 
and recording their consent) that data will be used for academic purposes, their identities will 
not be recorded and only people directly involved with the research will have access to the 
raw data. 
7.5 Describe the arrangements for withdrawal from participation and withdrawal of data/ 
tissue. Please note: It should be made clear to participants in advance if there is a point after 
which they will not be able to withdraw their data. See also 
http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/ResearchDataManagement. (max 200 words) 
Research participants are voluntary and will have freedom to leave or end the interview 
whenever they wish, and there is no need for participants to give any reason by withdrawing 
from the interview. All data collected at any point of the research project will be kept 
anonymised. After responding the interview, they will be informed that their raw data will be 
kept safely in the University’s Repository, emphasizing anonymity. They will also be informed 
that after this raw data is registered, processed and part of the thesis and possibly published 
in journals, they will not be able to withdraw their participation.  
7.6 Provide details of any incentives you are going to use and explain their purpose. (max 200 
words) 
Please note: Payment of participants should be ethically justified. The FREC will wish to be 
reassured that research participants are not being paid for taking risks or that payments are 
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set at a level which would unduly influence participants. A clear statement should be included 
in the participant information sheet setting out the position on reimbursement of any expense 
incurred. 
No incentives will be provided for participants. Their contribution will be explicitly voluntary 
and this will be clarified to them.  
 
 
Section 8: Data protection, confidentiality and anonymisation 
Guidance is available at http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/ConfidentialityAnonymisation 
8.1 How identifiable will the participants be? (Indicate with an ‘X’). 
 Fully identifiable 
 Identity of subject protected by code numbers/ pseudonyms 
X Fully anonymised 
 Anonymised but potentially identifiable 
 Data only in aggregated form 
 Other 
8.2 Describe the measures you will take to deal with issues of confidentiality, including any 
limits to confidentiality. (max 300 words) 
The State Environmental Agency already has data about landholders in a system that is called 
Rural Environmental Registry. This registry contains information about landholders’ property 
location, size, land use etc. This data is available online in the Environmental Agency platform 
and is already being used in this thesis to locate landholders and identify certain patterns 
within the study site. However, data on their views on this specific scheme have not been 
collected neither how this is located spatially. Limits to confidentiality involve the association 
of the content of interviews with the geographically sensitive data (e.g. properties’ 
coordinates with income). These raw data are subject to complete confidentiality and I will 
make sure participants understand and agree that their processed and analyzed data are 
going to be disclosed for academic purposes. None of the information I want to collect has 
the potential to be harmful or used against the participants. I will make this clear to them. 
Their raw data will not be disclosed academically (publication and thesis) neither the 
geographical location of the raw and individual socio-economic data, therefore it is not 
harmful for them in any way and does not offer them any risks. Still, I will make sure to apply 
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a correction filter in the geographical coordinates that corrects the point to a distance of 
10km away from the point, so as the sensitive data is not associated with the coordinate. I 
will not use quotes as data gathered will be quantitative.  
 
 
8.3 Describe the measures you will take to deal with issues of anonymity. (max 200 words) 
The identity of participants will not be recorded as this is not relevant to the interviews. 
Participants will be aware of that. The participants are not public personas, they are farmers 
in Mato Grosso, a state with colossal dimensions and a very high number of farmers. It is 
extremely unlikely that information given by one individual interviewed can be connected to 
their identity. Thus ensuring anonymity of individuals is totally feasible and realistic.  
8.4 Who will have access to the research data apart from the research team (eg translators, 
authorities)? (max 100 words) 
Because this research concerns the implementation of a novel scheme that is previewed in 
the environmental law, I would expect that governmental institutions might want to have 
access to some of the data if the work gets published. However, they will not have access to 
the raw data as it is classified as sensitive and confidential data, only the data that will 
eventually become public via journal publications or the thesis itself in the form of 
supplementary information.  
8.5 Describe the process you will use to ensure the compliance of third parties with ethical 
standards. (max 100 words) 
During the training process with the graduate students that will undertake interviews on my 
behalf, I will include in the training program ethical issues that they must be aware of such as 
confidentiality and anonymity, process of withdraw and its limitations, data usage for 
publication, interviewees voluntariness to participate, clearly stating aims, delivering and/or 
reading the participants’ information sheet and dealing with informed consent.  
8.6 Where and in what format(s) will research data, consent forms and administrative 
records be retained? (max 200 words) 
Please note: Mention hard copies as well as electronic data. Electronic data should be stored 
securely and appropriately and in accordance with the University of Leeds Data Protection 
Policy available at 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/data_protection_code_of_practice.html.  
The data collected (as the data that I am currently processing) is stored in a particular an L: 
drive of high storage capacity purchased by my supervisor. While on fieldwork, I will take a 
School’s laptop with me and raw data will be stored in the same L: drive via VPN and remote 
access to my desktop before I return to Leeds. The participants’ responses will be both 
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recorded and registered on forms by myself, which already covers the demand for hard 
copies. Consent forms and administrative records are stored in my M: drive.  
8.7 If online surveys are to be used, where will the responses be stored? (max 200 words) 
Refer to: 
http://it.leeds.ac.uk/info/173/database_and_subscription_services/206/bristol_online_surve
y_accounts  and http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/SecuringResearchData for guidance.  
N/A 
8.8 Give details and outline the measures you will take to mitigate any foreseeable risks 
(other than those already mentioned) to the participants, the researchers, the University of 
Leeds or anyone else involved in the research? (max 300 words) 
This study is of no risk at all to any of the research participants. All research data will be 
protected and kept confidential and each interview participant will be treated individually 
and the identity of interview participants will remain anonymous. 
For the researcher and others I do not foresee any risks.  
 
 
Section 9: Other ethical issues 
Yes No (Indicate with an ‘X’) 
X  
9.1 Is a health and safety risk assessment required for the project?  
Please note: Risk assessments are a University requirement for all fieldwork taking 
place off campus. The risk assessment forms and further guidance on planning for 
fieldwork in a variety of settings can be found on the University’s Health & Safety 
website along with further information about risk assessment: 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/safety/fieldwork/index.htm. Contact your Faculty Health 
and Safety Manager for further advice. See also 
http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/HealthAndSafetyAdvice. 
 X 
9.2 Is a Disclosure and Barring Service check required for the researcher?  
Please note: It is the researcher’s responsibility to check whether a DBS check is 
required and to obtain one if it is needed.  
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 X 9.3 Is there scope for incidental findings, ie unplanned additional findings? 
9.4 If so, what sort of findings, and what processes will be put in place to deal with these? 
(max 200 words) 
 
9.5 Any other relevant information 
No. 
9.6 Provide details of any ethical issues on which you would like to ask the Committee's 
advice. 
 
 
 
Section 10: Further details for student projects (complete if applicable) 
Your supervisor is required to provide email confirmation that they have read, edited and 
agree with the form above. It is a good idea to involve your supervisor as much as possible 
with your application. If you are unsure how to answer any of the questions do ask your 
supervisors for advice. 
10.1 Qualification working towards (indicate with an ‘X’) 
 Bachelor’s degree Module code:   
 Master’s degree (including PgCert, PgDip) 
X Research degree (ie PhD) 
10.2 Primary supervisor’s contact details 
Name (title, first name, last 
name) 
Guy Ziv 
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Department/ School/ Institute School of Geography 
Telephone number +44 (0) 113 34 37994 
University of Leeds email 
address 
g.ziv@leeds.ac.uk 
10.3 Second supervisor’s contact details 
Name (title, first name, last 
name) 
Tim Baker 
Department/ School/ Institute School of Geography 
Telephone number +44 (0) 113 34 38352 
University of Leeds email 
address 
t.r.baker@leeds.ac.uk  
Yes No 10.4 To be completed by the student’s supervisor 
X  The topic merits further research 
X  I believe that the student has the skills to carry out the research 
 
 
Section 11: Other members of the research team (complete if applicable) 
Name (title, first name, last 
name) 
 
Role (eg PI, Co-I)  
Department/ School/ Institute  
Telephone number  
University of Leeds email address  
 
Name (title, first name, last 
name) 
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Role (eg PI, Co-I)  
Department/ School/ Institute  
Telephone number  
University of Leeds email address  
 
Name (title, first name, last 
name) 
 
Role (eg PI, Co-I)  
Department/ School/ Institute  
Telephone number  
University of Leeds email address  
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Section 12: Supporting documents 
Indicate with an ‘X’ which 
supporting documents have been 
included with your application.  
 
Wherever possible the research 
title on consent forms, information 
sheets, other supporting 
documentation and this application 
should be consistent. The title 
should make clear (where 
appropriate) what the research is 
about. There may be instances 
where a different title is desirable 
on information to participants (for 
example – in projects which 
necessarily involve an element of 
deception or if giving the title might 
skew the results of the research). It 
is not imperative that the titles are 
consistent, or detailed, but where 
possible then they should be.  
 
Supporting documents should be 
saved with a meaningful file name 
and version control, eg 
'Participant_Info_Sheet_v1' or 
'Parent_Consent_From_v2'. Refer 
to the examples 
at http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/InvolvingRe
searchParticipants.  
X Information sheet(s)  
 
Please note: Include different versions for different 
groups of participants eg for children and adults if 
applicable. Refer to 
http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/InvolvingResearchParticipants 
for guidance in producing participant information 
sheets. 
X Consent form(s) 
 
Please note: Include different versions for different 
groups of participants eg for children and adults if 
applicable. Refer to 
http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/InvolvingResearchParticipants 
for guidance in producing participant consent 
forms. 
 Recruitment materials 
 
Please note: Eg poster, email etc used to invite 
people to participate in your research project. 
 Letter/ email seeking permission from host/ 
gatekeeper 
X Questionnaire/ interview questions 
X Health and safety risk assessment  
 
Please note: Risk assessments are a University 
requirement for all fieldwork taking place off 
campus. The risk assessment forms and further 
guidance on planning for fieldwork in a variety of 
settings can be found on the University’s Health & 
Safety website along with further information 
about risk assessment: 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/safety/fieldwork/index.ht
m. Contact your Faculty Health and Safety Manager 
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for further advice. Also refer to  
http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/HealthAndSafetyAdvice. 
 Data management plan 
Refer to http://library.leeds.ac.uk/research-data-
manage.  
 
 
Section 13: Sharing information for training purposes 
Yes No (Indicate with an ‘X’) 
X  
I would be content for information in the application to be used for research 
ethics and research data management training purposes within the University of 
Leeds. All personal identifiers and references to researchers, funders and research 
units would be removed. 
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Section 14: Declaration 
1. The information in this form is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief and I 
take full responsibility for it. 
2. I undertake to abide by the University's ethical and health & safety policies and 
guidelines, and the ethical principles underlying good practice guidelines appropriate 
to my discipline. 
3. If the research is approved I undertake to adhere to the study protocol, the terms of 
this application and any conditions set out by the Research Ethics Committee. 
4. I undertake to ensure that all members of the research team are aware of the ethical 
issues and the contents of this application form. 
5. I undertake to seek an ethical opinion from the REC before implementing any 
amendments to the protocol. 
6. I undertake to submit progress/ end of project reports if required. 
7. I am aware of my responsibility to be up to date and comply with the requirements of 
the law and relevant guidelines relating to security and confidentiality of personal 
data. 
8. I understand that research records/ data may be subject to inspection for audit 
purposes if required in future. 
9. I understand that personal data about me as a researcher in this application will be 
held by the relevant FRECs and that this will be managed according to the principles 
established in the Data Protection Act. 
 Applicant Student’s supervisor (if applicable) 
Signature 
  
Name Marta Giannichi Guy Ziv  
Date 23/03/2016 23/03/2016 
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A1.2: Ethics Approval 
 
 
 
Performance, Governance and Operations 
Research & Innovation Service 
Charles Thackrah Building 
101 Clarendon Road 
Leeds LS2 9LJ  Tel: 0113 343 4873 
Email: ResearchEthics@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Marta Lisli Ribeiro de Morais Giannichi 
School of Geography  
University of Leeds 
Leeds, LS2 9JT 
 
ESSL, Environment and LUBS (AREA) Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
University of Leeds 
 
 
Dear Marta 
 
Title of study: Empirical analysis of tradable permits in private forest conservation 
Ethics reference: AREA 15-099 
 
I am pleased to inform you that the above research application has been reviewed by the ESSL, 
Environment and LUBS (AREA) Faculty Research Ethics Committee and following receipt of 
your response to the Committee’s initial comments, I can confirm a favourable ethical opinion 
as of the date of this letter. The following documentation was considered: 
 
Document    Version Date 
AREA 15-099 MartaGiannichi_Ethical_review_GZ.doc 1 24/03/16 
AREA 15-099 MartaGiannichi_Information Sheet.docx 1 24/03/16 
AREA 15-099 MartaGiannichi_Participant_consent_Portuguese_formlowrisk.doc 1 24/03/16 
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AREA 15-099 Survey_1.xlsx 1 24/03/16 
AREA 15-099 Marta_Giannichi_High-Risk-Fieldwork-RA-form-GZ.doc 1 24/03/16 
 
Committee members made the following comments about your application: 
 
With respect to Journal Supplementary Information you might find the following article 
useful: 
 NISO/NFAIS. (2013). Recommended practices for online supplemental journal 
article materials http://www.niso.org/publications/rp/rp-15-2013  
 
In general the feeling on that email list is that for data it is probably better to store these in 
trusted repositories such as the University of Leeds Institutional Repository for Research 
Data rather than as Supplementary Information on publishers’ websites.  
 
Please notify the committee if you intend to make any amendments to the original research as 
submitted at date of this approval, including changes to recruitment methodology. All changes 
must receive ethical approval prior to implementation. The amendment form is available at 
http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/EthicsAmendment.    
 
Please note: You are expected to keep a record of all your approved documentation.  You will 
be given a two week notice period if your project is to be audited. There is a checklist listing 
examples of documents to be kept which is available at http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/EthicsAudits.  
 
We welcome feedback on your experience of the ethical review process and suggestions for 
improvement. Please email any comments to ResearchEthics@leeds.ac.uk.  
Yours sincerely 
Jennifer Blaikie 
Senior Research Ethics Administrator, Research & Innovation Service 
On behalf of Dr Andrew Evans, Chair, AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
 
CC: Student’s supervisor(s)  
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A1.3: Information Sheet 
 
 
Information Sheet 
 
IMPORTANT: THE INFORMATION BELOW WILL BE PRESENTED ORALLY TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you 
to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read 
the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or 
not you wish to take part. 
 
Title of research project: Empirical analysis of tradable permits in private forest conservation.  
 
Some information about the researcher: I am a researcher in Tropical Forest Conservation in 
University of Leeds, UK carrying out a research project in tropical forest conservation that is 
expected to last 4 years in total. I am a Biologist, Brazilian and have lived in Mato Grosso for 
some time. I have no affiliations with any government body nor authorities. I am an independent 
worker.  
 
What is the purpose of this project?  
The main objective is to understand farmers’ perspectives towards the Brazilian Forest Code, 
more specifically their predisposition to participate in Cota de Reserva Ambiental (tradable 
permit scheme to conserve private forest land) and what factors might influence their 
participation.  
 
Why have I been chosen?  
Because you are a farmer/landholder, with either exceeding or deficit of native vegetation in 
your Legal Reserve. This makes you a buyer or a seller of Cota de Reserva Ambiental in Mato 
Grosso and your understanding about this is important to the future implementation and 
enhancement of public policies as you are the manager of our natural resources. Just like you, 
other 600 farmers will be interviewed. 
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What do I have to do? 
Orally answer a few questions about socio-economic aspects of yourself (age, education, 
income), followed by questions more related to your property (size, land use, amount of 
vegetation). Later on I will focus more on your knowledge on the regulations in the Forestry 
Code and if you would participate in Cota de Reserva Ambiental and for what price. If you do not 
know or feel uncomfortable with any of the questions, do not hesitate to interrupt and/or 
withdraw from the interview. I need to register what you say, otherwise I will certainly forget! 
The best way for me to do is, is to record and take notes during the interview. But I will only do 
this if you explicitly agree, either orally or signing a term. Whatever you feel more comfortable 
with. The interviews are expected to last from 30 to 60 minutes and they will happen only once. 
There are no lifestyle restrictions as a result of participating.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
Absolutely not. You are contributing to this project as a volunteer and it is entirely up to you to 
answer the questions. If you decide to take part, please clearly state orally.  
 
Are these interviews anonymous and confidential? 
Yes. There is absolutely no need to reveal your identity.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
Absolutely not. All the information will remain anonymous and the information will be carefully 
used just for academic purposes.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There is no direct benefits of taking part. However, your answers can contribute to a better 
implementation of the Forestry Code and Cota de Reserva Ambiental, which can provide you an 
alternative source of income if you are a seller, and a more efficient solution for compliance if 
you are a buyer.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
Your answers will be analysed after I go back to the university in a way that all the farmers that 
contributed can help my research to draw conclusions about the present and the future 
implementation of the Forest Code and Cota de Reserva Ambiental. All the recorded interviews 
will be used strictly for analysis purpose, which means that what you say will be heard just by 
me and the people directly involved in this research.  
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What I say can become public? 
Probably not the way you are thinking! If my project reveals interesting results, it can be 
published in an academic journal. But again, what is published are the analyses, figures and 
numbers of the interviews and not what you exactly said. Also, everything is anonymous and 
confidential.  
 
Can I withdraw at some point?  
During the interviews you can withdraw at any moment. However, when your answers are taken 
back to the university and start writing my analyses, unfortunately you will not be able to change 
your mind. So please be sure you are willing to contribute.  
 
Who is organising this project? 
School of Geography, University of Leeds. This is where I do my doctorate research.  
Can you know more about what I am doing and get in touch with me? 
Of course! If you have any questions and want to know more about this research you can contact 
me by email or phone.  
 
Marta Giannichi 
School of Geography 
LS2 9JT Leeds 
Tel: + 44 (0) 7470 300 141 
e-mail: bs10mlg@leeds.ac.uk 
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A1.4: Risk Assessment 
 
 
Fieldwork Risk Assessment (High Risk Activities) 
 
Fieldwork Project Details 
 
Faculty 
School/Service 
School of Geography, Faculty of Environment 
 
Location of 
Fieldwork 
Mato Grosso State, Brazil.  
 
Brief description of 
Fieldwork activity 
and purpose 
(include address, area, 
grid reference and map 
where applicable) 
The purpose of this fieldwork is to conduct surveys and interviews 
with private landholders in a four municipalities in Mato Grosso. I will 
be visiting farmers at their properties and asking them questions. The 
main purpose of this fieldwork is to gather empirical data from private 
farmers in different Biomes in Mato Grosso. Maps attached to this 
form.  
 
Fieldwork itinerary 
e.g. flight details, hotel 
address 
Please find attached to this document: 
- Fieldwork itinerary;  
- Flight details; 
- Maps 
 
Hotel addresses are below as well as details of sponsor.  
 
Sponsor details: 
CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e 
Tecnológico) 
Coordenação de Execução de Bolsas no Exterior 
SHIS Quadra 01 Conjunto B - Bloco B, Térreo 
Edifício Santos Dumont  
Lago Sul, Brasilia - DF  
CEP: 71605-170  
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Contact person: Renee Silva 
Phone: +55 61 3211-4022  
e-mail: renee.silva@cnpq.br  
  
Fieldwork is arranged to happen from June 1st to July 15th 2016. 
Arrival in Cuiaba is expected on the 5th of June and return to Leeds on 
15th of July. Upon arrival in Cuiaba I will rent a car and head to the 
municipalities either the day I arrive or the following day, depending 
on the time of the arrival.  
The municipalities visited as their order of appearance are: 
 
1) Paranatinga 
Hotel Bandeirantes 
Av. Brasil, 895 – União 
CEP: 78870-000 
Phone: +55 66 3573-1258 
 
2) Santa Rita do Trivelato 
Hotel Matrinxã 
Rua 28 Dezembro, s/n lt 1423 Centro 
CEP: 78453-000 
Phone: +55065 3529-6154 
3) Juina  
Hotel Caiabi 
Avenida Mato Grosso, 665 – Centro 
CEP: 78320-000, Brasil 
Phone: +55 66 3556-1270 
 
4) Castanheira 
Same as above as they are 45 minutes’ drive.  
 
Organiser Details Contact details 
Name, Email, Telephone 
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Fieldwork Activity 
Organiser / Course 
Leader 
Marta Lisli Giannichi  
bs10mlg@leeds.ac.uk  
07470300141 
 
Departmental Co-
ordinator 
Guy Ziv  
School of Geography 
University of Leeds 
Leeds, UK 
g.ziv@leeds.ac.uk  
+44 (0) 113 34 37994 
 
Nature of visit 
Size of Group, lone 
working, staff, 
postgraduate, 
undergraduate 
Marta Lisli Giannichi - PhD student 
 
Participant Details 
Attach information as 
separate list if required 
Contact details 
Name, Address, email, telephone, Next of Kin contact details 
 
 
PhD student: Marta Lisli Giannichi 
bs10mlg@leeds.ac.uk  
 
 
71 Cliff Road LS6 2EZ 
07470300141 
Next of Kin: Heloisa Giannichi (sister) 
heloisagiannichi@gmail.com 
Rua Voluntarios da Patria 4040 ap43 
CEP 02402-500 
 
 
Phone: +55 11 2959-6331 mobile: +55 11 97623-4598 
 
 
Field assistant: Alfredo Luiz dos Santos Filho 
alfredoluizfilho@gmail.com  
Rua Ciridiao Durval 100 ap72 
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CEP: 04360-020 
Phine: +55 11 981607478 
 
 
Next of Kin: Ana Leticia dos Santos (sister) 
analeticia.arq@hotmail.com  
Rua Manuel Cherem 239 ap44 
CEP: 04360-030 
Phone: +55 11 97475-8210 
 
 
Important note: the field assistant is a Brazilian journalist, 
experienced interviewer and driver. He does not have any affiliations 
with any academic institution.  
 
 
 
   
159 
 
HAZARD IDENTICATION 
Identify all hazards specific to fieldwork trip and activities, describe existing control measures and identify any 
further measures required. 
 
HAZARD(S) IDENTIFIED CONTROL MEASURES  
(e.g. alternative work methods, training, supervision, protective 
equipment) 
 
 
Nature of the site 
School, college, university, remote 
area, laboratory, office, workshop, 
construction site, farm, etc 
 Mato Grosso has roads in good conditions, some paved 
some unpaved (please see map above). According to the 
official transport institution in Brazil, the unpaved roads in 
Mato Grosso are well maintained all year long, and 
specially in better conditions during the dry period (April 
to October). In this campaign it will be visited farms 
reachable by both paved and unpaved roads. To be sure 
about road conditions before travelling local farmers will 
be consulted as well as the website of Motorway Police. 
Also, fieldwork is already scheduled to happen during the 
dry season to avoid muddy and blocked roads and 
minimize risks.  
Farms across Mato Grosso 
possibly in remote areas 
 
Environmental conditions 
Extremes of temperature, altitude, 
exposure to sunlight, potential 
weather conditions, tidal condition 
etc 
 The particular fieldwork does not involve walking long 
distances as I will be getting around by car. Nevertheless, I 
will be careful to not expose myself in the sun for long, 
drink plenty of treated water, wear sun cream and pay 
attention to any signs of fatigue.  
Hot and dry conditions 
 
Site specific conditions 
e.g. cliffs, screes, bogs, featureless 
landscapes, local endemic 
infectious diseases, zoonoses etc 
 Fieldwork will take place both in Cerrado and Amazon 
biomes, but particularly in farms. There will be no 
situation in which it will be necessary to walk long 
distances across the landscapes. Any venomous wildlife 
(snakes, scorpions) are unlikely to be encountered.  
Brazil is experiencing at the moment a Zika outbreak. Zika 
is a mosquito-borne virus transmitted by Aedis aegypt, a 
hematofagus mosquito that reproduces easily in places 
with stagnant water. The symptoms are mild and last 
usually from 2 to 7 days. Like other similar viral infection, 
such as dengue fever and chikungunya, zika symptoms are 
fever, rashes and muscular pains. The main concern about 
Cerrado and Amazon 
biomes 
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the scientific community about zika is its potential 
correlation with microcephaly in pregnant women. The 
Mato Grosso Health State Agency has only registered 9 
cases of zika virus until mid-December 2015 and is 
investigating other potential 68 cases. The main focuses 
are Cuiaba (state capital), Varzea Grande, Rondonopolis 
and Tesouro. These municipalities are not part of this 
fieldwork campaign, apart from Cuiaba, that is the landing 
point. Neither treatment nor vaccines are available and 
prevention is based on personal protection using long-
lasting repellents. For this fieldwork, I will wear repellent 
containing DEET (the most effective ones) every day and 
reapply every 4 hours, according to CDC (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention). I will also wear long 
trousers and long-sleeve T-shirts to improve efficiency. 
Obviously, I am not pregnant and neither intend to be 
within the next couple of years. 
 
Process 
Operating machinery, electrical 
equipment, driving vehicles, 
handling or working with animals 
etc 
 The farms will be reached by car. I will be driving a small 
pickup truck that will be rented in Cuiaba airport. By the 
time the car is rented I will make sure its insurance covers 
for breakdowns and accidents. I will be accompanied by a 
field assistant, who is Brazilian and an experienced driver 
to avoid driving long hours. We will not take any route 
that leads to roads under poor conditions for regular cars. 
We will be equipped with GPS to locate the farms and a 
Mato Grosso Atlas to guide us through the roads. 
Whenever possible, I will be checking roads conditions 
online via the Federal Motorway Police website and we 
have mapped all the help stations alongside the roads. 
Emergencies numbers are also recorded in our mobile 
phones.  
Driving vehicles  
 
Transport 
Mode of transport while on site, to 
and from site, carriage of 
dangerous goods etc 
 By plane: From Leeds to Sao Paulo and from Sap Paulo to 
Cuiaba (capital of Mato Grosso). 
By car: From Cuiaba to the municipalities chosen and then 
return to Cuiaba. The car will be rented in the airport. 
By plane: From Cuiaba to Sao Paulo and from Sao Paulo to 
Leeds.  
 
- Plane 
- Car 
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Equipment 
manual handling risks, operation 
of machinery, tools, use of 
specialist equipment etc 
 We will be equipped with GPS, tablets to register the 
interviews, recorder, camera and field computers. The 
manipulation of this equipment does not present any high 
risk to safety and health.  
 
 
Violence 
potential for violence (previous 
incidents etc) 
 From my experience interviewing landholders, there has 
not been any situation which I thought there was a 
serious risk involved. Sometimes landholders refuse to 
answer questions, but this is not qualified as violence.  
Low risk 
 
Individual(s) 
medical condition(s), young, 
inexperienced, disabilities etc 
 I have plenty of experience in working with farmers. I 
have been working with this type of stakeholders since 
2010. I am Brazilian, therefore fluent in Portuguese. I have 
lived in Mato Grosso before so I know where to go and 
where not to go. I am familiar with the appropriate 
approach towards farmers and feel very confident about 
it.  
Experienced  
 
Work Pattern 
time and location e.g. shift work, 
work at night 
 All interviews will be conducted during the day.  
Day time 
 
Permissions Required 
Contact details, restrictions and 
details of permissions 
 As part of the ethical review, the participants will be 
requested to sign consent forms whenever possible.  
Consent forms 
 
Other Specific Risk 
Assessments 
e.g. COSHH, Manual Handling, 
Lone Working if so what is 
identified in these assessments? 
Are there training requirements? 
(cross reference where 
appropriate) 
 N/A 
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Health Questionnaire 
Completed 
Is it required and has it been 
completed, who by and where is it 
recorded 
 Yes (online) at 
http://www.its.leeds.ac.uk/healthandsafety/ 
 
 
Health Surveillance 
Required 
Is it required and has it been 
completed, who by and recorded 
 N/A 
 
Vaccinations Required 
Obtained and certificate where 
applicable 
 I have all the vaccines suggested (yellow fever, rabies, 
tetanus and hepatitis.  
 
 
First Aid Provision 
Requirement for first aid or 
specialist first aid equipment, 
access to medical equipment and 
hospitals 
 I will carry an extensive first aid kit in the field at all times 
as well a set of prescribed medications (basic antibiotics) 
to deal with minor illnesses straight away.  
In Cuiaba there is good university hospital for 
emergencies and tropical diseases (Hospital Universitario 
Julio Muller R. Luis Philippe Pereira Leite, s/n - Alvorada, 
Cuiabá - MT, 78048-902, Brasil) and all the municipalities 
in the state have a municipal hospital.  
 
 
 
 
Additional Supporting Information 
Pre-departure Briefing 
Carried out and attended 
 N/A 
Training 
Identify level and extent of information; 
instruction and training required 
consider experience of workers, details 
of relevant training 
 I have plenty of experience in carrying out interviews 
with landholders. During my MSc (2010 – 2011) I went 
to Peru to investigate participation amongst Brazil nut 
collectors in the Amazon and during years I lived in 
Mato Grosso state working for a timber company, 
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 taking care of stakeholders and surrounding 
communities’ relationships.  
 
FCO advice 
Include current FCO advice for travel to 
the area where applicable 
 Summary 
Still current at: 9 February 2016 
Updated: 20 January 2016 
Latest update: Health section - cases of Zika virus 
have been reported in 2015 and 2016; you should 
follow the advice of the National Travel Health 
Network and Centre, particularly if you’re pregnant or 
planning to become pregnant, and seek advice from a 
health professional. 
Cases of Zika virus have been reported in 2015 and 
2016. You should follow the advice of the National 
Travel Health Network and Centre, particularly if 
you’re pregnant or planning to become pregnant. 
Seek advice from a health professional if you have any 
further questions or concerns. 
 
Protests take place regularly, often without warning, 
in a number of Brazilian cities, including Rio de 
Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte. There have 
been violent incidents and injuries. Avoid 
demonstrations, monitor local media and follow the 
guidance of local authorities. 
 
Strikes affecting transport and security may take place 
at short notice across Brazil. These are often short but 
may cause disruption. Monitor local media for 
updates and advice. 
 
Levels of crime and violence are high, particularly in 
major cities. You should be particularly vigilant before 
and during the festive and Carnival periods. Bank card 
fraud is common. See Crime 
 
There is an underlying threat from terrorism. See 
Terrorism 
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217,003 British nationals visited Brazil in 2014. Most 
visits are trouble free. 
 
If you’re a single parent or guardian travelling with a 
child, you may need additional documentation. See 
Entry requirements 
 
Drug trafficking is widespread in Brazil, and incurs 
severe penalties. See Local Laws and Customs 
 
The Overseas Business Risk service offers information 
and advice for British companies operating overseas 
on how to manage political, economic, and business 
security-related risks. 
 
The number of dengue fever cases in Brazil as a whole 
has increased considerably in 2015, especially in the 
south-east and central-west. Cases of Chikunyunga 
virus have been confirmed in Brazil and the number of 
reported cases in the region is increasing. For more 
details about this outbreak, see the website of the 
National Health Network and Centre. You should take 
steps to avoid being bitten by mosquitoes. 
 
Take out comprehensive travel and medical insurance 
before you travel. 
 
Supervision 
Identify level of supervision required 
e.g. full time, Periodic telephone/radio 
contact 
 Dr Beatriz Marimon will act as a local support for this 
fieldwork. She is a professor at UNEMAT (Mato 
Grosso State University).  
Beatriz Marimon 
biamarimon@unemat.br 
UNEMAT 
BR 158, s/n, Caixa Postal 08 
Antiga FAB 
Periodic telephone contact 
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CEP: 78690-000  
Nova Xavantina, MT - Brasil -  
Phone: +55 66 34382389 
 
Other Controls 
e.g. background checks for site visits, 
embassy registration 
 
 I will contact my sister every day by phone and she 
will know my daily itinerary. If I do not contact her 
every 24 hours, she will contact local authorities.   
Background checks with family 
member 
 
Identify Persons at Risk 
This may include more individuals than 
the fieldwork participants e.g. other 
employees of partner organisations 
 
Copy of other Organisation’s risk 
assessment attached? 
  
 
 
Additional Information 
Relevant to the one working activity 
including existing control measures; 
information instruction and training 
received, supervision, security, 
increased lighting, emergency 
procedures, access to potable water 
etc. 
 I have comprehensive travel and medical insurance 
(from the University). On-site fieldwork assistant also 
has private health insurance.  
 
 
 
Residual Risk 
Is the residual risk acceptable with the identified controls? 
 
Yes  
No  
 
Assessment carried out by 
Name: Marta Lisli Giannichi 
Signature:  
Date: February 16 2016 
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Names of person(s) involved in 
Fieldwork 
N.B: This can take the form of a signed class 
register when large group work 
Name: Alfredo Luiz dos Santos Filho 
Signature: 
 
Date: March 17
th 2016 
 
Fieldwork Activity Organiser / Course 
Leader e.g. PI, etc 
Name: Guy Ziv 
Signature: 
 
Date: 18/3/2016 
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Flight details 
 
Leeds to Sao Paulo 
BA1345M 31MAY 2 LBALHR SS1  1925  2025  /DCBA /E              
BA 247S 31MAY 2 LHRGRU SS1  2150  0520   01JUN 3 /DCBA /E     
  
Sao Paulo to Cuiaba  
JJ3487X 05JUN 7 CGHCGB SS1  1430  1543  /DCJJ /E    
 
Cuiaba to Sao Paulo           
JJ3761M 10JUL 7 CGBCGH SS1  1915  2215  /DCJJ /E              
 
Sao Paulo to Leeds  
BA 246M 15JUL 6 GRULHR*SS1  1610  0720   16JUL 7 /DCBA /E     
BA1342K 16JUL 7 LHRLBA*SS1  1245  1350  /DCBA /E              
  
WPMUSD«                                                          
31MAY DEPARTURE DATE----- 
       BASE FARE      EQUIV AMT  TAXES/FEES/CHARGES    TOTAL     
 1-    GBP929.00     USD1321.00     565.50XT      USD1886.50ADT  
    XT     37.90BR     321.40YQ     103.80GB     102.40UB        
          929.00        1321.00     565.50           1886.50 
  
 
Fieldwork itinerary 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Departure Leeds-Sao Paulo
Arrival in Sao Paulo
Interviews with experts in SP
Departure SP-Cuiaba
Travel from Cuiaba to Paranatinga 
Interview period in Paranatinga
Travel from Paranatinga to Sta Rita
Interview period in Sta Rita
Travel from Sta Rita to Castanheira
Interview period in Castanheira
Travel from Castanheira to Juina
Interview period in Juina
Travel from Juina to Cuiaba
Departure Cuiaba-SP
Interviews with experts in SP
Return SP-Leeds
June July
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Municipality N Properties Days June
Paranatinga 50 8 M T W T F S S 
Santa Rita 30 5 1 2 3 4 5
Castanheira 40 7 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Juina 60 10 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Total 180 30 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Interviews/day 5 27 28 29 30
Itinerary Km July
Cuiaba-Paranatinga 400 M T W T F S S 
Parantainga-Sta Rita 250 1 2 3
Sta Rita-Castanheira 700 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Castanheira-Juina 50 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Juina-Cuiaba 750 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Distancias internas 400 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Total 2550
days travelling by plane
days interviewing specilists in Sao Paulo
fielwork days
days off
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A1.5: Survey sheet 
 
This survey was fully applied in Portuguese. For this thesis, I included the English 
version as this thesis must be submitted entirely in English.  
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1. Ethics:    Information sheet given: Prior consent: Signature 
2. Date and time:  
3. Municipality:
4. Biome: Cerrado Amazon
5. GPS Coordinates: X (Lon): Y (Lat): Direction to plot relative to coordinates (e.g. N, SW):
6. Age:
7. Gender: Male Female
8. Education: Illiterate Literate Middle School  incomplete Middle School  complete
High School  Inomplete High School  Complete Agrotechnician Agronomist engineer
Veterinarian Zootechnician Forest engineer Other
9. Access to communication: TV Mobile phone Radio Internet broad Internet dial
10. House electronics: Open antena TV Parabolic TV Cassete DVD Radio
Computer Access to internet None
11. Type of farm: Owner Settled Renter Partner Occupier
Producer with no land Family Farm Other: 
12. Bank account holder: Yes No
13. Income per hectare (R$): 
14. Income (min. wage): <1 1>2 2>3 3>5 >5
15. Registered in CAR: Yes No Registration number:
16.Total farm area (ha): Small (<100) Medium (100-1000) Large (>1000)
17. Legal reserve (%): 0 - 20 20 - 50 50 - 80 80 - 90 >90
18. Secondary forest (% of LR): 0 - 20 20 - 50 50 - 80 >80
19. Travel time to nearest market: <30min 30>1h 1h>2h >2h
20. Land use: Pasture Soy Corn Cotton Other: 
21. Classification of farmer: Buyer Seller
Property details
Socioeconimic data
Landowners Survey - Phase 1
177 
 
Appendix 2: Supplementary Information 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
A2.1 Environmental Reserve Quotas (CRA) 
 
According to the Brazilian Forest Code, every landowner must set aside areas of 
native vegetation within their rural properties, named Legal Reserve (LR). The proportion 
depends on which biome the property is located. In the Amazon, this percentage is 80%; 
in Cerrado 35% (within the boundaries of the Legal Amazon); and 20% in other biomes 
(Brasil 2012). Although instituted as forest title to incentivise conservation and ecosystem 
services provision, CRA is currently only seen as a compensation strategy to offset LR 
deficit (Soares-Filho et al. 2016). Some authors have highlighted CRA’s potential to 
become a national market for PES (Godecke et al. 2014; Silva et al. 2016), if implemented 
successfully, and, possibly integrating to other conservation strategies, such as REDD+ 
(Soares-Filho et al. 2016).  
In essence, CRA basic rules are clear: those with forest surplus (named sellers) can 
issue CRA which cover their exceeding LR and those with deficit (named buyers) can 
acquire quotas to offset their deficits (Brasil 2012). One quota corresponds to one hectare 
and offers can be made in trading platforms. Compensation with CRA is only allowed if 
the selling and buying properties are located in the same biome, preferably in the same 
state (Soares-Filho et al. 2014) and only for landowners who carried out deforestation 
prior to 2008. Landowners who deforested after this cut-off date must seek on-site 
compensation, either allowing natural regrowth or actively reforesting to make up their 
deficit. For those who have LR surplus (sellers), the exceeding vegetation in their LR can 
legally be deforested by the landowner, as long as it is approved by the state 
Environmental Agency. Therefore, CRA has potential to secure areas that may be legally 
deforested in the near future. 
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Small properties (< 360 ha on average for Mato Grosso) that predominantly utilize 
family labour are not required to compensate/recover their LR debt. On the other hand, if 
they have any amount of native or recovering vegetation declared as LR, they are entitled 
to offer CRA acting as sellers. 
CRA still awaits regulation and there are many uncertainties involved. For instance, 
it is currently unclear if trading volume will be enough to generate a market or if it would 
require a public intervention to generate an initial demand (e.g. creating “banks” by 
purchasing forest surpluses to supply future potential private demand) (May et al. 2015). 
The successful implementation of CRA relies on the full registration and validation of the 
National Rural and Environmental Registry System (acronym CAR). This system allows 
landowners to self-document their georeferenced properties boundaries, LR area, 
remaining forest area, arable area and much more land and landowner information (May 
et al. 2015). CAR is still gathering data and currently there are many inaccuracies. Mato 
Grosso was the first state to have a state-level rural registry system implemented 
(Richards and VanWey 2015). Once a landowner has their land holdings validated, the 
registration is approved if it meets environmental regulations, including having LR 
percentage according to the minimum established by law. If not, the landowner must 
present their strategies to meet environmental regulations, which CRA can take place 
(May et al. 2015).  
 
A2.2 Methods 
For this study, I followed the methodology outlined in Figure A2.1, with further 
detail provided in the following text.    
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Figure A2.1 Diagram of methodological steps taken in this study. Each box corresponds to a section 
in this methods section. 
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A2.2.1 Literature review to identify programme-specific factors 
To define thematic categories (or programme-specific factors) I carried out a 
literature review covering which factors are important in determining participation in 
schemes such as PES (Payment for Ecosystem Services), AES (Agri-environmental 
Schemes) and TDR (Tradable Development Rights).  The programme-specific factors 
used in the Q-set were reported in this literature as influential in participation of such 
schemes. 
A2.2.2 Choice of Q-methodology  
Q-methodology is designed to capture the underlying subjectivity within individuals’ 
viewpoints (Zabala and Pascual 2016), allowing the construction of interpretative 
narratives about groups of people and their perspectives. Participants are purposively 
selected to promote diversity as opposed to quantity (Armatas et al. 2014) and presented 
a set of statements (Q-set) representing a wide range of possible opinions on a topic. 
Participants are asked to sort onto a grid which represents their level of agreement or 
disagreement (Figure A.2.2) (Davies and Hodge 2012). Using a data reduction technique 
(PCA or Centroid Factor Analysis) (Zabala and Pascual 2016), analysis reveals factors 
which represent groups of participants who presented a similar sorting pattern (Previte et 
al. 2007). This so called ‘q-analysis’ generates a hypothetical sorting distribution 
representative to each group, to be subsequently interpreted. 
A2.2.3 Q-set design: construction of statements 
The Q-set is the population of statements filtered after the elaboration of the 
concourse. The concourse is a universe of statements representing the object of the study 
(Stephenson 1935): in this case the landholders’ views about CRA. The initial concourse 
was generated by structured sampling (Sandbrook et al. 2011; Pereira et al. 2016; West 
et al. 2016), a process which resulted in 131 statements created based on a combination 
of resources such as the scientific literature, Federal and State laws, reports, and 
interviews with representatives from key institutions (e.g. State Environmental Agency)  
and landowners. The refinement of the Q-set was done firstly by the authors, to edit and 
remove ambiguous statements, which generated 41 statements (29 common to both 
groups and 12 group-specific). After another round of refinement consulting with experts 
and pilot testing face-to-face with six landowners, the final Q-set comprised 39 statement 
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(32 common to both and 7 group-specific) covering the following thematic dimensions: 
contract length; eco-effectiveness; information on the scheme; role of intermediaries; 
payment vehicle; price; transaction costs; trust; and demotivation. Original versions in 
Portuguese are available in Table A2.1. 
A2.2.4 Sampling procedure 
I considered four criteria when sampling municipalities: (1) location (e.g. Amazon 
or Cerrado); (2) accessibility via major roads (BR-163, BR-158 and BR-070); (3) 
predominant land use (crop or pasture) and (4) different farm size classes (e.g. small, 
large). To validate our decision, we interviewed two key policy actors of the state 
(Federation of Agriculture and Livestock – FAMATO and Institute of Agro-economics – 
IMEA). This sampling procedure resulted in six municipalities: Querência, Paranatinga, 
Sorriso, Sinop, Alta Floresta and Lucas do Rio Verde. It is important to note that these 
municipalities were selected as bases for the interviews. However, many interviewed 
landowners have parcels in other surrounding municipalities. 
Table A2.1 Contacted local and regional organisations in base-municipalities. 
Municipality Contacted associations and cooperatives  
Querencia 
Local Association of Rural Employers 
Local Association of Rural Employees 
Coopquer (local cooperative of seed producers) 
IPAM (Local NGO) 
Town Hall 
Town Chamber of Deputies 
Paranatinga 
Local Association of Rural Employers 
Local Association of Rural Employees 
Sorriso 
Local Association of Rural Employers 
Local Association of Rural Employees 
CAT (local NGO - Clube Amigos da Terra) 
Coacen (regional agroindustrial cooperative) 
Sinop 
Local Association of Rural Employers 
Local Association of Rural Employees 
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Local Agriculture and Environment Agency 
Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research Coorporation) 
Alta Floresta 
Local Association of Rural Employers 
Local Association of Rural Employees 
ICV (local NGO) 
IOV (local NGO) 
Lucas Rio Verde Local Association of Rural Employers 
 
The local organisations were contacted and after an explanation of the research 
objectives, they were asked to provide contacts of affiliated landowners. Landowners 
were contacted by phone, provided a brief explanation of the research and asking to 
schedule a face-to-face interview. 52.2% of those asked took part in the research. 
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Table A2.2 Original Portuguese version of the statements and their correspondent translated version in English. 
Statement 
number 
Statement Statement in Portuguese 
S1/B1 Five years is the maximum period I'd contract CRA. Eu assinaria um contrato de, no máximo, CINCO anos. 
S2/B2 
I think a 10 year contract is good length to guarantee 
stability and a fair price for contracting CRA. 
Um contrato de 5 a 10 anos seria um bom período para 
garantir estabilidade e preço justo. 
S3/B3 I'd rather sign long-term contracts, from 15 years onwards. 
Eu preferiria assinar somente contratos de longo prazo, a 
partir de 15 anos. 
S4/B4 
The CRA scheme will significantly help animal and plant 
conservation. 
A Cota de Reserva Ambiental ajudará, principalmente, na 
conservação de plantas e animais. 
S5/B5 The CRA scheme will help protect forested areas. 
A Cota de Reserva Ambiental ajudará a proteger muitas 
áreas com florestas. 
S6/B6 
I'd deforest all native vegetation on my property if the 
Forest Code allowed. 
Eu desmataria toda a vegetação nativa da minha 
propriedade se o Código Florestal permitisse. 
S7/B7 
Before this interview, I already had a good knowledge of 
the regulations and requirements in the new Forest Code. 
Antes dessa pesquisa, eu já tinha um bom conhecimento do 
regulamento e obrigatoriedades do Código Florestal. 
S8/B8 
Before this interview, I was well-informed of the possibility 
to trade forest credits (CRA). 
Antes dessa pesquisa, eu já estava bem informado da 
possibilidade de compra e venda de CRA. 
S9/B9 I think the CRA rules are too complicated. Eu acho as regras de CRA muito complicadas. 
S10/B10 I think CRA will not work. Eu acho que a CRA não vai dar certo. 
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S11/B11 
I know intermediaries institutions of CRA such as BVRio 
and Biofilica. 
Eu conheço instituições intermediárias de CRA, como 
BVRio e Biofilica. 
S12/B12 I don't know what my responsibilities are as a seller/buyer. 
Eu não sei quais são minhas responsabilidades como 
vendedor/comprador 
S13/B13 
I would be willing to pay an annual fee for an intermediary 
institution that monitor the contract yearly. 
Estou disposto a pagar uma taxa para uma instituição 
acompanhar o contrato ano a ano.   
S14/B14 
Having an intermediary makes the whole process more 
expensive. 
Ter uma instituição intermediando o processo tornaria o 
negócio mais caro. 
S15/B15 
To me it would be impossible to go through all the CRA 
process without an intermediary. 
Seria impossível passar por todo o processo de compra e 
venda de CRA sem uma instituição intermediária. 
S16/B16 
I do not know where to find buyers and I need somebody to 
do that for me. 
Eu não sei onde encontrar compradores de CRA e preciso 
que alguém faça este trabalho para mim. 
S17/B17 
I prefer to negotiate CRA contract with a buyer myself, 
without intermediaries. 
Eu prefiro negociar um contrato diretamente com o 
vendedor, sem intermediários. 
S18/B18 
I prefer to receive annual payments for the duration of the 
contract. 
Eu prefiro receber CRA em parcelas anuais pela duração do 
contrato. 
S19/B19 I only feel safe to receive the payment via an intermediary. 
Eu só me sinto seguro de receber o pagamento através de 
um intermediário. 
S20/B20 The price will depend on my land use. O preço irá depender do meu uso da terra atual. 
S21/B21 
The associated expenses (negotiation, fencing (as seller) 
etc.) are a significant barrier for me to participate in CRA 
As despesas associadas à CRA (negociação, cercamento, 
averbação na matrícula, etc.) inviabilizariam a minha 
participação. 
185 
 
S22/B22 
I would trust an unknown landholder to proceed with a 
CRA contract. 
Eu confiaria assinar um contrato com um proprietário 
desconhecido. 
S23/B23 
I would visit the property of the buyer, no matter how far it 
is, before selling credits 
Eu faço questão de visitar a propriedade do comprador, 
mesmo que seja longe. 
S24/B24 
I do not see any real incentive for me to sell my exceeding 
Legal Reserve 
Eu não vejo nenhum incentivo para que eu emita CRA na 
minha Reserva Legal excedente. 
S25/B25 
I think the Forest Code will change again, so will wait and 
do nothing in the next few years 
Eu prefiro esperar porque acho que o Código Florestal irá 
mudar novamente. 
S26/B26 I would only sell/buy CRA for perpetuity. Eu só venderia CRA por contrato perpétuo. 
S27/B27 
CRA must have a fiscal incentive for aiming at 
conservation. 
O CRA deve ter um incentivo fiscal por visar a preservação 
de áreas vegetadas. 
S28 
The per-hectare price of CRA should be at least how much I 
would get renting my land 
O preço da CRA, por hectare, deve ser, no mínimo, igual ao 
que recebo por arrendar minha terra. 
B28 
The per-hectare price of CRA should be at most how much 
I make per hectare 
O preço da CRA, por hectare, deve ser, no máximo, igual 
ao que eu ganho por hectare. 
S29 
The per-hectare price of CRA should be at least how much I 
would get selling my land 
O preço da CRA, por hectare, deve ser igual ao que eu 
receberia para vender minha terra. 
B29 
The per-hectare price of CRA should be at most how much 
I would pay purchasing vegetated land in my region. 
O preço da CRA, por hectare, deve ser inferior ao que eu 
pagaria para comprar uma área vegetada na minha região. 
S30 
For a higher price, I would sell to any landowner regardless 
of his location in my state 
Por um preço maior preço, eu venderia CRA para qualquer 
proprietário. 
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B30 
For a lower price, I would buy from any landowner 
regardless of his location in my state. 
Por um preço menor eu compraria CRA de qualquer 
proprietário, sem me importar com a distância. 
S31 
CRA will only be attractive for who has Legal Reserve well 
above the minimum. 
CRA só será atrativo para quem tiver Reserva Legal bem 
acima do exigido. 
B31 
CRA will only be attractive for who has Legal Reserve well 
below the minimum. 
CRA só será atrativo para quem tiver Reserva Legal bem 
abaixo do exigido. 
S32 The longer the contract the higher the price should be. 
Quanto maior a duração do contrato, maior deve ser o preço 
da CRA. 
B32 The longer the contract the lower the price should be. 
Quanto maior a duração do contrato, menor deve ser o 
preço da CRA. 
S33 I wouldn’t deforest my exceeding Legal Reserve. Eu não desmataria minha Reserva Legal excedente. 
S34 
I see CRA as an investment so I will definitely be part of 
this market. 
Eu vejo CRA como um investimento então definitivamente 
fará parte deste mercado. 
S35 
An intermediary institution as a mediator reduces the risk of 
default. 
Uma instituição mediando os pagamentos minimiza o risco 
de calote. 
S36 The requirement of fencing makes CRA unattractive to me 
A possibilidade de ter que cercar a área faz com que CRA 
não seja atrativa para mim. 
S37 
The costs for travelling, documentation, certificates and 
other associated expenses must considered as part of the 
CRA price 
O custo de intermediários, documentação, cartório, cerca e 
outras despesas devem ser embutidas no preço da CRA. 
S38 
My exceeding LR is not significantly large so I wouldn’t be 
willing to issue CRA 
Meu excedente de Reserva Legal não é grande o suficiente 
para eu ser vantajosa a emissão da CRA. 
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S39 
Only CRA credits are not enough to make up the effort I 
made to conserve my exceeding Legal Reserve. 
Somente o CRA é insuficiente para recompensar o esforço 
por conservar o excedente de Reserva Legal. 
B33 
If buying from another private landholder I'd like it to be 
from a conservation priority area. 
Eu daria preferência de compra para áreas com prioridade 
em conservação. 
B34 
I am very afraid of getting fined for non-compliance with 
the Forest Code. 
Eu estou muito preocupado em ser multado por não atender 
ao Código Florestal. 
B35 
I am afraid to run the risk of the sellers not keeping their 
obligations to preserve the land appropriately. 
Eu tenho receio de o vendedor não cumprir suas obrigações 
de preservar a área contratada. 
B36 
I would prefer to buy vegetated land from another private 
landholder to be in compliance as opposed to renting CRA. 
Eu prefiro comprar uma área vegetada para me regularizar. 
B37 
I would prefer to buy a land within a protected area and 
donate to the government as opposed to renting CRA. 
Eu prefiro comprar uma área dentro de UC  para me 
regularizar. 
B38 I prefer natural regeneration than buying CRA. Eu prefiro a regenaração natural a comprar CRA. 
B39 To reforest my deficit is my least option. Reflorestar o meu passivo ambiental é a última opção. 
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A2.2.5 Application of Q-sort 
Interviews were audio-recorded and comprised three parts: (1) explanation of CRA; 
(2) collection of demographic and property information; (3) q-sort and justification. In 
total, the interviews lasted on average 1 hour. Before getting participants’ consent, they 
were informed about the objectives of the study and how their data were going to be used. 
Following approved ethical procedures for this specific study, we ensured participants 
complete anonymity and they were informed that were free to withdraw from the 
investigation at any time. They all participated voluntarily. 
It was not assumed that participants had good knowledge of the CRA scheme. To 
cover this issue, every participant received a verbal explanation, together with some 
written material. Before moving on to the Q-sort, they were encouraged to raise any 
questions to clarify doubts they had about the scheme. Q-sorts were carried out only after 
the participant was comfortable with all the information provided. 
Prior to the Q-sort, it was not known if the participant was a farmer with LR deficit 
or surplus. We classified them according their own declaration of LR area during the 
demographic survey. If the participant stated that his/her LR was below the minimum 
level required by the law for that biome, they were classified as buyers. If the declared 
LR was above the minimum for that biome, then they were classified as sellers. 
During Q-sorting, the researcher explained to each participant they would receive 39 
statements to be ranked onto a fixed ‘quasi-normal’ distribution grid based on their level 
of relative strong agreement and strong disagreement (Figure A2.2), bearing in mind the 
question: What are your views about CRA? For the middle of the grid (-1, 0, +1) was 
given a neutral connotation, meaning statements placed on this area did not provoke 
strong feelings. Participants then were encouraged to provide the reasoning behind their 
sorting once they were satisfied with the ranking, information which is particularly 
important Q-sort interpretations. 
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Figure A2.2 Grid distribution used in this study. Strong disagreement is denoted by -4 and strong 
agreement +4. 
 
A2.2.6 Data analysis 
PCA initially correlates each Q-sort and reveals communalities between them, and 
their components. This analysis extracted eight unrotated components with eigenvalues 
greater than one for buyers and 10 for sellers. However, this resulted in a large number 
of components, including components that did not further help to discriminate groups of 
buyers/sellers. Scree plots were used to visually aid the decision-making process, 
displaying how many additional components actually contribute to our understanding of 
buyers/sellers groups. The scree plots indicated three components for extraction, for 
buyers and sellers, and varimax rotation was used to highlight the majority viewpoints of 
the participants and to maximise the amount of study variance (Watts and Stenner 2012). 
Before extraction and rotation, loadings were calculated (Tables A2.3 and A2.4) to 
indicate how much one Q-sort is related with a group. These loadings are used to identify 
Q-sorts that are most representative to each component, a process called flagging. 
Flagging can be manual or automatic. We applied the latter, since we did not have 
considerable knowledge about participants. The process of automatic flagging considers 
two standard criteria: (1) Q-sorts loading higher than the threshold for a p-value < 0.05, 
and (2) Q-sorts with square loading higher than the sum of square loadings for all other 
factors (for a detailed explanation please see (Zabala 2014).  
A2.2.6.1 Choice of PCA 
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There is extensive debate amongst Q-methodologists about the use of PCA or 
Centroid Factor Analysis for factor extraction (Howard et al. 2016), however, both are 
widely accepted. Many of the reviewed Q-studies involving environmental and rural 
topics used PCA to analyse Q-sorts (Hall 2008; Hermans et al. 2012; Thompson et al. 
2013; Kvakkestad et al. 2015; Hamadou et al. 2016; Howard et al. 2016; Simpson et al. 
2016; West et al. 2016). However, we also ran centroid factor analysis (using PQMethod 
software version 2.35; available at http://schmolck.userweb.mwn.de/qmethod/) but the 
solutions provided contained void factors with no significant loaders after rotation, which 
led to a considerable exclusion of many Q-sorts. To avoid these exclusions, we chose to 
perform our analyses with PCA. 
A2.2.6.2 Calculation of factor loadings and z-scores 
Q-sort loadings were considered to be significant at a p-value < 0.05 for a given factor 
if: (1) loadings were higher than 1.96/√𝑁, where N is the number of statements; and (2) 
loadings were higher than the sum of square loadings for all other extracted factors 
(Brown 1980; Zabala 2014). Only the Q-sorts that meet these criteria are considered for 
future calculations. 
To compare meaningful differences between the ranks, z-scores were calculated. Z-
scores (Table A2.5) are a measure that indicates how much one factor agrees or disagrees 
with each statement. They are calculated based on the weighted average of the statement 
ranks given by each of the significant Q-sorts: the Q-sorts with the higher loadings are 
attributed more weight (Zabala 2014). The z-scores are then converted to the same array 
of discrete values used in the original distribution.  
 
 
Table A2.3 Loadings of sellers’ groups. A: independent conservationists; B: environmental disbelievers; 
C: willing deforesters. Asterisks indicate flagged Q-sorts. 
Participant A B C 
S1 -0.3 0.03 0.59* 
S2 -0.02 0.62* 0.44 
S3 0.54* 0.08 0.27 
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Participant A B C 
S4 0.03 0.26 0.5* 
S5 0.38 0.18 -0.41 
S6 0.55* 0.12 0.27 
S7 0.45 0.08 0.53* 
S8 0.51* 0.34 0.04 
S9 0.09 0.39 0.59* 
S10 0.36 0.64* -0.14 
S11 0.56* 0.15 -0.09 
S12 0.5 0.57* -0.02 
S13 0.46 0.27 0.45 
S14 0.46* 0.08 -0.04 
S15 0.36 0.46* 0.17 
S16 0.34 0.6* -0.23 
S17 0.44* 0.3 0.07 
S18 -0.08 0.49 0.58* 
S19 0.15 0.51* 0.24 
S20 0.59* 0.3 0.02 
S21 0.35 0.59* 0.37 
S22 0.63* 0.01 -0.03 
S23 0.36 -0.03 0.53* 
S24 0.2 0.31 0.66* 
S25 0.14 0.5* -0.17 
S26 0.75* -0.03 -0.16 
S27 0.41 0.37 0.26 
S28 0.31 -0.03 -0.28 
S29 -0.2 0.73* 0.13 
S30 0.54* 0.39 -0.05 
S31 0.81* 0.01 -0.08 
S32 0.78* 0.02 -0.07 
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Participant A B C 
S33 0.54* 0.29 0.08 
S34 0.68* 0.38 -0.01 
S35 0.05 0.56* 0.19 
 
Table A2.4 Loadings of buyers’ groups. D: the CRA outsiders; E: the cautious buyers; F: the 
compensation seekers. Asterisks indicate the loadings kept for calculations. 
Participant D E F 
B1 0.52 0.09 0.56* 
B2 0.41 0.62* 0.18 
B3 -0.19 0.69* -0.17 
B4 0.28 -0.14 0.63* 
B5 0.09 0.75* -0.04 
B6 0.6* 0.38 -0.24 
B7 0.36 0.15 0.39* 
B8 0.19 0.66* -0.09 
B9 -0.3 0.67* 0.38 
B10 -0.14 0.46* -0.11 
B11 0.63* 0.12 0.41 
B12 0.16 0.08 0.65* 
B13 0.32 0.41* 0.18 
B14 0.71* 0.31 0.03 
B15 0.04 0.6* 0.18 
B16 0.71* 0.04 -0.02 
B17 -0.23 -0.02 0.76* 
B18 0.29 0.26 -0.28 
B19 0.5* 0.24 0.1 
B20 0.31 0.63* 0.02 
B21 0.16 0.43* 0.02 
B22 0.52* -0.35 0.22 
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Participant D E F 
B23 0.77* -0.11 0.06 
B24 0.64* -0.03 0.15 
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Table A2.5 Z-scores of statements identical to both groups of sellers and buyers. 
Statement A B C D E F 
1 -0.354 0.854 -0.912 -0.087 -1.233 -1.334 
2 1.388 -0.979 -1.452 0.015 -0.948 -0.432 
3 -0.460 -1.356 -0.111 -0.641 -0.180 0.978 
4 2.137 0.991 -0.237 0.785 1.674 1.747 
5 2.126 0.462 -1.119 0.115 -0.270 1.503 
6 -2.116 -1.950 -0.5833  -0.692 -2.330 -0.924 
7 0.042 0.952 0.305 0.697 0.718 0.719 
8 -1.740 -0.766 -1.319 -0.498 -0.383 0.062 
9 -0.182 -0.043 1.179 -0.359 0.466 -0.619 
10 -0.816 0.173 0.661 -0.796 0.155 -1.396 
11 -1.024 -1.002 -1.812 -0.189 -0.881 -1.687 
12 0.810 1.079 0.673 -0.236 -0.505 0.054 
13 0.631 0.032 -0.906 -1.505 -1.128 0.582 
14 -0.221 0.942 1.240 0.188 0.958 -0.661 
15 0.530 -0.134 1.142 0.330 -0.796 -0.004 
16 0.649 0.893 0.237 -0.173 -0.127 0.558 
17 -0.308 0.166 0.712 0.145 0.444 -1.196 
18 -0.094 0.912 -0.205 -0.398 0.044 -0.993 
19 0.188 -1.403 0.539 -0.704 -1.115 0.076 
20 0.359 -0.394 2.274 0.445 -0.134 -0.133 
21 -0.183 -0.549 0.691 -0.040 0.117 -0.585 
22 -0.698 -1.490 -1.191 -0.192 -1.565 0.043 
23 0.133 -1.028 -0.897 -1.607 1.349 0.310 
24 -0.695 1.904 -0.173 0.376 0.960 -0.919 
25 -0.271 0.812 0.409 -0.436 0.993 0.105 
26 -1.604 -1.686 -0.465 -0.697 1.000 2.008 
27 1.153 1.223 1.450 1.831 1.007 0.882 
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A2.2.7 Trade Compatibility Index (TCI) 
The TCI was created to provide a metric to assess whether a pair of sellers and 
buyers has similar views on programme-specific factors, suggesting a potential trade. By 
examining the normalised scores and z-scores spread of sellers and buyers groups, we 
observed some mismatches that could be explored more systematically, hence the 
development of the TCI. The index ranges from 0 to 1 representing how much a pair of 
sellers (A, B, C) and buyers (C, D, F) mutually agrees or disagrees with all thematic 
categories or each set of statements separately.  
The idea behind TCI is to provide a mathematical tool to compare pairs of groups 
(or factors) using normalised scores. The latter are discrete values corresponding to the 
same values of the sorting grid (in our case from -4 to +4). Normalised scores are 
calculated based on z-scores (Zabala 2014; Zabala and Pascual 2016). Although z-scores 
provide a more statistically correct measurement, they have different minimum and 
maximum values for sellers and buyers (e.g. SELLERS z-scores min: -2.11 max: 2.27 | 
BUYERS min: -2.38 max: 2.36). This would require them to be normalised in a way that 
minimum and maximum values are the same for both groups to allow comparisons. As 
normalised factor scores already provide the same minimum and maximum normalised 
values, we chose to use these values in TCI.  
To explore potential mismatches within the category of statements relating to 
aspects of programme design, we calculated one TCI value per different combination of 
thematic category by subsetting specific statements of the thematic categories we wanted 
to include in the model. For example, to calculate whether there is a mismatch in contract 
length, we only included statements relevant to this category within our TCI calculations 
(Table SI7, column headed “Contract length”). I was then interested in how statements 
about price might alter levels of agreement, so included these in our next iteration of TCI 
calculations (Table SI7; columns headed “Price” and “Contract length and price”). Finally 
I repeated the process by adding statements one by one. This resulted in slightly different 
TCI results as more statements from a particular thematic category were added. I tried 
several different combinations of thematic categories to assess to assess whether overall 
TCI results were sensitive to the order thematic categories were added or removed from 
the calculations. However, in most of the combinations the two most compatible and 
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incompatible pairs remained the same, except when contract and price were removed 
from overall calculations (Table A2.7; column headed “All minus price”), suggesting 
these thematic categories are particularly important. 
A2.2.8 Robustness check of overall TCI 
To assess whether overall TCI values were representative of the agreement and 
disagreement between sellers and buyers using the normalised factor scores, we did a 
non-parametric Spearman correlation using the z-scores for sets of statements identical to 
both groups (n=27), while excluding comment statements with opposite meanings. The 
Spearman test simply correlates all statement’s z-scores from each pair of sellers and 
buyers without specifically considering the significance of defining statement scores. 
This means that in the Spearman correlation test, no statement’s z-scores are attributed a 
“weight” that defines its importance in defining a particular group. Thus to allow an 
accurate comparison, we excluded the parameter 𝑝𝑖
𝑋  from TCI calculations. TCI results 
range from 0 to 1 and the higher the value the more incompatible the pair is whereas 
correlations are the opposite. 
 When comparing the ranked results (Table A2.6), the only difference between the 
z-scores and normalised scores rank was between pairs AF and BD. Using normalised 
scores, the most compatible pair is AF and the second most compatible is BD. They shift 
positions for the z-scores. This robustness check supported the TCI results and 
highlighted its accuracy because TCI accounts for significantly distinguishing statement 
scores3 (p-value ≤ .05) whilst correlation does not.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Distinguishing statements are those that reflect if all groups (or one) think significantly different from 
one another (Zabala 2014) 
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Table A2.6 TCI results robustness check using Spearman correlation test using z-scores and normalised 
factor scores.  
 
AD AE AF BD BE BF CD CE CF 
TCI (normalised factor 
scores) 
0,765 0,875 0,617 0,656 0,7 0,93 0,84 0,765 0,96 
Rank (normalised) 5 7 1 2 3 8 6 4 9 
Correlation  (z-scores) 0,4 0,13 0,45 0,57 0,44 0,01 0,33 0,41 0,05 
Rank (z-scores) 5 7 2 1 3 8 6 4 9 
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Table A2.7 Trade Compatibility Indexes (TCI) values for pairs of sellers and buyers. Set of statements corresponding to each thematic category were added step-wise 
in the calculations. The column “Demotivation (all)” includes all statements. Shaded cells correspond to non-significant TCI values. A represents independent 
conservationists; B environmental disbelievers; C willing deforesters; D CRA outsiders; E cautious buyers; and F compensation seekers.  
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AD 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.208 0.214 0.234 0.25 0.267 0.3 
AE  0.125 0.125 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.271 0.271 0.297 0.296 0.296 0.321 
AF  0.438 0.438 0.225 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.179 0.172 0.167 0.166 0.141 0.089 
BD 0.125 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.229 0.214 0.232 0.275 0.391 0.313 
BE 0.375 0 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.175 0.275 0.218 0.25 
BF 0.625 0.438 0.469 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.391 0.389 0.375 0.4 0.375 0.391 0.354 
CD 0.188 0.375 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.354 0.339 0.4 0.333 0.406 
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CE 0.375  0.375 0.438 0.438 0.438 0.438 0.275 0.292 0.304 0.292 0.303 0.292 
CF 0.625 0.563 0.583 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.446 0.469 0.417 0.391 0.375 0.333 
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Information 
Chapter 3 
 
 
 A3.1 Compensation options and Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA) 
The Brazilian Forest Code (FC) is the environmental legislation that controls and 
regulates native vegetation across the national territory within private properties. The FC 
states that every private property should set-aside areas of native vegetation with the 
purpose of conservation. The first type are the permanent protected areas, such as riparian 
and hilltop areas. These areas are protected by law and are not subject to legal 
deforestation. The second type, called Legal Reserves, are areas of native vegetation that 
should be also maintained. The extent of Legal Reserves varies according to biome where 
the property is located. In the Amazon, for example, this percentage is 80%, although 
there are some exceptions (see section S4).  
For the landowners who are not in compliance with this limit (named buyers), 
there are a few compensation strategies available. One option could be to offset the forest 
deficit by acquiring private land inside protected areas and donating to the environmental 
agency. This strategy has been seen as problematic due to low additionality (as the offset 
occurs in areas already protected by law) and to over-surplus (Soares-Filho et al., 2016). 
Others consider positive as this could be an important resource to under-capitalized 
environmental agencies (Andrade, J., May, P.H. & Bernasconi, 2013). Currently, 
properties inside protected areas need to be habilitated to be sold as a compensatory 
strategy. In 2017, there were seven properties habilitated to compensation, summing 
295,975 hectares but it is likely that this number will increase as compliance starts to be 
adopted (Saretta, 2017). A particular issue that involves this type of compensation is the 
possibility of multiple buyers offsetting in one very large property inside a protected area, 
this is called condominium and is allowed by the Ministry of Environment (Brasil, 2016).    
Another option is the environmental reserve quota. Buyers who deforested their 
legal reserve until 2008 can compensate their deficit in other private properties that kept 
their Legal Reserve above the minimum (sellers). Sellers issue quotas (1 hectare = 1 
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quota) and their acquisition is lease-based. The native vegetation still belongs to the 
sellers, who leased their surplus to sellers. Trade must happen within the same biome and 
the same state. If outside state boundaries, it must happen inside priority conservation 
areas (figure S1). Considering that sellers have the right to legally deforest their surplus, 
CRA has the potential avoid future forest loss but still awaits regulation.   
Lastly, buyers have the option of on-site compensation. They can actively reforest 
their deficit or allow natural regrowth via abandonment.  
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Figure A3.1. Left-hand column represents administrative boundaries used as the five spatial scales in which 
we simulated off-site compensation, from the largest to the smallest. The Amazon biome covers nine states 
in Brazil: Acre (AC), Amapá (AP), Amazonas (AM), Maranhão (MA), Mato Grosso (MT), Rondônia (RO), 
Roraima (RR) and Tocantins (TO). Maranhão, Mato Grosso and Tocantins are only partly covered by the 
Amazon, and therefore only properties located in the Amazon biome were considered in these three specific 
states. Areas covered in green at biome level represent priority areas for conservation, which were only 
used to simulate compensation in the entire biome (between states). Right-hand column represents the 
policy scenarios considered for each administrative boundary. Policy scenario 1 considered properties 
inside all PAs (federal – orange, state – blue, and municipal – yellow), scenario 2 only properties inside 
federal PAs, and scenario 3 does not account for PAs at all (black).  
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A3.2 Land tenure data preparation 
Amazon land tenure was derived from Freitas et al. (2017), which is a database 
that integrates georeferenced land use categories including both private and public land. 
This land tenure map adopts a spatial resolution of 50m and contains the different 
categories of land use for all types of rural properties in Brazil. To meet the aims of this 
study, I first selected properties within the Amazon biome. Then, I excluded from this 
analysis polygons classified as non-processed land, as they encompass water bodies, 
roads and urban areas. Because participation in CRA is dependent upon clear land titling, 
we excluded properties classified as non-designated land. Although they cover a large 
portion of the Amazon (~55Mha), their clear designation and regularization process is 
slow and unclear (Freitas et al., 2017; Azevedo-Ramos and Moutinho, 2018). I have also 
eliminated one category called simulated land. This category covers areas that are not 
registered in any official database therefore the authors decided to estimate land in these 
geographical voids. Hence is also uncertain if these lands have land titling. Land tenure 
data is available both at shapefile and raster formats. Manipulation was done using R 
studio, version 3.4.1.  
A3.3 Land cover data  
GFC data 
I used Global Forest Change datasets (Hansen et al., 2013) to have an updated 
estimate of open land inside protected areas to explore potential regrowth. The most 
recent year available is 2016. Tree cover 2016 was calculated as tree cover in the year 
2000 minus yearly loss until 2016, plus forest gain. As the main interest here was in open 
area, pixels representing forest loss from 2000-2016 were reclassified as open land. To 
match the Amazon land tenure map, forest/non-forest pixel size were resampled to 50m 
resolution and overlaid with the tenure map to calculate open area per property. I also 
used GFC forest cover of 2000 to apply in our classification of buyers and sellers (see 
next section). GFC data was processed in Google Earth Engine and exported as raster 
files to be further manipulated in ArcMap 10.3.1. We employed a threshold of 10% for 
canopy tree cover – the same established by United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization (Hansen et al., 2010) to also account for Cerrado areas within Amazon.  
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Table A3.1 Summary of datasets used and their respective source. 
Layer Source 
Rural Properties Tenure Map of Brazil (F.L.M. de Freitas et al., 
2017) 
Land cover TerraClass 2008, 2014 (Almeida et al., 2016) 
Forest and non-forest cover inside protected 
areas 
Global Forest Change 2000-2016 (Hansen et 
al., 2013) 
Permanent Protected Areas (hilltop and 
riparian areas) 
CSR, UFMG (Soares-Filho et al., 2014) 
Economic-ecological zoning and Priority areas 
for conservation 
MMA4 
 
TerraClass 
TerraClass is a project of the Brazilian Space Research Agency that maps land 
use and land cover changes across the Brazilian Amazon. TerraClass explicitly accounts 
for classes, such as secondary forest and regenerating pasture (which can both be 
accounted as native vegetation remnants) hence the preference for this dataset. TerraClass 
has 15 different land cover classes (see Almeida et al., 2016). This analysis does not 
require that level of detail so I reclassified the dataset, which resulted in: (1) Forest, (2) 
Secondary Forest, (3) Savannah, (4) Pasture, (5) Crop, and (6) Others. The main classes 
of deforested land were reclassified into pasture, crop and others. The classes 
corresponding to native vegetation were preserved as their original classification: forest, 
secondary forest and savannah. TerraClass has one specific class called “regenerating 
pasture”, which contains vegetation at successional stage. This category was reclassified 
into Secondary Forest. I resampled pixels to 50m resolution and then calculated for each 
property the area covered by each land cover class in ArcMap 10.3.1. I used the years 
2008 and 2014 for this analysis. The FC states that only landowners who deforest until 
2008 are eligible for off-site compensation. Thus the vegetation cover in 2008 was 
necessary to classify eligible buyers and 2014, eligible sellers.   
                                                          
4 http://www.mma.gov.br/gestao-territorial/zoneamento-territorial/zee-nos-estados. Last accessed: 
21/02/2018 
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Hilltop and riparian areas 
Riparian vegetation and hilltop areas, if covered by natural vegetation, cannot be 
legally deforested. Riparian areas along rivers and streams have hierarchical levels of 
protection: the wider the river or stream, the larger the buffer of riparian protection 
(Brasil, 2012). To have a precise estimate of the native vegetation occurring in these areas, 
I used the raster map provided by Soares-Filho et al. (2014), which contains the 
hierarchical buffers. Then, I calculated for each property the area corresponding to 
riparian buffers to later discount from our estimates of avoided deforestation (see main 
text) as these areas are not subject to legal deforestation. For the calculation of the total 
native vegetation per property these areas were included as the Forest Code allows the 
computation of riparian areas as part of Legal Reserve and can be used as forest surplus 
in CRA. Hilltop areas also follow a hierarchical protection, but that is related to the slope 
and elevation (Brasil, 2012). I applied the same procedure of the riparian areas here, also 
using the raster map by Soares-Filho et al. (2014). Hilltop areas that overlap with native 
vegetation were computed as Legal Reserve for the same reason as riparian areas and also 
discounted from the estimate of avoided deforestation.  
At the end of this stage, the database contained private properties outside PAs 
with their respective natural vegetation remnants in 2008 and 2014; and private properties 
inside PAs with their respective amount of open land in 2016. 
Importantly, to calculate potential avoided deforestation in our analysis, I 
discounted riparian and hilltop areas, as they are protected by law and cannot be 
deforested. 
Economic-Ecological Zoning and Priority Areas for Conservation 
The Ministry of Environment (MMA) establishes a zoning system with areas of 
specific designation, called which The Economic-Ecological Zoning (ZEE). There are 
three main zones: (1) agricultural expansion; (2) controlled uses; and (3) special uses. In 
areas designated to agricultural expansion, Legal Reserve is reduced to 50% in the 
Amazon (instead of 80%). Priority areas for conservation are areas with strong 
conservation recommendations and supposedly conservation actions. The implication of 
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these areas to CRA is that at biome level, only sellers located in priority areas can offer 
their Legal Reserve surplus.   
A3.4 Classification of buyers and sellers 
To classify the properties into buyers and sellers is not a trivial task. The Forest 
Code states many exceptions to the rules, which makes it complex. To facilitate 
understanding, I depict this process in figure A3.1, but below I also provide a detailed 
explanation.  
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Figure A3.2 Depiction of the decision tree used in the classification of buyers and sellers using the land tenure 
dataset and land covers datasets from 2000, 2008, 2014 and 2016 with the later just to calculate potential 
regrowth inside protected areas.  
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Eligible sellers 
As a general rule, all properties in the Amazon must maintain a minimum of 80% 
as standing vegetation. If a property has above 80% as native vegetation today (using 
TerraClass 2014 as a proxy), this property is considered a seller. However, there are some 
exceptions. If a property is located in the agricultural expansion zones and has Legal 
Reserve above 50%, it is a seller. All small properties, those who are inferior to four fiscal 
modules (a standard national unit that varies according to the municipality, between 50 
and 100 in the Amazon) are also considered sellers and can offer whichever amount of 
native vegetation they have. Settlements are also considered sellers as they can offer their 
joint Legal Reserve for compensation. They are treated the same way as small 
landowners. Lastly, back in 2000, the Forest Code stated that the minimum Legal Reserve 
percentage was 50%. Article 68 says that landowners that supressed their Legal Reserve 
respecting the minimum percentage that was valid at that time and still maintain the same 
or a higher amount of native vegetation, can also offer their “surplus” in CRA market. To 
apply this exception I used the year 2000 of GFC dataset to calculate native vegetation 
for each property. Private properties that overlap with protected areas were also classified 
as sellers. In this case, the entire property is accounted as surplus. Thus, total surplus is a 
sum of all native vegetation above 80% or 50%, native vegetation in smallholdings and 
settlements, and private land inside protected areas.  
Eligible buyers 
I used TerraClass 2008 to classify properties eligible for CRA compensation. Landowners 
who illegally deforested their native vegetation below the 80% minimum until 2008 are 
allowed to participate in CRA. In general, all landowners who have below 80% of native 
vegetation in 2008 are considered buyers. If the property is located in the agricultural 
expansion zones and has Legal Reserve below 50%, the property is also classified as 
buyer.  
 
A3.5 Matching algorithm 
I developed an algorithm to simulate trade between potential buyers and sellers, 
considering area equivalence as the only condition that results in trade. For policy 
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scenarios 1 and 2, the Legal Reserve deficit was attempted to be offset first with private 
land inside protected areas.  
Buyers were sorted from the largest deficit to the smallest, under the assumption 
that those with larger deficits would seek this kind of compensation as it is unlikely that 
one landowner is going to forgo, for example, nearly 50,000 ha of productive hectares 
(which is the case of one buyer in Rondônia). Each buyer looked for an area inside 
conservation units that was equivalent or up to 1.2 times larger than their deficit. Once a 
buyer found a matching area, the deficit was offset and the seller became unavailable to 
other buyers. The best matching area was the closest value to the buyer’s deficit. This 
was iterated for each of the five administrative boundaries. Buyers who did not find an 
area inside protected areas that met this criterion remained available to interact with 
regular sellers in CRA.  
The CRA market algorithm had the same best matching principle, except that one 
hectare of deficit was offset with one hectare of forest surplus. Buyers and sellers were 
allowed a maximum of three contracts under the assumption that both tried to maximise 
their trade costs seeking for the minimum number of contracts and maximum utility of 
their deficit/surplus. Once a buyer found a surplus that met the best matching criteria, the 
deficit was offset. While buyers and sellers had not reached the maximum number of 
contracts, they were still participating in CRA with their remaining deficit/surplus. 
Buyers and sellers with deficit and surplus smaller than 1 hectare were excluded 
from the protected areas and CRA trade. We assumed these landholders will not opt for 
neither of the compensation possibilities given the high transaction costs associated with 
them (May et al., 2015; Soares-Filho et al., 2016), just to offset a very small area.  
The matching algorithm was elaborated in RStudio 1.0.143 (R Core Team, 2017) 
and the best match function used the package foreach ({Microsoft} and Steve Weston, 
2017). 
A3.6 Efficiency frontiers 
Efficiency frontiers were calculated in several steps, for each policy scenario. 
First, we used the sum of avoided deforestation and regrowth resulted from each 
administrative boundary to calculate their respective percentages based on the total 
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deficit. Second, we calculated the frontiers’ slope 𝐵 by taking the difference between the 
highest percentage (𝑥2) and the lowest (𝑥1) of regrowth, and divided by the difference 
between the highest (𝑦2) and the lowest (𝑦1) percentage of avoided deforestation:    
𝐵 =  
𝑥2 − 𝑥1
𝑦2 −  𝑦1
 
 
Third, we used 𝐵 to find 𝐴, which is the intercept of 𝑦 when 𝑥 corresponds to zero:  
𝑦 =  𝐴 − 𝐵𝑥  
where, 𝑦 the percentage of avoided deforestation at a given administrative boundary, 𝐵 
the slope, and x the respective percentage of regrowth at the same administrative 
boundary. After this step, we have the highest (or the most efficient) value of 𝑦 when 𝑥 =
0. 
Finally, to plot the other x,y point of the efficiency line, the same step above was 
iterated, but to calculate the 𝑦 value that corresponded to the highest percentage of 
regrowth. In the end, we had the efficiency lines with two x,y points, for each 
administrative boundary. 
 
A3.7 Sensitivity analysis  
To know whether changes in the assumptions established here would substantially 
change the patterns found in our results, we submitted our simulations to a sensitivity 
analysis. Firstly, I tested if changing the buyers’ criteria of offsetting in private land inside 
protected areas that were up to 1.2 the size of their deficit would influence the amount of 
offset and, consequently, on CRA market. I ran the matching algorithm for compensation 
in both federal and state protected areas (policy scenario 1) at biome level. Besides the 
1.2 limit, we tested five other limits (Table A3.2).  
The only limit that showed a substantial change in the total offset available for 
CRA was one. This means that buyers were looking for sellers inside protected areas that 
matched exactly their deficit. Other tested limits did not show a substantial impact on the 
amount of offset from total deficit. From 1.1 to 2.5 there was only 4% difference, on 
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average, in total offset across each administrative boundary. For that reason, I decided to 
maintain our limit of 1.2 in simulations inside protected areas.   
Table A3.2 Extent of offset and regrowth in private lands inside protected areas under different tolerance 
limits equal or above deficit size. For example, limit of 1 means area is equal to deficit; limit of 2 means 
the area is twice as large as the deficit. The percentage column indicates the percentages of offset inside 
protected areas from forest deficit.  
Administrative  
boundary 
Limit 
Offset from 
total deficit 
(ha) 
% from forest 
deficit 
Regrowth (ha) 
Biome 
1 182621.5 3.6 21798.75 
1.1 1293285 26.1 97246.5 
1.2 1361218 27.5 100790.5 
1.5 1462255 29.5 121265.5 
2 1485974 30 121332 
2.5 1497175 30.2 121445.5 
State 
1 0 0 0 
1.1 971628.9 19.6 88051.75 
1.2 1018956 20.6 97427.5 
1.5 1139265 23 107282.8 
2 1168476 23.6 107992.8 
2.5 1181521 23.8 112055.5 
Meso 
1 0 0 0 
1.1 613907.2 12.4 60535.25 
1.2 683844 13.8 69148.5 
1.5 744025 15 79429.25 
2 776258.6 15.6 81044.25 
2.5 797744.4 16.1 87708.75 
Micro 
1 0 0 0 
1.1 392533 7.9 44031.75 
1.2 477018.7 9.6 60189.25 
1.5 532734.1 10.7 68165 
2 583361.9 11.7 70536.75 
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2.5 600399 12.1 75856 
Muni 
1 0 0 0 
1.1 205632.3 4.1 27513.25 
1.2 248841.6 5 32701.25 
1.5 312027.9 6.3 38770.75 
2 350980.8 7.1 41576.25 
2.5 366486.3 7.4 49332.25 
 
I also tested if increasing the number of contracts for sellers would have an impact 
on regrowth or avoided deforestation. I simulated trade across the five administrative 
boundary allowing sellers to have up to 10 contracts and maintained the limit of 3 
contracts for the sellers. I tested this limit under policy scenario 3 because there were no 
interference of regrowth inside protected areas resulting in a precise idea of the extent of 
regrowth when increasing the contract numbers.  
Increasing the number of contracts did not change the pattern observed when the 
limit in the number of contracts for sellers was three (Figure A3.3). Avoided deforestation 
still decreased as administrative boundary became smaller and the opposite happened 
with regrowth. However, there were some very minor changes in the extent of regrowth 
and avoided deforestation at biome, state and municipality levels (Table A3.3). Regrowth 
at biome level increased in 6 hectares, at state level decreased in 85,531 hectares and at 
municipality level 6,650. Avoided deforestation decreased only at state level, in 38,134 
hectares 
Because this 10-contract increase did not substantially change the patterns 
observed, I did not test other scenarios. Nevertheless, it is known that as the market 
systems takes place, intermediaries may influence the extent of regrowth and avoided 
deforestation. Some surpluses are considerably large and can offset the demand of several 
large buyers. As suggested by previous studies, the over-surplus might have negative 
impacts on avoided deforestation (May et al., 2015; Soares-Filho et al., 2016). 
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Table A3.3 Changes in regrowth and avoided deforestation across all administrative boundaries, after 
increasing to 10 the number of contracts for sellers and maintaining 3 for buyers. We considered only Policy 
Scenario 3 for this comparison. To better understand changes, we also give regrowth and avoided 
deforestation areas obtained from the 3 contracts limits for both buyers and sellers. 
Administrative 
boundaries 
Regrowth (ha) Avoided deforestation (ha) 
3 
contracts 
10 
contracts 
Change 
3  
contracts 
10 
contracts 
Change 
Biome 433 439 +6 1,646,512 1,646,512 0 
State 215,898 130,367 -85,531 1,480,401 1,442,266 -38,134 
Meso-region 323,538 323,538 0 1,201,593 1,201,593 0 
Micro-region 685,852 685,592 0 1,068,577 1,068,577 0 
Municipality 1,315,092 1,308,442 -6,650 846,073 846,073 0 
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Figure A3.3 Patterns of avoided deforestation and regrowth after increasing sellers’ contracts to ten and keeping buyers’ at 
three, at the five different administrative boundaries. Only policy scenario 3 was used to test increase in contract number.  
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Appendix 4: Supplementary Information 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Figure A4.1 Distribution of maximum biomass values within buyers (A) and sellers’ (B) properties.  
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Figure A4.2. Distribution the predominant species composition value within buyers (A) and sellers’ (B) 
properties. Panel A shows the distribution prior to the moving window procedure.  
Figure A4.3. Distribution of species composition values of buyers after the moving window procedure. 
